SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

CR 72787

VS.

Supreme Court

KEVIN COOPER,

)

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY
HONORABLE RICHARD C. GARNER, JUDGE PRESIDING
REPORTERS' TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Respondent:

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For Defendant-Appellant:

IN PROPRIA PERSONA

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VOLUME volumes.
Pages 5636 to 5782, incl.

JILL D. MC KIMMEY, C.S.R., C-2314

BRIAN V. RATEKIN, C.S.R., C-3715

Official Reporters

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO	
3		
4	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,	
5	Plaintiff,	
6	vs.	NO. OCR-9319
7	EEVIN COOPER,	VOLUME 54
8	Defendant.	Pgs. 5636 thru 5782
9		
10	REPORTERS' DAILY TRANSCRIPT	
11	BEFORE HONORABLE RICHARD C. GARNER, JUDGE	
12	DEPARTMENT 3 - ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA	
13	Thursday, July 26, 1984	
14	EPPEARANCES:	
15	For the People:	DENNIS KOTTMEIER District Attorney
16		DENNIS KOTTMEIER
17		District Attorney By: JOHN P. KOCHIS
18		Deputy District Attorney
19	For the Defendant:	DAVID McKENNA Public Defender
20		By: DAVID NEGUS Deputy Public Defender
21	,	
22		
23	Reported by:	JILL D. McKIMMEY Official Reporter
24		C.S.R. No. 2314 and
25		BRIAN RATEKIN Official Reporter
26		C.S.R. No. 3715

ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA; THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1984; 10:17 A.M.

DEPARTMENT NO. 3 HON. RICHARD C. GARNER, JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

The Defendant with his Counsel, DAVID

NEGUS, Deputy Public Defender of San

Bernardino County; DENNIS KOTTMEIER,

District Attorney of San Bernardino

County, JOHN P. KOCHIS, Deputy

District Attorney of San Bernardino

County, representing the People of the

State of California.

(Jill D. McKimmey, C.S.R., Official Reporter, C-2314, Brian Ratekin, C.S.R., Official Reporter, C-3715)

THE COURT: All right. Coursel, back in court, defendant and all counsel are present.

I believe you were ready to go to item six on Mr. Negus' tentative list of motions, which is motion regarding admitting evidence of other bad acts, Pennsylvania rape and escape charges. In that regard, the District Attorney filed -- Kottmeier filed points and authorities in support of admitting evidence of other crimes as a similar. I have looked it over. I have read some of the cases that were cited, as well as the annotated code.

Mr. Kottmeier, do you wish to be heard?

MR. KOTTMEIER: Your Honor, as the Court I am sure

is aware from its reading of the cases, there virtually are no cases that allow the use of a prior with distinctive similarities that have a combination of all distinctive characteristics. Usually it comes down to one particular item that is very distinctive or unusual when compared with other crimes of a like nature. I would submit that in this particular case, the combination of items one and two, that is, the escaping from custody and then the going and breaking into a house a short distance from the escape, as well as the confrontation of people outside, as opposed to running away, are the distinctive characteristics between the Pennsylvania case and the present charged issues before the Court.

The other item --

THE COURT: There's confrontation here. What's similar about that?

MR. KOTTMFIER: In this particular case, obviously, the prosecution's position is that the defendant confronted the victims, as opposed to sneaking around, removing whatever it was that he was interested in, if he was interested in removing anything. At the Ryen house there was a confrontation, assuming that the People's case is proven.

THE COURT: Well, in the Pennsylvania case, you have something of a crime of opportunity, do you not, to where the girl knocks on the door, the defendant's there

and then pulls her inside, allegedly.

MR. KOTTMEIER: Except for the fact that -
THE COURT: So that kind of a confrontation. Here, dissimilarly, you have what apparently appears to be a premeditated stealing into a house in the middle of the night.

MR. KOTTMEIER: Except for the difference -THE COURT: The defendant's seeking them out. Excuse
me.

MR. KOTTMEIER: Except for the difference, Your Honor, that when Miss Strahl knocked on the door, the defendant was not visible. It was after the second time that she knocked that the defendant responded to the door and went through the physical exercise of pulling her in and hitting her at the same time and grabbing her by the hair, which is, I submit, distinctive in regard to the fact that most defendants in a similar situation, as escapees from an institution, would have run or hidden, as opposed to coming to the front door and responding.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KOTTMEIER: And I would submit it on the written points and authorities from the cases we have cited, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Negus?

MR. NEGUS: Yesterday you gave an indicated ruling that you are not going to change. If you are not going to

change that, I won't belabor it at length. I won't. If you want me to respond, I will.

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THE COURT: As I studied this yesterday afternoon and made my own notes, and I haven't re-read it this The Jamison, you have a single girl in a confrontation, not brought on by the defendant, where here you have a married family where the defendant has allegedly -- he allegedly seeks them out. There's a different situation. You have a different method of entry. You have what appears to be a sex motive in Pennsylvania. I can't tell what the motive is in the Ryen case. You have one victim versus five victims. You have minimal violence with reference to Jamison, and maximum violence in the Ryen case, threat versus no threat, and I look at the things that you might show by bringing in the Pennsylvania matters. The intent is not all that clear in Ryen, and I'm not at all sure that the Pennsylvania case would help to show intent. For common plan, scheme or design, I simply can't find the signature, the distinctive method that's similar enough to where I can say this is the same MO at all or the unique methodology as the cases speak about to show identification of the perpetrator, peculiar behavior pattern.

I really, Mr. Kottmeier, with all respect, do not feel that the Pennsylvania matter would tend logically, naturally and by reasonable inference to prove an issue

in this case, and the prejudice -- I'm weighing the prejudice also, and I think the prejudice of it outweighs the probative value of it. I don't think so.

MR. KOTTMEIER: Your Honor, I would request the opportunity out of the presence of the jury to reopen this particular issue if the defendant were to testify. indicated in the case of Brown that's cited toward the end, as well as Salazar and, I believe, Matsor, the issues may change dramatically, depending on what is said if the defendant testifies in this case, and I would at least reserve, with the Court's indulgence, the opportunity to be heard, should the defendant testify, as to the relevance of the issues, as well as the Pennsylvania evidence at that time.

MR. NEGUS: I think that's really hard. I will --I think there is -- there's a certain justice to the prosecutor's position and a certain injustice, and I'm willing to try and distinguish between what I think is the justice and injustice. Everything that has gone so far in this particular case would indicate that the issue involved in the case is going to be solely identity Mr. Cooper the person that did the crime? And the cases -the Jamison case doesn't apply to the issue of identity. The cases that apply to the issue of identity, People vs. Thornton, which Mr. Kottmeier cited, and I think he also cited People vs. Haston, and there's an exhaustive

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discussion of the whole other bad acts thing in People vs. Tassell, which is recent, 36 Cal.3d, 77.

THE COURT: Counsel, I read all the cases except Easley I never did.

MR. NEGUS: Easley doesn't have anything to do with this issue.

THE COURT: I never did find that case.

MR. NEGUS: But if the Court's ruling I think is -is -- is -- is predicated on the issue of identity primarily, if there should become a question of state of mind, that is, if there was a question if there was like a diminished capacity defense, the issues might change, but I would submit that no matter what the defendant says, as long as the issue remains identity, then the prosecutor should not have a right to -- to relitigate the motion.

If the defense changes, if there's some other defense proffered, then I think that the -- that it shouldn't the reason for that is I have to have some sort of idea of what's coming in.

THE COURT: Does that sound reasonable to you, Mr. Kottmeier?

MR. KOTTMEIER No, because I disagree that identity is the sole issue as far as when the defendant testifies. If the defendant portrays himself as just a casual walkaway with no concerns other than returning to the California State Prison, that is one state of facts or mind that, in

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effect, is placed in issue, particularly in light of the background of this particular series of circumstances out of Pennsylvania,

(No omissions.)

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MR. NEGUS: If Mr. -- if Mr. -- I would agree, if
  Mr. -- if Mr. Cooper tries to proffer some sort of defense
  to the escape which indicates that he didn't want to get away,
  I would certainly think that that would be a -- that would
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  be another type thing which could come up. But if the sole
  testimony is he didn't do the crime, then I don't see that
  how the things would change. And I should have the assurance
  that we're not going to -- that in picking a jury I don't have
  to voir dire on it and that sort of thing, because it's
  obvious that the kind of thing, if -- if -- if it's going to -
  you know, I see that the Prosecutors have the right -- not to
  sandbag me, but if my representation is the only thing we're
  going to argue_is he didn't do it, then I think that -- that
  the Court's ruling is eminently correct under the cases.
           THE COURT: Well, we had two things, at least, don't
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(a), "I didn't do it," is going to be the position, and, (b), it wasn't all a mistake or a casual walk away or something like that.

I don't think I'm going to offer a MR. NEGUS: defense to the escape charge.

THE COURT:

I mean, if I start trying to do that, MR. NEGUS: then that's something else again.

> You know, like in Walz --THE COURT:

There's a degree of --MR. KOTTMEIER:

THE COURT: -- Walz, you can see the tremendous amount

of work involved in preparing for perhaps a slim contingency. 2 MR. KOTTMEIER: Your Honor, this issue has been 3 prepared. Mr. Forbush has been back to Pennsylvania. is not an area that the Defense is offering or trying to in 5 effect have set aside so they don't have to prepare. It's 6 obvious, because if we should reach a penalty phase, this 7 particular incident is going to be highly relevant under the 8 state of the law at this time. THE COURT: All right. We're just talking about 9 10 quilt phase. 11 MR. NEGUS: All I'm talking about is the guilt phase. 12 I don't -- I mean, penalty phase is totally different issues. 13 And none of these motions are going to the penalty phase. 14 MR. KOTTMEIER: And all I'm asking is that I be 15 allowed to have a say after the defendant testifies. THE COURT: Well, I think I'm inclined to give you 16 that in spite of the fact that I know that Mr. Negus is going 17 to be taking that into consideration, that there's a possibility 18 at least that it may get into the Pennsylvania matter in the 19 guilt phase. I think it's slim, Mr. Negus, and I'm inclined 20 to agree with your analysis mostly at this point. But I just 21 can't predict what might happen all the way in trial, so --22 MR. NEGUS: All I'm asking is if none of these -- if 23 no -- if no issue other than identity is in -- is interjected 24 into the thing which the Pennsylvania rape might have a 25

tendency and reason to prove, let it stand, because I --

because I think that at least -- I can represent that that's what I think the issue's going to be.

I mean, if I were to be sneaky and change it, then that would be one thing. But in terms of picking a jury and voir diring, if -- you know, I -- I think I need to know in advance, as long as I live up to my representations, that I'm not going to have it re-litigated on me.

THE COURT: Well, you know, as I looked through the various things the similars show and thought about them yesterday, though there's been no offer of proof, I don't believe you pinned yourself down as to the issues that you would prove. Identity basically is -- is the only one. I don't think we -- it shows motive. Intent to kill is not an issue. Identity of the perpetrator is about the only thing.

Common plan, scheme and design is simply not evident, I submit, from the -- from the similar features.

MR. KOTTMEIER: The motive, Your Honor, is relative to the fact that the defendant had been identified out of Pennsylvania in regard to this particular rape through finger-prints. Also, it illustrates a degree of desperateness upon his part, knowing that he is facing all these other charges out of Pennsylvania, should he be apprehended, once he escapes from CIM. And all of these issues relate circumstantially to identity. Identity is not as --

THE COURT: You don't have somebody cornered who strikes back and commits murder unnecessarily, so to speak.

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either."

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THE COURT: -- he didn't do it to protect himself from discovery by Pennsylvania or California authorities. That this was -- whoever committed these murders apparently sought the victims out in the still of the night, and there was some other motive for going into that house at the time.

What the evidence has shown so far is he didn't --

MR. KOTTMEIER: I'll --

MR. KOTTMEIER: I disagree about being cornered. The defendant makes phone calls to the two people that he thinks will help him, who both turn him down and say, "We are not going to help you."

THE COURT: They were not going to send any money. "We're not going to come and get you, MR. KOTTMEIER:

MR. NEGUS: The defendant didn't do anything to try and hide his identity in the Lease house, either.

THE COURT: But I don't see how that particularly helps you.

> He is frustrated. MR. KOTTMEIER:

THE COURT: You talk -- when you mention it, it shows the degree of desperateness the defendant is in. I just don't -- if the defendant is the one that committed these crimes, I just don't see this as being a desperate act at all. You know, it's not -- it's not something that was forced upon the attacker in this case. The attacker sought them out deliberately, apparently. Possible that he could have

gone to the house thinking that it was empty, but not likely, since apparently the hatchet was removed and taken as well as other weapons.

So I will reserve your right to call, Mr. Negus.

But the chances of it happening are pretty slim. Depends

upon what happens. Some way we will certainly have a hearing

out of the presence of the jury before any reference would

come in. And that's the best I can do at this time. Otherwise, your motion is denied.

MR. NEGUS: You mean their motion to have it introduced is denied.

THE COURT: That's true. What did I say, your motion?
They moved. Was their motion -- well, maybe it wasn't.

MR. NEGUS: I'm not sure. But I -- it's clarified.

THE COURT: Your motion is basically granted with a hooker.

MR. KOTTMEIER: Your Honor, there's an -- there's a side issue that comes in, at least in reference to this.

And that is that, at least as far as the conversation with Diane Williams from Pittsburgh at the time of the defendant's presence at the Lease house, there is conversation about the Pittsburgh authorities looking for the defendant. And I would submit that at least in general terms that that was discussed, without going into detail, because there was no detail in the conversation, that that --

THE COURT: What was said in the conversation?

MR. KOTTMEIER: Something to the effect of the defendant knew that Pittsburgh was out looking for him and that there was conversation about the Pittsburgh authorities trying to find the defendant, and --

THE COURT: What relevancy does that have to this case? The issue of bringing in the conversation is to place him at the location, I would think.

MR. KOTTMEIER: Yes. But to in effect say that we have to excise or try and limit what was said in the conversation puts a burden --

THE COURT: We do it all the time, Mr. Kottmeier.
We edit confessions, admissions, instruct witnesses before
trial to leave a certain matter out. We do it all the time.
We can live with that.

I think that that's obviously a reference to other crimes, obviously a reference to what we have talked about, and that it would have to be excised in some way from that conversation when you put Diane Williams on the stand.

MR. KOTTMEIER: I would offer that, as far as Diane Williams is concerned, that I doubt that I will have sufficient control over her or Mr. Negus or potentially even the Court that she will not in some way, depending on how the question is framed, relate her fears of the defendant, and that her fears are based on the fact that he also seems to be getting out of custody and coming after her.

THE COURT: Do you have any objection to that portion

of the conversation? 2 MR. NEGUS: Yes, Your Honor. And I -- basically 3 we're going to get to Diane Williams later. I agree with the Court that the only -- the only issue that I can see that 5 Diane Williams' testimony is relevant on is -- has to do with 6 Mr. -- with -- with Mr. Cooper having made a phone call to her. 7 And that's not going to be disputed. I mean, I don't -- I 8 don't intend to dispute that Mr. Cooper made phone calls to 9 Diane Williams on June the 3rd, I believe it was, June the 4th 10 and June the 6th from -- two from the Lease house and one 11 from Tijuana, so --12 THE COURT: You're going to dispute what you're sure 13 they're going to prove, apparently? 14 MR. NEGUS: Well, I ---15 THE COURT: In any event --16 MR. NEGUS: -- am only disputing what's not true. 17 THE COURT: In any event --I have a separate motion on Diane 18 MR. NEGUS: Williams later on, if you want to reserve this part of it 19 20 until we get to that. THE COURT: What's the nature of your motion? 21 I don't believe that Diane Williams will 22 MR. NEGUS: be possible to testify truthfully, and they know it, as they 23 just indicated from their -- from their -- some indication 24

of that in their statement. I don't believe she has personal

knowledge about anything other than the phone calls. And I

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don't even think she remembers the phone calls very well.

I also have -- there's also some 352 issues with
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respect to that, because Diane Williams' alleged fears are -are contradicted by several other items of evidence where

she acted in contrast. Getting in and proving that and bringing all the people from Pennsylvania back that can disprove that, will, I think, raise a giant collateral issue which is of very little probative value in --

of stipulation that if she were called she would testify that she received the phone call from the defendant on such and such a date at approximately this time?

MR. NEGUS: Well, I don't think she would testify, but I'm willing to testify that she did -- I'm willing to do it differently, that she did in fact receive the phone calls on such and such a date and such and such a time.

THE COURT: From the defendant?

MR. NEGUS: Yeah.

MR. KOTTMEIER: I would have to see how that's drafted, Your Honor. There's a lot more --

THE COURT: Work on it.

MR. KOTTMEIER: -- to it than just receiving phone

23 calls.

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THE COURT: Well, work on it. If she's a flakey witness in some way -- I got into her testimony at the, I guess, the Preliminary Hearing at one stage in this, at some

stage. And, as I recall just offhand, it seemed like there was a question about the times or the dates of the phone calls, she got mixed up on that.

MR. NEGUS: She doesn't know. She doesn't remember anything. And there's all kinds of things about her credibility which could -- she's also impossible to control, as Mr. Kottmeier says. And as such, she's just the kind of witness that would love to cause a mistrial for no good reason. And I -- I think that -- that the only thing that she can prove is the phone calls. And I don't disagree with phone calls were made.

THE COURT: Right now I will tell you that if she testifies she must not be permitted to bring out statements from the defendant indicating that the authorities in Pennsylvania are after him. I think I have been fairly effective in the past of admonishing witnesses before they step before a jury in no uncertain terms, "Do not mention this," and I can be attentive as well to the questions that are asked and interrupt before it gets out of her mouth, maybe. We can all be guarded against it.

We will have -- if she testifies, let's make certain that we have a hearing out of the presence of the jury first. If you want to avoid the can of worms that it may open that Counsel suggests, Mr. Negus, it might be to your benefit as well. Each of you work on some sort of a stipulation, what specifically you want from her, Mr. Kottmeier, under the

1 circumstances, and show it to Mr. Negus, and maybe you can 2 arrive at a stipulation. Okay? MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, if I may interject, there's another witness that presents the same issue, and that's Yolanda Jackson. THE COURT: Another girlfriend, allegedly. 7 MR. KOCHIS: And her situation is a little different 8 in that she has approximately an hour and 30 minute phone call with Mr. Cooper. One hundred and ten minutes, sixty minutes in an hour, so it would be --10 THE COURT: One hundred and ten minutes. 11 12 MR. NEGUS: Almost two hours. 13 MR. KOCHIS: That places him getting off the phone 14 at about the same time the Ryen and Hughes boys are leaving 15 the barbecue and heading home to their home. 16 MR. NEGUS: _No, that's not true. 17 MR. KOCHIS: I believe the phone call is somewhere 18 around 8:30 in the evening. MR. NEGUS: The phone calls made Thursday night 19 20 are -- Diane Williams' phone call is the one that's -- that ends at 8:39. 21 22 MR. KOCHIS: I have to check. In any event, in the Yolanda Jackson phone call, there's a number of references to the defendant's proposed future actions, what he's going to do, why he's going to do it, why he has to leave the area.

And those touch on Pittsburgh as well.

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THE COURT: Well, I would think that anything that can be considered an admission to show the California authorities are after him for any reason would probably well be admissible, but I see no reason why we shouldn't continue to make the effort to excise out references to Pennsylvania. There -- in addition to the matters that I mentioned before with reference to the out-of-state similars, we have an obvious 352 question here, the time, the expense, the possible confusion to the jurors, the misleading of jurors with reference to bringing in another -other acts and charges in Pennsylvania, so it's a balancing aspect of prejudice and probative value, and right now you simply haven't shown me that Pennsylvania has that much bearing upon California; so we're going to have to try and make the excise. Okay? Anything further on that -those points?

MR. NEGUS: No. I don't like to be contradictory, and I'm not trying to change your mind about your ruling on the Beagle motion yesterday, but --

THE COURT: Sure you are.

MR. NEGUS: No, I'm not. I swear -- I actually am not, I'm not trying to change your mind, because I really don't believe in that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NEGUS: But what occurred to me is that by forgetting to say something, I might have cut myself off

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from arguments in the future. People vs. Geiger, whatever it is, I had it here somewhere, it's a recent case.

It's --

THE COURT: On the other hand, it's not fair to the trial judge -- I don't care how the Appellate Court looks at it -- to mention other authority after a decision has been made and you're no longer trying to change a judge's point of view.

MR. NEGUS: Hear me out and let me just -- hear what I want to say.

now --

MR. NEGUS: No, I'm not.

THE COURT: -- with something I didn't consider, and I don't like that much.

MR. NEGUS: Well, it's not your fault that you didn't consider it. It's my fault that I forgot to bring it up. People vs. Geiger says that you can get lessers that are not charged. Okay. That's a new -- new case.

35 Cal.3d --

THE COURT: Yes. I'm aware of it.

MR. NEGUS: I am at least contemplating the possibility of requesting lessers on burglary of the Lease house during the trial.

THE COURT: They haven't charged burglary at the Lease house.

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MR. NEGUS: They have not charged it, but that is something which I believe that I might be entitled to under Geiger, and I don't want to make up my mind on that before the end of the case.

THE COURT: What does that have to do with Beagle? MR. NEGUS: I made a Rist argument yesterday, and I neglected to put in the Rist argument that there might be -there might in -- be a lesser. I am not trying to change your mind on the -- on the -- on that decision. don't want to be in a position where I'm ambushing you on the -- on the -- on the Geiger issue.

THE COURT: No. I think that's fine to bring that up at some point. I'm wondering. It's a lesser of what?

MR, NEGUS: It's incidentally related. It doesn't have to be a lesser included offense anymore. lesser offense is closely related to that charge factually, then it doesn't matter about the -- the People vs. Martin and all those other elements anymore. It's a different situation, so --

> THE COURT: I will have to read that case.

MR. NEGUS: All I wanted to do was not to make you think that I'd ambushed you by leaving that out of my Rist argument, and so I don't want to preclude myself from arguing I should get the lesser burglary because of my sloppiness in the Rist argument.

THE COURT: Motion regarding reference to lack of

prosecution discovery of defense evidence and to actions of defense lawyers and investigators. Mr. Negus, do you want to amplify on that?

MR. NEGUS: I thought Mr. Kochis --

MR. KOCHIS: Well, we did amplify on it, Judge, you leaving it, which surprised me somewhat, is you said, well, you're just going to have to move for discovery of those reports, and that's how we're going to handle it, and I have cited to the Court I believe the -- some cases Tuesday. The Olson case is final as of today. I did not check this morning to see if a hearing was granted. I don't know if Mr. Negus did.

MR. NEGUS: We haven't got -- when the time I left the office, we had not got the latest advance sheets.

MR. KOCHIS: I have a copy of that case. It's similar to the ruling and reasoning of the Polos case.

THE COURT: I'm not sure that I have a copy of it yet.

MR. KOCHIS: Well, you don't, because I don't think it would be proper for a lawyer to hand the Court a copy of a case which isn't final. There are rules against doing that, against citing cases that aren't final, and if I handed you a copy, I'd be citing it.

THE COURT: I did read the Reed case, the Meredith case, the Polos case somewhat on the same point.

MR. NEGUS: Basically, all those cases I don't think

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are on the point that I was making. The point that I was making was that we shouldn't have testimony in front of the jury about defense discovery procedures, whether the defense gives discovery or not. The issue of whether the prosecutor gets discovery is totally different than whether or not it all gets -- it all gets put out in front of the jury, and the theory behind that is that --

THE COURT: Well, I don't really have any quarrel with your position, Mr. Negus.

> MR. NEGUS: Then we don't have an issue. Okay.

MR. KOCHIS: No. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. I agree with the separation of the issue, and the issue I wanted to address is the one Mr. Negus specifically refers to in number eight. It seems to me unusual that in a fact-finding process, he is able through questioning, through argument and through insinuation to suggest that perhaps the plaintiff is hiding, manufacturing evidence, and yet in a situation where a witness gets on the stand, has been interviewed by his investigator six, seven, eight months ago, can't honestly recall what they said, to do that, we'd need to refer to the transcript. Why is that being hidden from the witness if what we're searching for is the truth?

THE COURT: Are you going to maintain the position that you're not going to let the witnesses refresh their recollection with tapes before they're called to the stand

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and testify or transcripts?

MR. NEGUS: I suspect that that's going to depend on different witnesses. I mean I -- I don't believe that I'm required to turn over anything.

THE COURT: Now, he's going to be a cross-examiner,

MR. NEGUS: Maybe yes, maybe no. There's a lot of witnesses that I suspect he's going to call that

Mr. Forbush has talked to.

THE COURT: Let's assume for a second that

Mr. Kochis and Mr. Kottmeier is cross-examining one of
your witnesses on matters that would be a ripe subject for
cross-examination.

MR. NEGUS: First of all, the phrase "my witness," there are very few people that Mr. Forbush has talked to who can be at all considered to be sympathetic or favorable to Mr. Cooper. Many of them, like Linda Headley and others, are in fact quite anti-Mr. Cooper. I'm stuck with the position where I have to go — the only — I can't find Mr. Cooper's friends, relatives and family in positions to observe that which I need to prove, so I have to go with adverse-witnesses, and they are very adverse, some of them.

THE COURT: Still, they are witnesses in some cases that he will not be calling, that you will be calling.

MR. NEGUS: Right, but --

THE COURT: And if you in one way can cast stones,

that?

I'm not --

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MR. NEGUS: I know, and that's obviously a very, as it were, human feeling; however, the law, I believe, is that Mr. Cooper's on trial. I'm not. Now, it may seem unfair in the scheme of things that I -- in a personal sense that I can suggest and introduce evidence that the prosecution team has misbehaved, but the law focuses in on the conduct of Mr. Cooper and not of the defense lawyer.

his argument is that should not they be able to counter

THE COURT: Let's cut through it, Mr. Negus.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. Do you want the cases?

THE COURT: What authority do I have to deny him the right to fully cross-examine like you might have?

MR. NEGUS: Well --

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, I might add I'm not interested in casting aspersions on Mr. Negus or Mr. Forbush. There's some witnesses that, although they may be sympathetic to Joshua Ryen, say things that certainly are as adverse to my case as an alibi witness. I want to cross-examine that witness, even if she's a fine, upstanding hospital citizen employee, the way I would an alibi witness, and I want to test her memory. I want to show how it's faulty. I want to find out why she hasn't reviewed a document, and I want the jury to understand that it's not my fault that she hasn't reviewed a document, and I want to challenge her

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 memory, and I want to discredit that person on the witness stand.

THE COURT: I don't blame you for that. Normally

I would protect your right to fully cross-examine as I

just indicated.

MR. NEGUS: Let me just make a distinction between the fact that she hasn't reviewed a document is one thing. Why she hasn't reviewed a document is another thing. The fact that she hasn't reviewed may be probative.

THE COURT: Well, let's think about it. It's hard for me to think of rulings in this type of case in the abstract when I don't know of a particular witness, I don't know what the particular response can be, so all I can do is think of hypotheticals for a second. She gets on the stand and she can remember the few salient questions or answers to questions that you may ask, but he, to go into the rest of the conversation and to fully cross-examine, runs up against the blank wall, and he says, did you make a statement to Mr. Forbush? Have you looked -- have you refreshed your memory? Have you tried to refresh your memory? What's wrong with that?

MR. NEGUS: Let's focus it on two things. First of all, let's take a witness that I just ask questions, the witness answers questions, I haven't shown the witness their -- their transcript, and I don't ask them any questions about the transcript. All right?

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THE COURT: But you're asking them questions contained on -- on matters contained within the transcript.

MR. NEGUS: But they haven't used it to refresh their recollection. I'm not referring to it in my questions. I just ask them about what they remember. Obviously, the transcript has nothing to do with their memory at trial.

THE COURT: You know, this can all be obviated. If you move under 1102.5, we may have to have -- we're going to wait till these cases are final, and when those decisions are finally made, I may have to have in-camera hearings on it.

MR. KOCHIS: There's no question, Your Honor, that I will be making that motion. In fact, I withdrew it at one point. Technically, it is my position we are in trial, jeopardy has attached; therefore, technically 1102.5 applies. Linda Headley has testified at trial.

(No omissions.)

THE COURT: Well, if I -- if I go --

MR. KOCHIS: -- at trial.

THE COURT: -- along with that and there's some dispute in the Appellate Courts, and the Supreme Court hasn't spoken on that, apparently, yes, but if -- if I give you the right to see reports that are made by Mr. Forbush --

MR. KOCHIS: That would obviate --

"Your Honor, may I have a recess for the witness and I to take a look at the report," in which case we don't really have a problem. And I don't know. So maybe we're getting the cart before the horse here until -- until we know which cases are final and which are not final.

MR. NEGUS: Well, it's clear, I think, under the cases, <u>Prudhomme</u>, <u>Polos</u>, all those cases, that they can't get anything until they have rested. That's a self-incrimination problem.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. NEGUS: And they haven't rested yet.

THE COURT: Part of their case in chief, they --

MR. NEGUS: Right.

THE COURT: It's only after the witness has

23 testified on direct.

MR. NEGUS: Right. That -- and so we're not anywhere near that place yet, because they haven't rested. And if they do, I'd like to make an 1118 Motion.

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MR. KOCHIS: The statute -- the statute doesn't say The statute simply says after the witness testifies on direct at trial. We're in trial.

THE COURT: Oh, Counsel --

MR. KOCHIS: But I agree with the Court, and I can wait until we have rested to make the motion. But to save time, I will make the motion when we rest as to people I anticipate Mr. Negus is going to call so I'm not in the position, in a long trial and at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, of asking the Court if we can be dark for the rest of the afternoon.

THE COURT: You're trying to get all this in advance, aren't you? I wasn't aware of that. While this may be trial, 402 type motion, so to speak, we're not in trial, as far as I understand the spirt of 1102.5. after that witness testifies before a jury, at that point on direct that I -- that you're entitled to. I haven't looked at it with that point in mind. Have I overlooked something?

MR. KOCHIS: Well, Your Honor, I think the purpose for which the statute was designed is so, when Defense witnes designed testify, I am allowed to look at reports of what they have said so I can determine if there's some selective reading. When they've testified in a motion, it's as important as anything that's going to take place during the trial.

I'm not at this point demanding that I get discovery under 1102.5. I'm going to make that motion when I rest as

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to every person that I anticipate Mr. Negus calling.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll take another look at it and be more prepared at that time. And I think that -- I think that we're far down the road before I have to rule on this extremely fine and minute point, Mr. Negus.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. Well -- well -- but let -- let me just -- let me just give you an example. Okay. Linda Headley got up on the stand and asked in court when she testified here, pursuant, I believe, to instructions of Sergeant Arthur -- I don't think anybody would deny that -to have a copy of her tape. Mr. Woods has instructed various other witnesses when they get to court at trial to demand to see a copy of their tape.

THE COURT: I don't know of anything illegal or immoral about doing that.

MR. NEGUS: That was a different issue. Okay? I'm not -- I'm not saying whether -- I'm just telling you that that has been done, okay? What -- I think that doing that in front of a jury is irrelevant, prejudicial and tends to turn the focus of the case from the defendant's guilt or innocence to the Defense lawyer's.

I certainly understand that, given my particular personality and the way that I -- that I process this case, that many, many people on the other side would like to have a chance to -- a chance to -- to point out things that I have done that they haven't liked. That's a very human response.

The problem is that the law, as I understand it, is to the contrary. You're not supposed to put the Defense lawyer on trial; you're supposed to put the defendant on trial. It may seem like a lack of symmetry, but that's the way it is. And that's the purpose for the motion.

The 1102.5 motions with respect to various witnesses that -- that have testified, I think, will be very much the issues as to -- that material which is used to impeach any witness will be very much obviated at trial, because I don't expect to have the same type of limitations on giving out reports to the Prosecution after they have rested and after the witness has testified on defense that we did here.

The reason that we brought it up the way it was here was that my understanding of what <u>Prudhomme</u> and the other cases say is that giving it to them before they have rested lightens their burden. And that's a no-no for a Defense lawyer.

They -- the -- the issue that I'm -- the other issue that I'm concerned about, for example, though, is witnesses who have good memories, who have talked to the Prosecution, have talked to the Defense and who I'm not going to impeach.

THE COURT: This is simply not that big of an issue.

Let's take the type of thing that you're trying to guard

against. When Headley or some other witness gets on the stand,

you're asking her a question in direct examination, she says,

"Before I answer that, Mr. Negus, may I please see or read



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the transcript or hear the tape that you made of your interview. I need it to refresh my memory, and I'd like to be more precise when I answer the question," and thus perhaps embarrass you or the defendant at trial. That's what you're worried about, isn't it?
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MR. NEGUS: Basically.

THE COURT: So on that, it's just a question of timing. If you're trying to make a point, I don't see any reason why I shouldn't instruct the witness ahead of time or you instruct him, Mr. Kochis, not to make such a request on direct examination. You can surely make it on cross, and you're probably going to do it. No way he can stop you from doing that on cross examination.

So what -- what he's trying to avoid in the midst of his part of it, you can ask, "You didn't know. When you testified on direct, you hadn't seen your -- your transcript. Your memory was not all that clear until you got it a few minutes ago," or something like that. So I think you can cover it on cross examination.

MR. KOCHIS: I'm sure I can.

THE COURT: I'm sure you can. So what are we fighting about?

MR. NEGUS: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. I don't find any reason why
I shouldn't make a blanket instruction that that type of
question shall not be asked by Defense witnesses on direct

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MR. NEGUS: Okay. The other -- the other -- the other issue is Prosecution witnesses. For example, Mr. Forbush, I believe, has talked to Larry Lease on numerous occasions. And the Prosecution is not entitled to discovery of Mr. Forbush's reports on Prosecution witnesses unless I elect to impeach them with it. That seems to be a clear case that it is irrelevant to --

THE COURT: That's something that we didn't heretofore mention.

MR. NEGUS: I know. That's why I'm -- so that's -- that was the other thing that -- that does concern me, is there's lots of Prosecution witnesses that Mr. Forbush has talked to. And if --

MR. KOCHIS: Well, Your Honor, that would come up another way. That's going to be a 771 issue. I imagine the witness is going to say yes or no, he's going to put Mr. Forbush on, Mr. Forbush is going to say, "On X date I talked to Mr. Lease, and he said A," on cross I'm going to ask him, "That was a year ago. What did you rely on?" And he's going to say something —

MR. NEGUS: I anticipate Mr. Lease is necessarily going to contradict anything that he -- I mean, I expect him to testify the way he has talked to Mr. Forbush and the way he has talked to the police. I mean, there's lots of these witnesses that Mr. Forbush has talked to that I don't expect

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THE COURT: You know, you know --

MR. NEGUS: And that's what I'm talking about.

THE COURT: You know when you're getting heard and when you're not getting heard or when you can help and when you can't help. By the time we get around to the jury in this case, let's don't -- let's don't fight just to fight.

I don't think there's any necessity for me ruling on that at this time.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I just wanted to bring it up so that it doesn't happen in front of the jury. And, you know, it's a lot easier, I think, to do it now than try and make motions for mistrial and get into that kind of nonsense. And I -- I --

THE COURT: You will take up matters in chambers.

I'd like advance notice, certainly appreciate that. We'd like to avoid disruptions in the trial as much as possible.

But I'm sure we'll have a number of chambers motions or out of the presence of the jury motions during the trial.

I think -- I think you're talking on the same wave length. He's talking, "Don't worry about it. As soon as they impeach him, I'm going to get it."

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, I'm not going to be advising people to demand from the witness stand on direct to see their transcripts. That's not the way I operate. I usually tell people --

MR. NEGUS: But --

MR. KOCHIS: -- "Answer the questions. If you can't remember, say, 'I can't remember.' If people start quoting things to you, if you remember that, say you do. If you don't, say you don't."

THE COURT: Okay. You aren't pressed for any ruling at this time?

MR. NEGUS: As long as that's what happens, that's fine. But Mr. Woods has told people otherwise. And I just — that's why I brought it up. I didn't expect Mr. Kochis to do it. Mr. Woods has already done the job, and Mr. Hughes.

See, the problem, there's a lot of witnesses --

MR. KOCHIS: I think we're really arguing at this point, really, about nothing. I think when the witnesses -- those witnesses testify, Mr. Negus can tell me before they get on the stand what he's concerned about, we can bring the witness into chambers and we can have further discussion on it and, if necessary, admonish the witness.

MR. NEGUS: That's fine.

MR. KOCHIS: I think we're taking time --

THE COURT: Sure, it is. I'd like to minimize those where we can. So I think, in the first instance, however, there can be some indicated positions from the Court. On these witnesses that you have dialogue with that the witness is going to be called, simply tell them not to make a demand for tapes or transcripts of their interviews in the first

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I am attempting

testify as to the basis for the motions.

to gather as quickly as I can the written --

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MR. NEGUS: Uh-huh. But I -- I think it could be obviated, because I -- if the Prosecution is willing to agree that you can consider published materials on it rather than having -- rather than -- rather than having to gather witnesses. I haven't had a chance to gather witnesses. I have incompletely gathered some published material which I'm trying to present to both Court and Counsel and see whether or not that published material can be the basis of -- of the motion rather than having to try and get expert witnesses to

was --

some of the contentions that are made. With respect, then, to -- if I could just -- starting on the separate jury thing, if I could articulate why it is

material. I do think that I need to have factual basis for

important to have the separate jury and indicate some of the things that I would -- would rely on in putting that forward,

in People -- or, Hovey vs. Superior Court, whatever cite that

(No omissions.)

THE COURT: I have it. I know it.

MR. NEGUS: -- pages 54 to 57 of that decision set out a series of public opinion polls in which the court found that more women oppose the death penalty than do men, and more Blacks oppose the death penalty than do whites. The general overall percentage of people that are opposed to the death penalty in the country is something -- something like -- sixty-some-odd people are in favor of the death penalty, and twenty-some-odd percent are opposed, and the rest are wobblers. If I recall the figures correctly in Hovey, of Blacks, only I think less than half the Blacks in the country are in favor of death qualifications.

I have as an exhibit that I'd like to mark, it's not a certified copy, because the original of a certified copy is in another case file, but I presume that counsel will not object, as to the vote on Proposition 7 in the 1978 election, which was the Briggs Initiative in which people not only -- you know, it wasn't a vote pro and con the death penalty. It was a vote should the death penalty statute which we had be made more punitive and encompass more crimes, so I have here the results for the various counties and the total results of the state as to that, which I'd like to have considered on that issue.

THE COURT: Any objection if it's received, Counsel?

MR. KOCHIS: Well, Your Honor, how would that be

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relevant if it's not a statement of votes on the position on the death penalty for murder but expanding it to other crimes which really is not the issue in this case? This case we have a specific crime for which the death penalty is applicable, and perhaps the vote of the various counties on --

THE COURT: It shows some position of favorability or disfavor, doesn't it, of the population?

MR. NEGUS: You couldn't vote in favor of that unless you were in favor of the death penalty, so the people who -- the people who voted against it would include some people who are in favor of the death penalty but thought the old law was good enough, and those people who are opposed to the death penalty, so, you know, the "yes" vote is a smaller universe than -- than the whole --

THE COURT: Where are we going? What's the bottom line? MR. NEGUS: The position -- the position of it is

the death qualification of jurors is going to -- is going to eliminate what -- what little chance we have of getting a Black on the jury, because the -- the attitudes of -because it doesn't cut -- cut down -- it doesn't cut evenly. When you death qualify, what you do is you bias the jury in favor of white males and against Blacks and against females, and so the effect of death qualification is to -is to --

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You're blazing a trail, Mr. Negus, aren't THE COURT: you?

MR. NEGUS: Oh, no, Your Honor. If I were blazing a trail, I'd have to have all these witnesses, but this material has been presented in many courts and is pending in the State Supreme Court, and I'm not blazing any trail. I'm copying the State Public Defender.

THE COURT: I have just simply never heard of a case, since '78, at least, where we do -- you have to death qualify a jury in some manner. You have to -- you have to Witherspoon them,

MR. NEGUS: Well --

THE COURT: Whether you do it in chambers or not, you have to Witherspoon them.

MR. NEGUS: I'm saying that if you do it, you have to balance off the effect of Witherspooning, which gives you a lily-white jury, as opposed to the advantage of death qualifying. One of the relevance of those particular statistics is that there's an overwhelming percentage of people in favor of the death penalty in state, anyway, and so it's really just -- it's just an exercise in getting the prosecution a better jury. It's not really necessary in order to preserve the prosecution's right to a fair trial.

THE COURT: Excuse me just a minute to where I understand. You mean that we should limit our questions

in some way to where we do not ask jurors if there are any circumstances where you could or could not vote for or against the death penalty?

MR. NEGUS; Well, there's two separate ways you can go about it, and those are motions one and two, Okay?

One way is that you have separate juries on -- on guilt versus penalty.

THE COURT: Motions one and two? What are you talking about?

MR. NEGUS: Well, a and b, okay, separate juries or the Witherspoon one.

THE COURT: This is 9a and 9b?

MR. NEGUS: Right. They are essentially in the alternative. Okay? A -- the easiest way, although it may not be the most -- the cheapest way is just to have a separate jury on the issue of guilt, which is not Wither-spooned, and an issue -- if you have to Witherspoon, then do it on penalty, In this particular case, the issue that is before us that's -- that, you know, the biggest issue is -- is the guilt issue, and what the prosecution gets by Witherspooning is a jury that is going to be more -- more inclined to be in their favor.

I have another study that I'm trying to get a hold of, and I just have -- I think I have a couple of press clippings about it. I hope --

THE COURT: Let me go back a moment to the prior

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document that you marked. It seems to be a copy of a certification from the Secretary of State, March Fong Eu, with the proposition submitted to voters, I will overrule your objection as far as relevancy is concerned, Mr. Kochis. Any further objection to it?

MR. KOCHIS: No.

THE COURT: All right. Then it will be received.

Now move to your next item.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. These items, I hope to have the complete study in a printed form available to you on --

THE COURT: Have you seen these items?

MR. KOCHIS: The one that's just been admitted, I have.

THE COURT: Let's take a 10-minute recess and show him what you've got.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. I was in the middle of showing him what I had when you walked in.

(Recess,)

THE COURT: All right, Counsel, we have had a recess now.

Have you finished showing Mr. Kochis --

MR. NEGUS: Yeah. I finished them. I don't know how you want to do this.

THE COURT: Is there anything that can come in without opposition?

MR, KOTTMEIER; No, Your Honor.

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MR. NEGUS: I don't think that it's -- they haven't had a chance to read any of this stuff because I just got it together last night,

THE COURT: All right,

MR. NEGUS: And some of it is not even the actual item itself, but it's just a preview of what it's going to be when I get a hold of it, okay, which should be Monday.

MR. KOTTMEIER: Your Honor, let me -- maybe I can help the Court and Mr. Negus as far as this particular issue is concerned. I cited to the Court the authorities that, in effect, have, I think, laid the issue of death-qualified, separated juries to rest, and I will not be interested or prepared to stipulate to any written type of documentation. If this issue has to be relitigated, if after an offer of proof, you find that this is an area that should be relitigated, then we're going to --

THE COURT: What do you mean relitigated?

MR. KOTTMEIER: Well, I submit that this issue has been settled, death qualification as well as --

THE COURT: You mean elsewhere?

MR. KOTTMEIER: Yes, by the California Supreme Court, so that if we are going to get into studies, recommendations and so on and so forth, then we will have to call our witnesses and the defense will have to call theirs. not going to sit by and let a lopsided record come in with no cross-examination and no presentation of experts from

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25 26 our side.

THE COURT: Well, he's not raising the issue that was raised in the <u>Thornton</u> case, for example, or the <u>Gilbert</u> case that you cited to me.

MR. KOTTMEIER: I'm only indicating for the Court that should you find, after an offer of proof, that this is a new issue or an issue that the Court is going to litigate, then we are going to have to do it on the record with the witnesses called and with the opportunity for the People to present our witnesses in opposition.

MR. NEGUS: What I want to do right now is I understand their position, and I mean it's not necessarily, in my mind, an unreasonable position, but the reason that I'm proceeding the way that I am is that I haven't had time to do otherwise. I would like to -- and I thought that it would -- I am more comfortable making offers of proof based upon printed materials by people who know more than I do than trying to articulate what my offer of proof would be. What I am trying to get together is the printed documents which would -- which constitute an offer of proof as to what I would expect to prove if we had a contested hearing. If after I get all these materials, which I hope, to have all marshalled and available on Monday, I'm just trying to give -- give you a record now so that you can have something to start in on the weekend, because there's quite a bit to it, and so that counsel has a chance to

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start looking at them too. If, based on the offer of proof, you feel that you would -- you would still rule against me, then we don't have to do it, but I want to at least -- I want -- I feel it's incumbent upon me to be able to make these offers of proof, because I think that Mr. Cooper is not going to get a fair trial if we have an all-white jury, and I think we are going to get an all-white jury, so I'd like to at least make the offers of proof as to the various social science research that's been done since Hovey.

(No omissions.)

(NO OMISSIONS.

THE COURT: Well, you can make the offer of proof.

And I would suggest that why don't you hold off on it -- I

don't really know; this is kind of an interesting idea to me

until we see what that offer of proof is and perhaps take a

look at the material. And I can even set your matter over

for you, give you a chance to respond a week or a reasonable

time thereafter before I made -- but if I -- if, in reviewing

that --

MR. KOTTMEIER: I only --

THE COURT: -- I decide that I'm going to rule against him, then we don't have to go any further.

MR. KOTTMEIER: And all I'm saying, that I am not stipulating that these are items of evidence but are just merely the offer of proof for the Court to rule on.

MR. NEGUS: I understand that. And that's basically what my understanding of what I was doing was, too.

THE COURT: Well, then, but you still, even with that kind of an understanding, that it's offer of proof as opposed to evidence, but I can consider and read it, you still don't have all the materials together.

MR. NEGUS: No. And I'll describe to you basically from what I understand.

THE COURT: No.

MR. NEGUS: Well, let me just --

to him, and then get some kind of a stipulation that I can

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consider whatever you then have, and then I can maybe do it over the weekend or something.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I'm not going to have most -- I'm not going to have -- can I give you what I have now?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NEGUS: Because I think that will -- maybe that
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MR. NEGUS: Because I think that will -- maybe that will give you something to do over the weekend. The rest of it I may not get until Monday.

THE COURT: Bless you, my child.

MR. NEGUS: Thank you.

Okay. Let me -- there is -- I have a copy of a -- did I give you Keeten vs. Garrison?

MR. KOTTMEIER: Yes.

MR. NEGUS: I have a copy of a case from the -- from the Federal Court in North Carolina which has summaries of a bunch of social science data. Some of that social science data is -- is summarized, and I just have the table of contents at the present time. I don't have the actual -- the actual article, but it's summarized and published in this publication, Law and Human Behavior.

I have, in addition, testimony of two sociologists that took place in the case of People vs. Bonillas. There's a little bit about the -- about a survey we did in San Bernardino County, but most of it -- most of it is -- is general information which has to do with this motion plus the motions that I'll be making next week about jury surveys.

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That's --
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THE COURT: About what?

MR. NEGUS: Jury surveys.

THE COURT: Jury service?

MR. NEGUS: About trying to find out what the racial composition of the people who actually show up at

San Diego --

THE COURT: Oh, survey.

MR. NEGUS: -- right -- at the San Diego County Courthouse.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. NEGUS: And then this --

THE COURT: Would the clerk punch holes in it and put it in a stapler.

MR. NEGUS: That was run out without clerical assistance in the middle of the night last night.

Then, finally, there -- the leading book on the subject of problems with jury selection procedures at the present time, which is referred to in the -- in the --

THE COURT: There's no way I can read all this material in a weekend.

MR. NEGUS: I know. That's why I'm -- I don't expect you to have it all mastered. But I'm just trying to give -- give it out, because that's why I feel I need to have for the -- to make an offer of proof. I was trying to get it out earlier in the week, but I just didn't get to it.

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Finally --
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              THE COURT: Do the same with this one?
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              MR. NEGUS: Finally, I have just some newspaper
     articles describing what a study I hope to give you on Monday
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     will be about.
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             THE COURT: There are apparently three articles
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    there.
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             MR. NEGUS:
                         Last but not least, I have drafted --
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             MR. KOTTMEIER: Excuse me. I think that's going to
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    be a different issue. That's the questionnaire.
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             MR. NEGUS: The questionnaire.
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             MR. KOTTMEIER:
                             Yes.
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             THE COURT:
                        Now --
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             MR. KOTTMEIER: Your Honor, as far as the materials
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    that have just been submitted, the fact that I said that we
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    could have an offer of proof does not mean that I think that
    these items should be read in their entirety by the Court and,
   further, that they should be incorporated as a part of the
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    record. I'm only suggesting that Mr. Negus has the opportunity
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   to refer to them by title or whatever and then glean from
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   them in some articulate fashion, as I'm sure he can, the
   specifics of what he's going to prove. I think it is entirely
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THE COURT: Well, I assure you I'll not read them

verbatim, every single word. But I'm trying to be somewhat

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improper to do --

May I do that?

MR. KOTTMEIER: I would submit that it is incumbent on Mr. Negus, as opposed to offering all the material in the abstract, to show what is different, if anything, over the cases that have decided this particular issue in the past that would require this Court to re-litigate in effect an issue that has been settled.

THE COURT: What he's trying to do, apparently, is -the general rule is we must have the same jury, they'll be
tried by the same jury except for good cause shown. He's
trying to do the latter, to show me good cause why I should
deviate from the general rule and -- and the statutory scheme
of things --

MR. KOTTMEIER: Except the --

THE COURT: -- and the legislative -- the clear legislative intent that there be a single jury penalty hearing.

MR. KOTTMEIER: Except that in Fields, the Court was very specific that this is not an area involved in good cause. This is a separate issue.

MR. NEGUS: The problem is that Fields was a three judge plurality, joined by Justice Kaus in a brief opinion.

Justice Kaus referred in fact to some of the materials that I'm giving you and indicated that, as far as he was concerned, it might still later be decided differently by a Federal Court and noted the pendency of litigation in the Federal Courts on this particular issue.

Fields hardly closes off the issue. Justice Kaus

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specifically leaves it open. And so that's the reason why I wish to make an offer of proof. I think you make an offer of proof --

THE COURT: When you -- when you make -- it didn't occur to me what the alternative here is. The second alternative, Number b -- 9b, perhaps.

MR. NEGUS: That we do away with the Witherspoon qualification.

THE COURT: Now, tell me this, then. How, if we did away with Witherspoon, how would we select the jury panel that involves a possible death penalty?

MR. NEGUS: Just like you select any other jury panel.

THE COURT: Well, some people are, "Hey, Judge, I'm against the death penalty."

MR. NEGUS: That's irrelevant, because the -- what I'm -- what the argument is is that if you don't have separate juries, okay, if you don't, it's either one -- either way. / If you don't have separate juries, you have to balance off the interests involved. You've got conflicting Constitutional interests. You've got the right to a fair -to a fair jury and you've got the Prosecution's right not to have -- not to have hangers on it.

I submit that the Prosecution's right not to have hangers is perhaps getting a less portion than the defendant's right to have a fair cross section.

THE COURT: You mean people on the fence?

MR. NEGUS: No. A hanger is somebody that -- that -- who would say, "Well, I'm against the death penalty, so I would never go for it," and so obviously they have -- that's what Witherspoon says, is they have a right to have a jury qualified, but -- qualified so that they don't get those people.

But you're getting into an -- you're getting into an area where you have competing -- you have competing

Constitutional problems. You've got the Prosecution's right to that, but, then, you have the defendant's right to representative cross section and a fair jury. You also have the defendant's right not to have people that are so ground down by the death qualification process that they're ready to just go out and hang somebody just after they get through the voir dire.

THE COURT: Having tried a number of them, I -- I know we get people both ways. Some people, "Hey, if he killed somebody and did it on purpose, I'm going to give him the death penalty."

MR. NEGUS: But Mr. -- but his research, as I understand the way it's been represented to me by Mr. Haney and others, is that the -- he has done research which is summarized in one of these articles, which I still haven't got from the state P.D. yet, to the effect that that process conditions people to vote for death, that it's just doing the

That's all been done, obviously, since <u>Hovey</u>. And so I -- my -- the argument I have is you've got -- you know, we're getting to an area where the evidence shows that there's a conflict. The evidence -- and the -- and the results, I think, are -- are clear in the -- in the Stanford study as to the effect of all this.

The penalty for killing a White person is death.

The penalty for killing a Black person is life. And if you look at the victims on -- on death row, there's 19 Black people, people that killed -- 19 of the victims of the people on death row were Black, one hundred and some-odd people were -- were White. There's ten times as many people on death row for killing a White person as there is for killing a Black person.

jury selection which we have. We underrepresent Blacks at every stage. And this is just one of the arguments on that.

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, that statement is absurd, because what the study shows is if you're White, your chances of being killed are much better than if you're Black. There's just a lot more White victims out there than there are Black victims.

The study doesn't show how many Black victims are killed in a death penalty situation which qualifies for the death penalty which goes to court and which a jury comes back with a life sentence. It doesn't show that.

THE COURT: You know, I'm concerned that even if there's an imbalance shown, and I've read the, at least, the late papers of the results of this White versus Black thing, even if there's an imbalance shown, the alternative to me is an absolute lack of being assured of getting a fair trial if we're never able to ask them --

MR. NEGUS: Well --

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THE COURT: -- "Can you possibly, under any circumstances, vote one way or the other?" And I don't see how you could ever get -- you know, we've got somebody on there that's unalterably opposed to being able to act fair and impartially depending upon the evidence.

MR. NEGUS: Then I guess the only alternative, then, is separate juries.

THE COURT: No. That wouldn't solve it.

MR. NEGUS: Yes, it would, because --

THE COURT: Well, you're going to have --

MR. NEGUS: I never heard --

THE COURT: -- you have, to do death, to qualify

them for the -- for the penalty phase.

MR. NEGUS: I never heard a single juror in all -- in all the transcripts of everything, and maybe Mr. Kochis has

heard otherwise, but I never heard a single juror say that
"My opposition to death penalty would be -- would make it
impossible for me to be fair on the issue of guilt."

MR. KOCHIS: I have heard several of those in the Gray case, where they have said, on a close case, "There's no question I may consider it knowing that if I vote guilty I'll get to that second phase."

THE COURT: Yes. That -- I recall that.

MR. KOTTMEIER: In fact, I have had it go much further than that, which I think is the crux of the issue, and that is that the juror has told the Judge, "Judge, I will not follow the law."

MR. NEGUS: On guilt?

MR. KOTTMEIER: On guilt.

MR. NEGUS: Well, maybe so. But my experience has been -- has been the contrary. I think that's a very, very small percentage of people that --

THE COURT: May I take a look at the material,

Counsel, for a preliminary indication --

MR. KOTTMEIER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- at some point next week, and it may be Monday.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. And then the -- well, the other counter to that is you don't have to tell people at the guilt phase that -- that their -- that their findings are going to result in a -- in a finding of death. And if they are, it's

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just like anything else, you don't consider penalty and punishment at the guilt phase. So --

THE COURT: All right. Let's assume for a second the material here, two inches' worth notwithstanding, that I will find against you on the issue, without being mired in concrete. Then let's move on to whatever else we can here for a second. I guess then we have to pass one and two of -- a and b, rather, of subsection 9, and go next to what's there.

(No omissions.)

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MR. NEGUS: I have for you -- I wrote out a little script to give to jurors and then a proposed questionnaire.

I would indicate that as to questions 21 and 22, which ask for their occupation, I am of mixed mind about that, and if anybody didn't like it, I would be glad to withdraw doing that in questionnaire form.

THE COURT: Give me just a minute, please.

MR. NEGUS: And I --

MR. KOCHIS: Perhaps we could break it for two minutes so the Judge can review the questionnaire. I have objections to it, both generally and specifically, and so perhaps the Court could review it.

THE COURT: No. It's not taking that long.

MR. KOCHIS: Then 30 seconds.

THE COURT: You want a recess?

MR. KOCHIS: No.

MR. NEGUS: He wanted to shut me up.

THE COURT: All right. I have looked it over. To whom would you propose giving this, Mr. Negus?

MR. NEGUS: Everybody that shows up as a potential juror in the community, en masse.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. KOCHIS: I have some objections. I don't know when you want to hear me.

THE COURT: Let's talk first about what we're working with. You're talking now if we did it at all

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similarly to the way we did Gray, you're going to have, say, 60 people in at a time to excuse those for time, and we wouldn't have them -- well --
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MR. NEGUS: Yes, we would.

THE COURT: Yes, we would.

MR. NEGUS: So you take the first 20 minutes of that excuse business to have them do the questionnaire.

THE COURT: Okay. I would probably modify it a little bit more to have them fill it out even if they know that they can't serve on the case, so to each of those 60 people, the first thing would be to do --

MR. NEGUS: Read them the Information.

in and start going through the questions on time.

MR. NEGUS: Right.

THE COURT: And I'm not -- I thought at first you wanted something like disrupting all the panels that might come into the jury assembly room.

MR. NEGUS: That's a different issue.

THE COURT: There you're going to run into a little resistance.

MR. NEGUS: But this is a different issue.

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, before we get much further down the road, can I articulate on the record my objections to this?

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. KOCHIS; This is a case in which we already have in the neighborhood of 4,000 pages of discovery in terms of police reports, over 10,000 pages, I believe, now, of transcripts. This is a four-page questionnaire when multiplied by 3 or 350 times is going to be an additional 1200 pages of discovery that lawyers and the Court are going to have to review and categorize.

There are questions on the questionnaire that we would never routinely ask a juror in open court.

THE COURT: I know. I haven't gone through some of those. Some of them I think we can edit out.

MR. KOCHIS: And the length of time that would be saved I think is small considering the time it would take to fumble when they get in the box and look for their name alphabetically. My experience, and I'm sure the Court's experience and Mr. Negus' experience, is when the jurors get in the box, it takes them anywhere from three to four minutes, if that long, to give their name, their place of residence, their occupation, the number of children in their It allows the lawyers to take records of people that are actually in the box and going to be prospective It allows the jurors to answer some questions jurors. that are non-threatening, that are in no way personal, gets them comfortable speaking in a courtroom, and that reduces the duplication this procedure would cause in that we are undoubtedly going to lose a lot of people due to the length

of this trial. We are going to lose a good percentage of people, perhaps 15 to 20 percent, on the Witherspoon issue, because I imagine in this case once jurors hear the number of victims, a percentage of the jurors are going to say I don't care what he has to say, the defendant, in a penalty phase; if I convict him, he's going to get the gas chamber. All those people would be excused, and we would have questionnaires on all those people that would seem to be meaningless and a waste of time, and I can't see why we're keeping track of people that can't sit due to time, can't sit due to financial resources, can't sit due to Witherspoon.

MR. NEGUS: But I'm going to be objecting, and I'll

MR. NEGUS: But I'm going to be objecting, and I'll tell you right now, to excusing any of those people.

THE COURT: Is what?

MR. NEGUS: To excusing people for financial hardship, and one of the reasons — obviously one of the reasons that I — unless ordered not to, I'm going to ask all those questions. I think it's a lot less embarrassing to me to have them do it in writing than to have me do it. I think I am entitled to ask —

THE COURT: Ask them whether they're male or female?

MR. NEGUS: Well, unfortunately, if you -- I mean you sit there, you look at the transcript, and you've got

Marion Jones, and if -- you might say Mrs. Jones or Miss Jones or Mr. Jones, but it doesn't always appear on the transcript.

Certainly race doesn't, and anything else -- male or female

is the only one that you really -- that you can tell for sure.

Date of birth is a way of handling the age question, because I believe that we're likely to find that the people that want to -- want to sit are old. I think that I will be probably introducing testimony when we get to San Diego on the challenge issue that -- that at least in the San Diego area, people who are younger and people who are older are distinctive in cognizable classes, and --

THE COURT; Let me interrupt you a minute. There's so many of these issues when we get into them, they're interrelated.

MR. NEGUS: Right, and this is also covered by some of the testimony at Bonillas' hearing.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know anything about Bonillas.

I didn't try it.

MR. NEGUS: I know.

THE COURT: I had other things to do when that was going on. All I knew is that we missed you, Mr. Negus, for some months, but it's interrelated, for instance, with your 9a and b, separate juries,

MR. NEGUS: And e.

THE COURT: And e?

MR. NEGUS: To pay jurors a living wage, which I requested orally the other day, 9e.

THE COURT: D, David, pay jurors a living wage? I

thought I'd already denied that.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I hope not, because the offer of proof is based upon the testimony of Mr. --

MR. KOCHIS: You made a tentative ruling in that you can't imagine doing that, but you did not fix it.

THE COURT: Well, let me retract that. I can imagine my doing most anything, with the education I sometimes get, so it's off the wall, as far as I'm concerned, but I'll reserve your right to show me what you've got.

MR, NEGUS: Okay.

THE COURT: I asked you a moment ago to assume that I would deny your request for lack of <u>Witherspoon</u> or for separate juries, and we were talking the other day about the time it would take if we're back — if we go through the <u>Hovey</u> procedure as well as <u>Witherspoon</u>, <u>Press Enterprise</u>, all of that, and you indicated somehow that you would ask the three questions in <u>Hovey</u> — <u>Witherspoon</u> and —

MR. NEGUS: What I was suggesting is that if we have to do this <u>Witherspoon</u> nonsense, that we pare it down that we --

THE COURT: Did you make a script for me in that regard? That's what I wanted to see first.

MR. NEGUS: I -- I -- the script that -- the way you had the questions phrased when you did it in Gray -- let's see. Sitting --

THE COURT: Your answer is negative, so you've got

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no script.

MR. NEGUS: Well, no. Yes, I do. I don't think I had any objection to the first four questions,

THE COURT: I don't have mine here.

MR. KOCHIS: I made a copy for you, Your Honor.

MR. NEGUS: Let me find — let me just get — I didn't get a chance to finish writing last night, and my secretary just managed to getthrough the questionnaire this morning, but — does that say "voir dire"? Okay.

THE COURT: You said the first four *-

MR. NEGUS; Let me find the --

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, for Mr. Negus, I believe questions two, four and five are the three verbatim Witherspoon-type questions.

MR. NEGUS: That -- well, I think they could be reworded to be understandable. My experience is that nobody can understand those questions when you ask them to them the first time.

THE COURT: Well, the way it worked in Gray is that sometimes we reframed the question in a more understandable manner.

MR. NEGUS: Right. Well, I'd suggest that we try and do that before we start, because I think that anybody that can understand the bench book and -- as it comes out in the bench book is -- Judge Keene may be able to, but he's the only one that I can imagine,

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THE COURT; You see the way this script went, we wouldn't ask all the questions. 4-A indicated there maybe frequently wouldn't come up.

MR. NEGUS: Yeah, I understand, but --

THE COURT: Five may well not come up, for instance.

MR. NEGUS; The thing is what I'm saying is that there's two different -- there's two different ways that it goes down, okay, and one is that you just ask the questions, you accept the answer, you don't do any follow-up. give the wrong answer, you kick them off. If they give the right answer, they stay and nobody questions them in detail about just those three questions. That's one way to do it, and in this particular case, I can't imagine there being a sort of easy, in-between alternative. If Mr. Kochis is going to be allowed to ask other questions, then I'm going to try and ask all the questions that I have to ask. I don't think I can give him the advantage of being able to ask other questions without my doing it. I'd like to have neither of us do it. Okay?

(No omissions.)

THE COURT: Counsel, I think it would be probably improper for me to, as much as I'd like to shorten the procedure, to be the exclusive asker of questions unless there was a very strong waiver and stipulation.

MR. NEGUS: Well, we're -- I'm willing to do that.

THE COURT: So what -- so what I did was, "Defense Counsel," after I finished, "do you have any questions?"

Sometimes you say, "No, I have none, no," or, "Yes, just a couple," and they would be fairly brief. And then it was likewise brief. That's why I think we went, what, from six to ten minutes normally, occasionally a little longer.

MR. NEGUS: But --

THE COURT: But, again, you --

MR. NEGUS: -- when I did, it took longer.

THE COURT: I'm sure.

MR. NEGUS: And if I take longer than Mr. Kochis, then Mr. Kochis can take longer for the most part. And what I'm saying is that — that both sides are at a certain disadvantage, just taking the answers at face value that the jurors get. I mean, it can cut both ways. It's not something which — which is going to necessarily favor one side or the other. I'm stuck with their answers; he's stuck with their answers. And we don't — we don't — we don't sit around belaboring the point for — in — inculcating this whole idea of death penalty into them when Mr. Cooper hasn't been convicted any more with his —

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THE COURT: Let's think about it over the noon period. Resume at 1:30.

MR. NEGUS: Well, do you want -- I don't know how much more we're going to be able to do -- to resolve today. I mean, do you want to --

THE COURT: There's somewhat that we can resolve today. Let's be back at 1:30. We haven't finished this up yet.

MR. NEGUS: Thank you.

(Whereupon the noon recess was taken at 12:00 o'clock until 1:32 p.m.)

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ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA; THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1984;
                                                     1:32 P.M.
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     DEPARTMENT NO. 3
                                    HON. RICHARD C. GARNER, JUDGE
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              (Appearances as heretofore noted.)
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             THE COURT: Where were we?
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             MR. NEGUS: Don't know.
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             MR. KOCHIS: We were -- we had not left the
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     questionnaire, which is 9c.
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             MR. NEGUS: I thought we had gone onto the voir
     dire thing.
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             THE COURT: Well, I told you at one point I would
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     call it all kind of interrelated.
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             MR. NEGUS: The questionnaire is discussed -- or,
     some of the theory behind the questionnaire is discussed
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    also in the materials.
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            MR. KOCHIS: I'm sorry. I was just talking about
    the -- I thought we were on the limited issue. We had moved
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    to what we would do in chambers on Witherspoon.
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            MR. NEGUS: Okay. That's what I -- okay; take it
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    back -- we agreed on.
            MR. KOCHIS: The script, then, not the questionnaire.
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            MR. NEGUS: The script.
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            MR. KOCHIS: And we were looking at the questions,
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    the nine questions the Court has asked in a previous death
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penalty trial. And I gave you a copy.

THE COURT: Is this?

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MR. KOCHIS:

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MR. NEGUS: Yep.

Yes.

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THE COURT: All right. We're assuming, then, that we do have two phases, two juries, and that we do have sequestered voir dire for purposes of our discussion, not being locked into that, and still having some other things to discuss.

MR. KOCHIS: I think you said we assume we're going to have two juries, and I don't think we have.

THE COURT: I didn't mean that. One -- one panel.

Is there anything on here -- would you be even interested, in case we do that, Mr. Negus, in knowing terms of, second page, eight and nine? Those are of minimal value, perhaps.

MR. KOCHIS: Those are ones that I'm interested in asking either to the Court's voice or my own.

> THE COURT: Wouldn't forego them?

I wouldn't feel comfortable foregoing MR. KOCHIS: them, no.

THE COURT: Mr. Negus, if we go through it, I have no idea what additional questions you might like to ask, but I'd like to give you reasonable rein to inquire yourself what your estimates are.

MR. NEGUS: Well, what I'm saying is that -- that all I'm asking, I haven't got a script right now as to what questions I asked. You can look at the one I did of

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Mr. Bonillas, if you want. But I don't think I'll be asking the same questions, because it's a different case. But I was just saying that neither of us have been given an opportunity, neither Mr. Kochis or myself.

MR. KOCHIS: I'm willing to forego it if I'm sure that he is. If not, then I'll have to figure out what I'm going to ask. And I haven't done that.

THE COURT: Are you sure of that, Mr. Kochis? you be willing to not inquire?

MR. KOCHIS: No. I don't recall ever having lengthy voir dire with any juror individually in a Witherspoon case. I typically ask one or two questions or no questions. I think what Mr. Negus wants, and I can't agree to it, is he's saying, "Judge, I'll go one of two ways. I'll let you ask three questions, and none of the lawyers, any questions, or I want full rein to take -- if it takes 15 minutes a juror, 15 minutes."

I'm -- I don't think either one of those is necessary. I don't feel comfortable with just three. And I certainly wouldn't ask 15 -- 15 minutes of questioning of any juror, nor would I even ask 10 minutes.

If Mr. Negus needs 15 or 20 and the Court needs 5, I can probably do mine in a minute. But I can't agree to the extremes. He's proposed to me two extremes. And I'm not comfortable with agreeing with those.

MR. NEGUS: I think I just proposed one extreme.

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the gamut of many variations of opinion on the subject, and there are some areas that I quickly, after concluding my brief inquiry, turned it over to Counsel that I think very properly should follow up. And, yes, I couldn't excuse for cause for it. So I wasn't looking to have the Judge do the only voir dire in chambers for the death penalty. I don't have any improvements for this particular script.

(No omissions.)

THE COURT: You know, real particularly, we run

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MR. NEGUS: Well, as far as then if we're going to be allowed to have the counsel do it, then I would request you ask the three questions. I don't think that number one is relevant. I don't think that -- I think number three is redundant. I think number six is redundant. I think number seven's redundant.

THE COURT: All right. Maybe we will. Let's see. To some extent, I think three -- one just kind of softens the leading into the tough questions. That's bare bones, but I have no objection to doing that, if we get into it with the same assumptions we mentioned before.

There would necessarily have to be some follow-up to make certain that we understand; in other words, I would have to go, with an affirmative answer, to one of them. Then I'd probably have to go to 4-A, 4-A-1 or 2, but initially I think those three questions might be sufficient under the law.

MR. KOCHIS: Well, technically they are sufficient under the law. The reason I think I am inclined to ask the Court to follow this area is the Court, in my experience, is able to ask questions in a more rapid and succinct fashion than either I am or Mr. Negus is. And if you don't ask some of the other questions, I may ask one or two of those to satisfy in my own mind the mental state of that juror, and that simply may take longer. It doesn't really make a difference to me whether I do it or the Court does it.

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I can certainly save the Court's voice.

MR. NEGUS: If Mr. Kochis asks questions eight and nine, I'd object to them, eight because it's irrelevant what position somebody took over seven years ago, and nine I'd object to because I think it's almost nonsensical. I mean I don't see how you can answer that till they heard the verdict.

MR. KOCHIS: Starting from the bottom, I don't know why, but there is a percentage of people, in my experience, that have a problem in -- it has surprised me, but it continues to exist that people in a Witherspoon say, you know, Your Honor, I voted for the death penalty in 1977, I could never make the decision myself, or I certainly could never put my signature on a verdict if I was foreman, and if I was polled in a courtroom, I just can't handle the decision with that personally, in the abstract I can, on a case-by-case basis I can't. And I think as a prosecutor I have a right to know that.

As to number eight, I can't think of any question that is more designed to get at the heart of the matter as to what someone actually thinks about the death penalty than those two questions. I am not interested in all the typical questions that people ask about different philosophies in the Old and the New Testament and their reasons behind the death penalty, but I think number eight, those two limited questions, goes right to the heart of the matter,

and when people answer those, they usually provide the type of information that allows me to evaluate them, and it's not necessary for me to ask other types of questions in that area.

If the Court doesn't want to ask it, that's one of the questions I would ask permission to ask.

THE COURT: Mr. Negus, on the basis of relevancy,
I'd have to overrule your objection.

MR. NEGUS: What difference does it make -- I mean
I assure you that there's lots of opinions I had seven
years ago which I don't have anymore, and I just don't see
what difference somebody's opinion seven years ago has now.
You have already asked them about their conscientious scruples.
Certainly neither of those questions -- well, certainly
number eight does not go to cause; therefore, I don't think
it is appropriate for the Court to ask, and I still don't --

of the petitioners who passed around and circulated the petition.

MR. NEGUS: That doesn't go to cause. You can't kick somebody off for that.

THE COURT: Well, of course, you know --

MR. NEGUS: My understanding of the case law, and
I could be mistaken, but if Mr. Negus is going to stipulate
that we're only going to ask questions of jurors that go
to cause, not peremptory challenges, we're really going to

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shorten the voir dire process.

MR. NEGUS: The point I made was that Williams talks about lawyers asking questions as to going to exercising peremptories, not lawyers using the court to ask questions that go to peremptory.

The additional objection besides relevance to what one's opinion was seven years ago is that this number eight question is really one of Mr. Kochis' peremptory questions and doesn't go to cause at all and, therefore, if it's going to be done, it should be done by Mr. Kochis and not by the Court, because you're sort of giving -- I don't think it makes any difference.

THE COURT: I have no objection to that. I'm not volunteering to preempt voir dire. I will not therefore ask eight and nine. Mr. Kochis can use his own discretion. Otherwise, I will then run through mine. I'll turn it over to you, Mr. Negus, and then I will permit Mr. Kochis to inquire.

MR. NEGUS: Can -- can we reserve the right, if I can think of a way that's agreeable to Mr. Kochis and to you, to perhaps change the wording on a couple of those so that they get the same sense?

THE COURT: Sure. I'll be happy to reconsider whatever you wish to do.

MR. NEGUS: Do you have a proposal from the Gray case or something else of the introductory script? The one that's

in the bench book is incomprehensible. I mean in our last thing when we read that to the people, over 50 percent of them didn't know what you were talking about.

MR. KOCHIS: I believe I handed Mr. Negus a copy, a rather lengthy document, that was a proposed statement. I handed it to him yesterday. It was a number of pages, and it included what the Court would read --

THE COURT: Do you have a copy for me?

MR. NEGUS: I probably have it. I just --

THE COURT: It won't be the same as Gray, I assure you, because there were three phases,

MR. NEGUS: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: But I haven't looked this over, but
this will be a long statement to the -- let's see. I'm
not sure whether I read -- you know, this was the last
thing that I did before we took a recess. First thing I
do is to basically qualify them for the time involved and --

MR, NEGUS: Did you do that in groups of -- in mass groups of 60?

about -- we're going to wind up with maybe 15 or 20 out of that that will be able to afford the time that this case is going to take.

MR. NEGUS: Just -- I'm not sure I said this earlier or not, but I'm going to be objecting to excusing people because of financial things, because that's another thing

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that gives me rich white males.

THE COURT: You did say it.

MR. NEGUS: Okay.

MR. KOCHIS: And I am not sure how that's going to work, because my experience has been that in a lengthy case, the prosecution loses the vast majority of jurors that they would want, and those type of people are usually excused because of time problems, but I'd rather let Mr. Negus be the unreasonable party in that regard.

THE COURT: That's going to be probably the one singlemost request for excuse. They simply can't afford to serve six to eight months on a case that's going to pay them five dollars a day.

MR, NEGUS: I know, but I can't afford to let Mr. Cooper get convicted by people that can.

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, in that light, I would hope at the end of the motions when we're both relatively confident -- Mr. Negus, myself and Mr. Kottmeier -- what types of evidence are going to be admissible, that we can give the Court a somewhat reasonable limit or length of the trial, and that I think jury selection is going to take a number of weeks, five to six, and the jurors aren't going to be expected to be there for those five or six weeks, I think they will be there once for Witherspoon.

THE COURT; I'm fully aware of that, We did the same thing in Gray.

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MR, KOCHIS: So I'm not sure it's going to last eight months. I think our six- to eight-month limit would include, I would hope, jury selection.

THE COURT: You're just making a record on your objection for financial hardship, or is there any authority for that?

MR. NEGUS: Well, my experience is that most people get up and say, well, it would be difficult for me, but most people it wouldn't really be difficult for them, and they would -- what we normally do is we let people who want to be on the jury be on the jury and dismiss those who don't. That tends to give a very pro prosecution jury.

I've sat through it before, and I'm -- I disagree with Mr. Kochis, I think that most of his people stay and most of my people go.

THE COURT: I don't know how to handle that.

MR. KOCHIS: We would have to handle that -
THE COURT: That's an area that's fraught with

danger.

What did you say?

MR. KOCHIS: We're just going to handle it on a case-by-case basis, because I don't think that's what you're going to find. I'm sure the Court's experience and Mr. Negus' experience, if he thinks about it, is you get a lot of jurors that appear to be men who are Caucasian who are between 40 and 55 and they say, Judge,

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I'm a supervisor, I supervise 15 or 20 people, they can't replace me for six months, or I'm a president of a company, and they can't replace me for five or six months, And those people leave, and I can't imagine Mr. Negus wants 12 of those individuals in the jury box.

(No omissions.)

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THE COURT: So raise your objections at the time, Mr. Negus.

MR. NEGUS: I'm not making it a blanket thing. I'm just going to tell you that I'd like, when we do the hardships, I think we probably -- what I did in the last time we had the trial was we took all the excuses, everybody wrote down what the excuses were, like the 60 people, you write down the excuses, and then we went back and we agreed to some, didn't agree to others, and the Judge ruled on those we didn't agree to.

THE COURT: Wrote down the excuses?

MR. NEGUS: Well --

MR. KOCHIS: We typically have done that in your court, Your Honor. We have the people stand up for time, we note their excuse on the jury sheet, and --

THE COURT: I did it all orally.

MR. KOCHIS: Well, from time to time you -- my recollection was you have taken both attorneys back into the chambers and said, "I'm inclined to let these 10 people go. Any objections?"

THE COURT: That's all oral. He's talking about something in writing.

MR. NEGUS: No, no, no. I'm just -- I'm just -- I'm -- all I said was you can -- if you -- if you can remember what their excuses are without writing them down, then that's --

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THE COURT: Oh. I write them down, yes.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. That's -- that's what I'm talking about, is that you write them down, I write them down, D.A. writes them down, and then we go back and do it. That has the added advantage of not keying people into what the magic words are, I mean, because, you know, the people -- there's a lot of people that just want to get off, and they see Juror No. A get up and say, "Well, I'm going on vacation." Goodbye." Juror No. 2 gets up, says, "My company can't afford to let me go." "Stay." Then everybody's got a vacation.

THE COURT: Well, I think, generally speaking, I'm more inclined to ask a juror to tell their boss to blame the mean old Judge or something, typically my type of words in that type of situation. And I'm resistive to excusing jurors unless indeed it indicates to me that -- that --

MR. NEGUS: I know that --

THE COURT: -- they can't serve. Although I'm fairly quick to take stipulations from Counsel. And if there will be no stipulations forthcoming --

MR. NEGUS: I didn't say there would be no stipulation, but I'm --

THE COURT: I'll have to study this. There's no point in, I think, in us going through this anymore. Both Mr. Negus and I will study that.

Do you foresee us doing about the same thing -- now,

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Gray was a what, 30 to 60 day case?

MR. KOCHIS: Six to seven weeks.

THE COURT: 30 to 60 days. And this one is going to be substantially longer, jumping around again. But how many people on a -- if we brought in 60, and I can't remember what the seating arrangement was there, but I think I could probably do it by putting them in the jury box as well. So how many of those 60 do you think that we need to go through to get a panel, say, for -- if we're going to go through individual voir dire and the 60 -- when I -- when I get over the time hurdle, then I'll -- then I step off the bench, Mr. Negus, and they line up and they go through the clerk and the bailiff, the two of them, using appointment slips and schedule them to come in for sequestered voir dire, if that be the procedure. And throughout this I'm just making an assumption that we'll go because I think you have the laboring oar on that. But it may not be.

MR. KOCHIS: If we could work backwards, I think it's easier to arrive at the numbers, how many --

THE COURT: Once we clear how many is going to be enough to permit 26 peremptories, is that what you mean?

MR. KOCHIS: These are the figures. You need 52, you can write 50 down; that's 26 a side. Then how many people do we want to have sit through the duration? Do we want 14, 16, 18, 20? How many do you want?

THE COURT: Let's take that situation now.

you now that the jury box, like this one, seven and seven, for a total of fourteen, there's room for at least one more and I believe two more, which would make it a total of sixteen or four alternates. I'd like to have another couple of alternates, but I absolutely find no reasonable way to put them in that jury -- in that room, unless I maybe put a number of seats on the other side of the room.

MR. NEGUS: Well, if you have four, that's another sixteen challenges.

THE COURT: It doesn't say that, but I'll probably give it.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I think it does say that, and --

MR. KOCHIS: Well, in terms --

THE COURT: One per alternate.

MR. NEGUS: Not in capital cases.

THE COURT: It doesn't say for capital cases. It doesn't make an exception. But I -- but I, nevertheless, went with the spirit of capital cases. I think I have always permitted it. So it says one per alternate, and it doesn't break it down into capital cases.

Well, that would be just for the jurors and peremptories alone.

MR. KOCHIS: That's a minimum of 84 people. And I think in this case it's reasonable that, during the actual voir dire not related to <u>Witherspoon</u>, that it might be possible for each side to have as many as 10 challenges for

cause. That would put us at 104. And, therefore, it would seem to me that, as a -- with a potential of additional excuses, you would want to have --

THE COURT: I must have missed it somewhere. You've got 52, 16 --

MR. KOCHIS: Pardon?

MR. NEGUS: Then you've got to get the jury in, another 16.

THE COURT: All right. I added that. That comes to 84.

MR. KOCHIS: Right. And then the challenges -I assume Mr. Negus may have some challenges for cause.

MR. NEGUS: I see 10 apiece for cause.

MR. KOCHIS: For cause. That's an estimate, of course. Then we're up to 80 -- we're up to 104. So it would seem to me that, as a bare minimum, to be safe, you would want to have in the neighborhood of 120 jurors left after Witherspoon.

MR. NEGUS: So -- and how many people do you think -- how many people do you think would get <u>Witherspoon</u> excused on this case?

MR. KOCHIS: In this type of case, I would expect there would be a lot of people who would. My guess would be there would be a lot of people who may be excused unchallenged by Mr. Negus who would say, "The family was killed, four people were killed, I would give the defendant

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the death penalty in every case."
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              MR. NEGUS: I think that's probably true, because
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     I -- certainly they said a lot of that in the last case I
     had and there weren't any kids involved.
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             THE COURT: Well --
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             MR. KOCHIS: So I would expect --
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             THE COURT: -- we run up against a kid aspect; no
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     doubt about that.
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             MR. KOCHIS: So I would expect to lose as many as
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     20 to 25 people out of every 100 on Witherspoon alone.
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             MR. NEGUS: So what you're saying, then, is we
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     should have 160 people, approximately --
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             MR. KOCHIS:
                         -- to Witherspoon.
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             MR. NEGUS:
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             MR. KOCHIS:
                          That would be a minimum to Witherspoon.
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             THE COURT:
                         I don't find any trouble with the number.
             MR. NEGUS:
                         I do. I mean --
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             THE COURT:
                         It's a lot of trouble, but --
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             MR. NEGUS:
                         That's what I meant. I'm sorry.
                                                            It was
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     just a joke.
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                         Yes. Oh, it's terrible. But I don't
             THE COURT:
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    know how to avoid it.
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            MR. KOCHIS: And then to reach --
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            MR. NEGUS:
                         We --
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            THE COURT:
                         We could go ahead and try it with a
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lesser number, and then you -- you won't wind up with a full

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jury box, most likely.

MR. NEGUS: It doesn't mean -- whether you want to take -- whether you want to go through them all at the beginning or whether you want to go through them in stages doesn't matter to me.

MR. KOCHIS: And then I think in this case, due to the length of time, we may lose due to time one out of every three people.

MR. NEGUS: We lost one out of every three in a 30 day case with me objecting.

MR. KOCHIS: So I -- I think with -- my estimate would be is that we would have to have four sessions of 60 each to end up with 160 people to <u>Witherspoon</u>. And then we can tell if, after the end of the first day, if, after talking to 120 people, we had 105 people left, we might not even have to get to the second panel, if, after the first day, we had 30 people left.

THE COURT: You mean -- you don't mean that.

MR. KOCHIS: That's --

THE COURT: Four sessions at 60 each would be 240.

MR. KOCHIS: Right.

MR. NEGUS: You lose --

MR. KOCHIS: If you lose a third of those people --

MR. NEGUS: 160.

MR. KOCHIS: -- that comes out exactly 160. You lose 80 of them due to time, one out of three.

MR. NEGUS: Mr. Kochis thinks we may have to have 160 people to ask questions of. If you bring in 240 people, you're going to lose at least 80 of them, because they -- they're going to have vacations scheduled and what have you. So he's saying in order to ask questions of 160 people you need a 240 group to start with.

MR. KOCHIS: And, Your Honor, I'm taking into account that I assume the Court's going to follow a procedure that's similar to the procedure in past cases where, when you brought the groups of 60 in, you not only talked about time but we mentioned the names of some of the witnesses and the nature of the case, and some of the people you excused at that point, people who had a close relationship with a particular witness and said they wouldn't -- couldn't be fair on his testimony or because of the nature of the case.

We lost some people --

MR. NEGUS: I would be objecting to that in the general -- that general thing. I don't think that -- that may work in a situation like Mr. Gray, but in this particular case you're starting to get into -- you're going to get into publicity, and all of a sudden people are blurting out things. And I think that's going to cause problems.

MR. KOCHIS: That may be the case, but that -- that was -- would be my number to start, is -- is about 240 people. And then we could adjust that up or down. If everybody is staying, we obviously don't have to talk to everybody.

If everybody is being lost, then we -- it may take more people than that. And even at 100, if we're able to have 160 people from which to <u>Witherspoon</u>, even moving through --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. I don't understand.

MR. KOCHIS: Even moving through 12 to 18 a day, Witherspoon's only going to last two and a half, three weeks.

THE COURT: We can't start off with 240 people and get a jury in this case.

MR. NEGUS: You think that's too little?

THE COURT: I do. Let me find out where my thinking is wrong.

MR. NEGUS: I think it --

THE COURT: For the time question, how many do you think we'd lose there?

MR. KOCHIS: 80, one out of every three. And that's an estimate. You could be right, if we lose --

THE COURT: I think you're going to lose 50 percent of the time.

MR. KOCHIS: Well, then, we would be down to 120, and we would be below what we need. If you're -- if you're thinking of 50 percent, then what you're talking about is 320 people to talk to. You're talking about one week of bringing them in in groups of four days, 80 a day, 40 in the morning, 40 in the afternoon.

THE COURT: Oh, no. We go 60 at a time. I'm -- we can almost take in three of those panels a day, but probably

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not. If I did, I'd have to bring in extra clerical people.
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MR. NEGUS: And extra --

THE COURT: What?

I'll tell you once we get started on the individual sequestered voir dire, if we do, if we're going to go through week after week of that, we're going to work diligently and fairly long.

MR. NEGUS: I can't do it, Judge. I can't go beyond five hours, like we have been doing.

THE COURT: No, Mr. Negus. Flat no.

(No omissions.)

MR. NEGUS: Judge, that was -- that was the commitment you made, and I just can't physically do it and do all the other things I have to do.

THE COURT: No, I don't remember making that commitment.

MR, NEGUS: Well, that's what -- you said that we're not going to go beyond five hours a day four days a week.

a couple times that during voir dire, it's not the -these things get to be done -- you can do them in your
sleep once we get started on it, particularly if we wind
up with 320 of them.

MR. NEGUS: You're asking me to do something I can't do, and I have been planning on -- on the basis of that, because I figured I'd be able to use the evening time to do the other work of preparation which I haven't done yet, and I can only do so much.

MR. KOCHIS: I think we're ahead of ourselves. I think 320 jurors are not going to be with us for very long, and if the Court's accurate, it's going to put us back to the figures that we originally discussed, and we're going to be able to move through the Witherspoon, I would think, in a rather succinct and organized fashion, and we're not going to spend months on it.

THE COURT: Well, it's still an open question. I told you before, and I mention it again, that I should give

instructions on this to the people there as far in advance as I can. It doesn't have to be at the moment, because I don't see us going down there within the next 30 days, but I'm going to be trying to firm that up early on. I don't even know the source of the jurors there for downtown, where the jurors come from. Do you know? Have you checked that out?

MR. NEGUS: No. That's -- I was going to ask you to -- to have them send us that information, and also their procedures in summoning them.

THE COURT: What do you mean by procedures in summoning them?

MR. KOCHIS: How they get the names and what they do to get the names into the courtroom.

THE COURT: Haven't you done that already, Mr. Negus?

MR. NEGUS: No, I haven't, Your Honor. I have been pretty much busy with the Hitch issue.

THE COURT: Use your legal runner.

Okay. I can do that.

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, the one thing we haven't discussed, and I think we should get, if possible, some idea at this time, 9d is sequestered questioning, and I wonder if we could get an indication from Mr. Negus so the Court can make some tentative rulings as to what, in addition to Witherspoon, if anything, he would want the jurors voir dired on individually.

 MR. NEGUS: Publicity, period.

THE COURT: You were going -- I asked you once before,
My jury is still out on that question. I'm hesitant and
reluctant to open it up to that.

MR. NEGUS: In <u>Hovey</u> or <u>Press Enterprise</u> -- I forget which -- they even suggest that publicity is another area which should -- which could possibly in certain cases be gone into.

THE COURT: Oh, there's a lot that possibly could be gone into.

MR. NEGUS: But they suggest that -- and the obvious reason is -- you don't do it is you have to do it that way, I think, in order to preserve your panel, is if you ask somebody what they've heard and somebody blurts out something about, for example, Pennsylvania rapes, then you've got to -- I move to send the people home and we have to start all over again, or else I think you build in error.

THE COURT: You write me a script on -- or just tell
me now generally how you would approach that subject in
chambers.

MR. NEGUS: I would like to have the questions there that I put in the questionnaire, have them done in written form first so that we have some idea as to whether or not there's -- whether -- you know, what kind of person we're talking about. Once I know that information, I'm probably

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just going to ask them, you know, like what have you heard, and then go on the basis of follow-up. If they haven't heard anything, then it doesn't come up.

THE COURT: Everybody's heard something.

MR. NEGUS: Well, then I want to know what they heard, and then, depending on what they heard, I want to know whether that's going to make an effect on them, but it's not a script sort of thing. It's an open-ended thing, just tell me what you heard, and then, depending on what they say, go from there. I don't think it's -- especially if I have it in the questionnaire form so I don't have to go through newspapers they read, what radio programs, if we have that beforehand all written out for us, then I --I don't imagine it taking very long. Somebody who's -who -- I can imagine a person who gives me reason to believe that there's -- that there's something to get rid of them for cause but doesn't want to get rid of for cause, that could take five or ten minutes. Somebody who's straightforward about it, in the past, I would expect it would take considerably less, so I don't think -- it's not necessarily a particularly time-consuming process. It doesn't save any time to do it in open court, as opposed to doing it in voir dire, because I'm going to ask the same questions: What have you heard? I need to know the individual responses in open court, the -- so there's no time saving doing it with a bunch of people as opposed to just doing it individually.

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THE COURT: Let me go through your questionnaire just for a second here. Going to number seven, why do you exclude Mexican-Americans from that and have a separate category?

MR, NEGUS: Well, the -- those things are based on the census, and it's described -- Dr. Decker describes how he did -- why he did it in that particular way. that's the way the census does it, and so that's the way that -- that I did it. The Mexican-American is not a racial category, because if you'll talk to -- if you look at the next question, next question, go on to the next question.

THE COURT: I see, but why do you make two questions of it?

MR. NEGUS: Because -- because that's the way social scientists deal with the question. the way the United States census deals with it now. That's that is the way it is on the census.

THE COURT: Neither one is applicable to this case.

MR. NEGUS: What do you mean?

THE COURT: Why should we single them out and treat them differently for our purposes, not census purposes, not for social object purposes?

MR, NEGUS; The reason is that in order to tell a person who's a Mexican-American, for example, a Mexican-American might very well answer question number seven as white, as Indian, as a whole bunch of different things.

Some of them will even describe themselves as Black, usually white or Indian, and they vary in their description. Mexican-American is an ethnic heritage, and that is — it's unreliable to do it that way. The Mexican-Americans have been fighting for years not to do it that way. I don't want to insult them, and that's the way that they prefer to see it. That's the way the social scientists prefer to see it. That's the only way that the answers we get can be compared with other data, and circling two questions doesn't seem to make much difference.

MR. NEGUS: That's a mistake on my part. Twenty should be about Kevin Cooper, and not the Chino Hills murders.

Twenty-one and twenty-two I just -- that's not --

THE COURT: Strike the Chino Hills murders and just insert Kevin Cooper.

THE COURT: Are number 18 and 20 the same?

MR. NEGUS: Yes.

THE COURT: Let me share a couple thoughts with you, My experience is that the longest part about voir dire, potentially, in this type of case is going to be the sequestered voir dire, if we go that route. I have no objection to revising this somewhat, taking off some things that I don't think need to be gone into, and still pick up your ethnic or racial background questions, as well as the publicity questions, and to doing that to all 320 jurors, if you so desire, if that will shorten the sequestered part

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of voir dire, you know. Anything that needs to be asked or followed up on, of course, but if you plan a long, extended voir dire anyhow ~~

MR. NEGUS: If somebody, for example, tells me on the questionnaire how much do you remember hearing in the newspaper about the Chino Hills murder? Nothing, How well do you remember what you heard? I remember nothing. How much do you remember hearing in the news media? Nothing, and then I remember nothing about Kevin Cooper, I'm not going to ask them any questions.

(No omissions.)

THE COURT: Asking to excuse him for cause most likely is being a bit silly, perhaps.

MR. NEGUS: But, you know -- and so the -- those -the answers to the questions will clue me to which -- to
which things I want to ask. Same way with the source of
the news, because Mr. Kochis and I both are, I'm sure by
now, and you are as well, aware of the content of the
different news stations and -- and what have you.

So having that background information, I can then focus in and -- and so whether there's any -- any prejudicial information that they have had which has -- which has caused them to make up their minds one way or the t'other. And that's all I really want to do. And I just want to do it so that their answers don't pollute anybody else. I mean, we have to do it on an individual basis no matter what.

So I think that the questionnaire will shorten the sequestered voir dire, because if I have to ask all those ten questions to each juror in the chambers, no matter how fast it goes, when you get -- when you just start rattling off ten questions, it still takes a certain amount of time. I just know from experience that goes a lot slower if you have to -- if you have to ask it.

I don't see anything that's -- I don't see anything that we lose by having them fill it out in advance. And --

THE COURT: Wouldn't your average, to change the subject, Mexican-American, when he looks at number seven,

which would be first on your questionnaire, wouldn't he say, "How come they left out" --

MR. NEGUS: Well, the reason that we do it that way is because -- because the census and the -- and the Mexican-American community has -- has gone through that. You'll find --

THE COURT: You have indicated that to me. My question to you is is there going to be, looking through this and searching, isn't their initial reaction going to be resentment before they finally discover number eight?

MR. NEGUS: I don't think -- well, we can probably retype it so that we have it on the same page.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NEGUS: And renumber it so it's on the same page.

Some of them write "Mexican" under the "other" because they

feel like it, some write "Chicano," some people write

different things. I mean, it's been the experience of

investigators.

But this -- but in fact, race is different than ethnicity. I mean, as being from the -- from being -- coming from a -- from Mexico or Cuba is different than -- than race. There's a lot of Cubans, for example, that are Blacks. And so you -- the racial question and the "where do you come from" is a different question. And that's the reason why people have done that.

THE COURT: Anything to interject before I move on?

MR. KOCHIS: Well, I -- I think I --

THE COURT: I'm not through with the subject. I'm going to move on to certain --

MR. KOCHIS: I think I articulated my objections to the entire questionnaire this morning in terms of the -- and I --

THE COURT: Let me cover part of it.

MR. KOCHIS: I have specific, for example, objections as to date of birth, ZIP Code --

THE COURT: Let me go through it, Counsel.

MR. KOCHIS: I mean, I --

THE COURT: And then I'll come back to you.

I have initially, Mr. Negus, crossed out the following ones as ones that I will either be covering in open court or I don't consider appropriate subjects.

Two, three -- looking at all of them here -- four, five, six, on gender, nine, annual income of family, ten, members in the household, eleven, how far do you go to school. Twenty-one and twenty-two, occupation and spouse's occupation, cover that in open court.

MR. NEGUS: As I say, no objection to kicking off
twenty-one and twenty-two. If in fact all the other questions
are covered in open court, then I have --

THE COURT: I won't cover all the other questions.

I wouldn't cover -- well, marital status I would cover, yes.

Gender I wouldn't ask in open court. I never go into income.





Never have yet. And you can -- you can get the answer to that when you look at a witness and listen to him as to their level of affluence.

MR. NEGUS: Yes, Your Honor. But for -- but for -- but for purposes of Wheeler, which is the --

THE COURT: What's Wheeler?

MR. NEGUS: Wheeler's the case that says that the Prosecution can't use their challenges to kick off cognizable groups.

MR. KOCHIS: And Wheeler does not recognize income as a cognizable group.

MR. NEGUS: I think that <u>Wheeler</u> is an equal protection case, and -- and -- and economic status has been a cognizable group since 1946.

THE COURT: I tell you if I catch the District

Attorney in the slightest doing such a thing, I'll bring
him up short.

MR. NEGUS: But the thing is that there's no way you can make a record of it other than that. Wheeler required that in order to make a Wheeler challenge I have to establish a record from the get-to, and they say I should do it from the -- as early as possible. With respect to -- with respect --

THE COURT: I just don't think there's any authority for that, that where I have to do that in order to lay a foundation for punishing the District Attorney for excusing

on recognizable class.

MR. KOCHIS: Well, it's not -- I think Wheeler says both plaintiff and defendant, so I don't want you to feel that I'm the only one that you should be looking at.

If Mr. Negus starts kicking cognizable classes, I'm going to ask for sanctions, too.

MR. NEGUS: I don't think Wheeler does that.

THE COURT: At that point I can modify my procedure.

At some point, I can start going into it. But I'm not going to take the whole group here and go into their private finances.

MR. NEGUS: Well, the -- then -- well, see, the problem is that there's no way that -- that if -- if you ask them obviously your gender and your -- your gender, then there's no problem as -- as far as that -- as far as that is concerned, because you can get them as long as we establish Mr. and Mrs. My experience has been the records are sloppy about that. But usually that's -- that's not a big problem.

THE COURT: No, it isn't. "Marie" is not going to be a male name, a male person; that's all.

MR. NEGUS: But, like, Marion and what have you.

THE COURT: Depends on how they -- how she spells her name.

MR. NEGUS: Or whatever. I agree that the section is not a big problem, so I can live with that. But in terms of you -- you're not going to -- you're not going to be able

Wheeler notwithstanding. I'm not going to go into it at

this time. And I'm -- I'm very quick to pick up on any

MR. NEGUS: Then can I -- the date of birth reason,

discrimination in jury selection.

to tell from the records whether you have a poor person or

a rich person unless you get the -- unless you get some sort

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that could even be shortened to month and year, if you -if there's a privacy interest in the date, it's the easiest
way to, and the most honest way to, determine age. And,
again, in -- especially in San Diego, I think that there
are tremendous differences between -- between people in terms
of their age. And the whole record doesn't reflect that.
I mean, you can't tell from the record --

THE COURT: You know, I'm not an Appellate Court, doggone it. I'm a trial bench. We have the person before us and we're looking at him. And you make your record some other way, but I'm --

MR. NEGUS: How can I make a record, Judge? I mean, you -- I mean, how can you make a record any other way? I mean, do you want, after each -- after each witness, we go up and say, "May the record reflect that -- that the last witness appeared to be 55." I mean, it's -- it's nonsensical This is a very easy, simple way to make a record.

THE COURT: Not for resentment by giving age. Male and female.

MR. NEGUS: That's why we put "date of birth," and that's why you can make it month and year.

THE COURT: I don't know. There's other ways you can handle it. If your investigator sits through all of this, as he has through most of these hearings, he can make a note and you can make a declaration for appeal, if you wish.

MR. NEGUS: He is going to have to go out and run

through all their driver's licenses to find out how old they are? Think of the cost of that. I mean, this is the most -- it is the most cost effective way of doing it. And if you do it in a questionnaire form, they don't have to give it to anybody else other than -- other than the Court.

We have done it before. You have done it before in the jury room, and have it with the month and the year. People filled it out and --

THE COURT: I know. This isn't the same case.
You've gone --

MR. NEGUS: I'm just telling --

THE COURT: You've gone through an nth degree further in this case than you did any other.

MR. NEGUS: That's true. But this is a -- that's why. It's because it's not the same case. But there's no other way that one can make a record as to the ages of the people that get excused.

MR. KOCHIS: Sure there is.

THE COURT: I beg your pardon?

MR. KOCHIS: There is.

THE COURT: How's that?

MR. KOCHIS: Without insulting people, you give them the boxes just like you do on race, "20 to 30, 30 to 40 to 50, over 50."

MR. NEGUS: The reason that they -- that they do
the date of birth is, as opposed to the boxes -- and I don't

care about -- I mean, if we want to go to the boxes, that's fine. But normally, according to the social scientist, and I think there's some testimony about that by Dr. Decker in the -- in the offer of proof, that people will be more likely to give you an honest answer if you ask them for their date of birth because it's harder to fudge than it is to fudge on the number of years, how old, years they are old. That's the only reason for doing date of birth as -- and month of the year as opposed to -- as opposed to doing the bracketed. And they have done this -- I mean, the reason -- this is not the -- those questions were not developed by --

THE COURT: People have done everything, but I don't necessarily follow them.

MR. NEGUS: I know. But this is something that -that there's -- it's fairly standardized within the social
science business, and --

MR. KOCHIS: But we're not in the social science business.

MR. NEGUS: But the social science business is the business of -- of how to get information about this kind of -- about this kind of stuff. And if you're going to ask them the boxes, you might as well ask them --

THE COURT: You know, you're looking -- you're looking -- looking for a record on appeal. I'm looking to give both of you a fair trial. That's all I'm looking for.

MR. NEGUS: No. I'm looking for a record in front

of the Court, Your Honor. How else am I going to -- how else am I going to make a record? None of us can remember people that have been kicked off after we have been doing it for a while and, you know, how old they were. It's going to be a matter of dispute.

I mean, we start -- I say, "Well, he kicked off seven young people." "I don't remember that being young."

I mean, it always comes out that way.

This is the easiest, most cost effective, least controversial, most accurate way of doing it.

THE COURT: Any other -- other that you want in there?

MR. NEGUS: The reason I want the ZIP Code is because then that makes it -- that's a -- that is essentially, for me, it makes it easier to figure out the demographic characteristics of the place they live.

THE COURT: We wouldn't have to ask them in open court where they live.

MR. NEGUS: Okay with me. Just give me the ZIP Code. You can get the phone books and you can figure it out.

THE COURT: If that's all right with you, that might be all right.

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, I -- again, the last thing
I need is 1200 new pages of discovery to assign an investigator
to match ZIP Codes with areas in San Bernardino.

THE COURT: 1200? How do you come up with 1200?

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MR. KOCHIS: Well, 320 jurors times four pages a That's 1200 pages is what I'm looking---

THE COURT: Well --

MR. NEGUS: I'll give you a thing out of the phone book as to where the ZIP Codes are. You know, you're looking at them one at a time for the most part, for our purposes, as they come forward, and once we -- when we bring them into open court or wherever we're going to do sequestered voir dire, if it's done, you're going to have 30 seconds to look over their answers.

THE COURT: Mr. Negus, doggone, you -- you never lose, do you?

> MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, if you're going to --MR. NEGUS: That's not true.

MR. KOCHIS: You indicated you're not going to give three or four. If you're going to give any information, let's make it number three. That way he gets the information and we don't have to look it up in a ZIP Code book. If you feel he's entitled to a questionnaire to know what city they're in, let's just have him put it rather than put a ZIP Code and have us go look at it.

THE COURT: Well, city elements of San Diego run for 60 miles or something like that. I don't really know. It's a mighty big --

> MR. KOCHIS: It's the same as here. People are not . THE COURT: San Ysidro, we find out, is part of San Dilego.

 MR. KOCHIS; People will say they live in Point Loma, Sunset Cliffs, Ocean Beach, Pacific Beach.

MR. NEGUS: But those -- those -- those things don't happen to have -- they're not tied into census data. This is -- this is purely for --

THE COURT: Do you have a list of the --

MR. NEGUS: -- census data --

THE COURT: -- areas that we would be able to understand?

MR. NEGUS: Yeah. I'll xerox you a copy of the -of the phone book which has a map of the ZIP Codes. You
can look at it. The thing is that -- that the ZIP Codes
are tied in to census data. All the census data is
organized in terms of ZIP Codes. That way it's -- in fact,
you usually find that your jury commissioner will summon
people in terms of ZIP Codes. That's what they do in this
county, and it's the easiest --

in a way, if by a quick, ready reference here you can find out what part of the area they're from. I don't have any objection to that, and leave out the city then. What is their date of birth? What is your ZIP Code? No more marital status here. We can ask them that out -- outside for self and spouse, not gender. All right. We will leave number seven as is. Eight leave it as is, if you want it.

MR. NEGUS: I do.

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revising 20. MR. KOCHIS: Well, Your Honor, if you're going to

THE COURT: Striking 9, 10 and 11.

of that, you can revise those, leaving off 21, 22 and

ask two and four, could you include three so those of us that don't want to match a ZIP Code with a city or a town in every case don't have to?

Going down to 12, 13 and on, if you've made notes

MR, NEGUS: I have no objection to that, it's more accurate, and it doesn't take more than a second more for them to fill it out.

THE COURT: No. I'm trying to cut out all the surplusage at all. Your objection is you don't want to have to work with another list beside you?

MR. KOCHIS: Not in every case.

THE COURT: Let's see what it looks like. think I've ever really looked at that.

MR. NEGUS: What you get --

MR. KOCHIS: It's more general. People who live in four or five communities are obviously going to have the same ZIP Code, or possibly more.

THE COURT: Do you think some people wouldn't know their ZIP Code?

MR. NEGUS: That's the reason why we put the city and the ZIP Code. That's true that they don't, so that's the reason why we have both in the --

THE COURT; All right. Let's give both of them, It's not that much more.

Okay. Now, I want it clearly understood that while I don't wish to inhibit you unfairly, there might be a difference of interpretation, and if I find we're going to be spending an undue period of time in chambers on publicity, I simply am not going to —

MR, NEGUS: I'll be forewarned, and -

THE COURT: I'll just cut it off. Well, you know, let's communicate, I just think that that can be done outside, and I do that in every case, and I have handled a lot of celebrated cases. I've never yet done that on a seguestered basis, Mr. Negus, so you're getting me to do things I've never, ever done before.

MR. NEGUS: I just — I will make sure that I don't abuse you on that particular issue so you don't get mad at me, but I feel that —

THE COURT: I never get mad at you. I may just sound mad or angry sometimes.

MR. NEGUS: If you don't find that I'm using undue time, and the reason is I feel it doesn't -- the time element remains the same, but the prejudice element is considerably less.

THE COURT: With reference to time, the clerk will take from our 60 people, if we wind up with -- whatever we wind up with. She's going to schedule. She, with the bailiff,

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will schedule them in at -- what were our intervals before?

MR. KOCHIS: I think we did eight -- sixteen a day,

THE COURT: Well, we were adding to that, but this is going to take longer, so maybe keep it at eight and eight, at least to start with.

MR, KOCHIS: And then we did go up to I think nine or ten a session. We ended off with 18 to 20 a day, as opposed to 16.

MR. NEGUS: I hope we can do -- I think it will take longer than it did in the -- in the --

THE COURT: I'm allowing for that, but we were through, basically, by 11:00 o'clock when we started out with eight and eight.

MR. NEGUS: Is that right? The way that Judge Jones did it, it turned out to be horrible. I mean he read — he spent 15 minutes a person in chambers reading the bench book to them, and then I would spend 15 or 20 minutes questioning them, and Mr. McPherson would spend 5 or so minutes questioning.

I assume that you're not going to read the bench book to them for 15 minutes.

THE COURT: You know what I'm going to read, and it goes fast. I will be through in about three to five minutes maximum.

MR, NEGUS: That's -- I would hope then that we could do 20 to 30 minutes per person, leaving time for

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Mr. Kochis.

MR. KOCHIS; That's fine. That only calls for eight hours a day for voir dire to do sixteen people or less.

THE COURT: If we have

MR. KOCHIS: If he's talking 30 minutes a person --THE COURT: It's not going to take 30 minutes a person. It's simply not going to take it, not on the sequestered voir dire. If we had eight, let's see how it goes, that was allowing -- if we allowed fifteen minutes a person, that's four per hour. If we started at 9:00, that would be 12 in the morning; so if you started at 9:30 at 15 minutes a piece, that would be 9:30 till 12:00, we'd get 8 in, wouldn't we?

MR, KOCHIS: You could conceivably spend almost 20 minutes a juror, I think, on 8 in the morning and 8 in the afternoon, because my experience is every session, one or two people self-destruct almost immediately with something, within two or three minutes. It doesn't take 20 minutes for them to say I forgot to tell you that I'm getting married next month or I can't sit.

MR. NEGUS: I think there are very few people that have done it in as short a time as you did it in the Gray case.

THE COURT: I'm inclined to agree, to some extent, Mr. Abubakari was not verbose.

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 MR. NEGUS: You know me,

THE COURT: Well, restrain yourself, Counsel, and go to the gist of it, and do the rest of it in open court on a class basis as much as you can. You don't really -- I'm not going to lecture you, because I don't think really counsel sway the jurors like you sometimes think that you do.

MR. NEGUS: My questioning has not been designed to sway them, but I think the questions that I think go to cause sometimes take longer.

THE COURT: What we can do is to if we find that -you know, we can juggle the list. We can take the ones
on the end and add them up or delay them or something else,
reschedule them.

MR. NEGUS: How are we going to -- okay. Let's say that we go -- that we pick however many names that we're going to pick and we death qualify them so that we have 120 or however it is that -- however many Mr. Kochis figures we need who are death qualified. What are you going to do then? How are we going to go through those people once we get to the general voir dire? Do we draw them out?

MR. KOCHIS: No. What we did last time is if at the end of their sequestered voir dire when they left the courtroom, we gave them a group and a day to appear, and we did, as I recall, at random every — every third or fourth person.

THE COURT: We go back and we get another 60 people in the courtroom. They may be 60 people out in the community. We put 12 of them in the jury box. We go through more questioning, wind up with 12 of them, and we go right through and excuse for cause and peremptories.

MR. NEGUS: When do you draw the order?

MR. KOCHIS: His question was how do you choose which 60 are the first to come back out of the 120?

THE COURT: I was going to get to that. The clerk's scheduled at instructed intervals and by agreement of counsel. They didn't want them all to be from the first group and all from the second group, so she was allowing to fill in -- I might have you explain that, Mrs. Lewis, You were bringing some of the last group in the first day of the first 60 group that we had?

THE CLERK: You had three separate groups, and then we took one of each group and set it up on the list of the days they were going to come back, so the first one maybe would come on the first day, but number three would come on the first day later. It was done in rotation.

THE COURT: That's as far as individual voir dire, and then how did we get the large group, the 60 in later on?

MR. KOCHIS: That's how. When you brought eight in in the morning, the first person to qualify at random went into group one that was coming back Monday morning. The

second person to qualify would be in group two brought back the second day. The third person would go in group three, and you kept dividing everybody up into groups of three.

MR. NEGUS: There was never any drawing of names? It was self-selected on the basis of the order in which they got in the line?

MR. KOCHIS: And the order of who had been excused prior to them. Someone who could theoretically --

THE COURT: No. There's no drawing as far as when to bring a group in here. The drawing is when we put them in the jury box.

MR. KOCHIS: I know, but I think what Mr. Negus is asking, or getting ready to ask, is that we don't do it that way, and that there's a second random.

THE COURT: What's concerning you?

MR. NEGUS: I don't like it, and it happened to me last time, that there the non-random elements of the selection, and that strikes me as -- as -- as -- we're not going to have the present clerk or present bailiff in San Diego. I don't know who we're going to have. I wouldn't -- there are those -- these people I wouldn't have the same objection with, but --

THE COURT: That can be easily handled, I would think, if you have --

MR. KOCHIS: We kept -- the lawyers kept track of

that.

estimate is, say, 160 and if -- if we therefore could only accommodate 160 people with putting them in the courtroom A, B and C, do you see what I mean on three days, whenever they may be, then we can have -- we could have three numbers in the box, in the wheel, and then as the jurors finished with their sequestered voir dire, the clerk would draw out one of the three numbers, if you want, until we exhaust either A, B or C and then only have two left, any number of ways that you want to. Something like that wouldn't take any time.

(No omissions.)

MR. NEGUS: Okay. I -- I don't think that the -that the things take even time. It's just a different
way of organizing them. I'm trying to --

THE COURT: Well, I'm open to suggestion.

THE CLERK: Your Honor, when we did it last time
on the Gray trial, the attorneys were also able to keep
track of what groups they were in because I had three
different dates for appointment schedules, and I would give and I had them marked 1, 2 and 3. The attorneys also knew
which ones were going in there.

THE COURT: When you say "appointment schedule," you're talking about?

THE CLERK: Where they were to come back for the final jury selection, when you started pulling the names out of the box.

THE COURT: Then we start out -- I've forgotten already. If we start out with 60 people on, say, a Monday, when are we going to get to the second group of 60? When do we have them come back?

MR. KOCHIS: We would either have them come back the following morning at 9:30 or in the afternoon. We would try to estimate how long it would take us to do a general voir dire of that group of people and exercise the peremptory challenge that would exhaust them as a group. And then what happened was we never got beyond the second group, because everyone runs out of peremptory challenges.

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MR. NEGUS: This may be a tad more complicated way of doing it. But let's just -- let me see if I can make a suggestion. We're going -- the order in which the people come in the first 60 is going to be, I presume, random. That is, we're going to get 60 randomly selected people, then another 60, another 60.
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THE COURT: Well, let's think about it for a second.

MR. NEGUS: All right.

MR. KOCHIS: What -- where we're --

THE COURT: We're talking about the very first time we're getting anyone in the courtroom.

MR. NEGUS: Talking about step one.

MR. KOCHIS: That will be up to, I assume, the Jury Commissioner as to how those people get in. We will have no say.

MR. NEGUS: We will have no say, so that's 60 people random.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NEGUS: If we -- and we'll have anywhere between 40 to -- 30 to 40 survivors, depending upon whose estimate is more accurate as to how many we lose, right?

MR. KOCHIS: Yes.

MR. NEGUS: All right. If we draw the order of appointments in a random manner so that --

THE COURT: That's no problem.

MR. NEGUS: -- Juror Jones is given appointment No. 1,

on the <u>Hovey</u>, if we then maintain that same randomness, we haven't lost any randomness, and both sides then know what order the jurors would be called into the box and we don't have to do any more drawings, and it's easier to schedule stuff.

2, 3, all the way through, then we are maintaining a random-

ness in the order in which we -- we voir dire people. On --

MR. KOCHIS: I am now completely lost, because from the 20 or 30, what's going to happen next is <u>Witherspoon</u>.

MR. NEGUS: Right.

MR. KOCHIS: And they're going to get a day certain to come back for Witherspoon.

MR. NEGUS: Right.

MR. KOCHIS: And we -- the -- what we lose a little bit is the flexibility of a juror saying, "I have a doctor's appointment that morning."

THE COURT: We made a lot of -- we made a lot of adjustments in that regard to accommodate you.

MR. NEGUS: We didn't. And we know that other people --

THE COURT: How can that possibly be important?

MR. NEGUS: Well, what I'm -- I -- I can't prove it,
but I feel that it was important to my last case. Maybe
I'm just paranoid, but I -- it -- it allows people
the possibility of manipulation. And, as I said, if we had
this clerical staff in San Diego, I would have no problem.

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And so I would -- would like to have it -- make sure that who comes into the box when is completely random and has not got to do with the clerk's making assignments in any point along the way.

But I don't know which clerical staff we're going to have

THE COURT: Well, let's -- let's think about it, stop just right there for a second.

MR. NEGUS: Okay.

THE COURT: We have excused for cause, that being for time, primarily. We're down to 30 or 40 people in the courtroom. At that point, I will explain the procedure, whatever it may be, to the remaining people, and we, all of us, four of us here, five, if Mr. Kottmeier is here, will then leave. We're going to get the heck out of the courtroom so that the clerk can do her bit --

MR. NEGUS: Right. Okay.

THE COURT: -- with the bailiff. And then at that point, what she's got to do is to give, then, an appointment schedule with a record of that appointment schedule.

MR. NEGUS: There's another way to do it, okay?
When the first 30 come in, at that point in time, we draw
them in order, 1 through 30.

THE COURT: What -- what -- what first 30?

MR. NEGUS: 60 people come in.

THE COURT: Yes.

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. NEGUS: Okay. You've got 30 left. We put their names in a hat, we draw them out, we give out No. 1, No. 2, all the way down through 30. That is the order in which they will be called to the box. As they are struck, then, you know, somebody else moves up in the list. we have -- what I'm suggesting is we have a list of the order in which the people are going to go into the box right at the beginning. That is the only practical way that I know of, not having multiple drawings, preserving randomness.

MR. KOCHIS: That to me seems like the least random, because what you're saying, then, is you were saying the people that show up the first day you're definitely going to get in the jury box one way -- after everything, after Witherspoon, after pretrial publicity.

MR. NEGUS: Right.

MR. KOCHIS: They're going to be in the box for sure.

MR. NEGUS: And that's -- that's -- but, see, the thing is they're coming in in a random fashion. There's no lack of randomness in who comes in the first day, second day, third day. As soon as you let the clerk determine the order in which people are going to be coming in, then you're open to manipulation.

I don't think that that's in accord with THE COURT: the law.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I --

THE COURT: I have to check it out, but it -- it talks in there somewhere of when -- sets out the jury procedure about when you pass by cause, for cause, the jurors shall then be randomly drawn. I think that that has to be the last stage.

MR. NEGUS: Well, that's -- that can't be right, because we normally put 12 in the box before we examine for cause, true?

MR. KOCHIS: But, you know, Judge, my concern is, practically, what happens is, if we follow that, you're never -- the people who we see the third day of our first general -- the people who are going to be jurors, 250 through 350, they are never going to get in the box --

MR. NEGUS: What's wrong with that?

MR. KOCHIS: -- ever.

MR. NEGUS: Why is that a problem? I mean, how does that affect the randomness of it all?

THE COURT: Well, you just have a different idea than before. Counsel before felt that was a problem.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I mean, it doesn't strike me as a problem. Maybe Mr. Kochis can educate me. I mean, I'm going to learn as to why they thought it was. But I don't -- I don't see that there's any significance as to who gets -- who arrives here on Day 1 versus who arrives here on Day 3.

I do see there's a signficance as between males and

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females and that sort of thing when the clerk starts setting up appointments, because that's what I feel happened to me. I may be wrong, but that's what I feel. And I don't want it to happen again.

MR. KOCHIS: I'm having trouble appreciating what Mr. Negus said, because in our case, no matter what the clerk did in terms of an appointment, that did not have an absolute effect on what proof you went into. If the clerk decided to stack all the women from 9:30 to 11:00 and all the men from 11:00 to 12:00 in the morning, still depending on what happened during Witherspoon, the whole process was still random in that you went one into group one, one into group two, one into group three. And if you looked at the list in the morning, the people you thought were going to be the first group were in the second group, and all of a sudden the people that you thought were going to be in the second group were in the third group, and vice versa. It was all random.

MR. NEGUS: Maybe -- how about another way of doing it? This -- this will solve Mr. Kochis' problem and my problem both, perhaps.

We -- if we're going to have 320 people show up, okay, on Day 1, we assign them a number drawn randomly from 1 to 320. That will randomly distribute them around. And we won't have any other mechanical way of doing it. Follow me? Does that solve your problem?

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in making our -- in our jury selection.

advantage out of -- out of that. You do know which order they're going to come in. And it randomly distributes people around, so it doesn't matter which order you interview them in and it doesn't matter which -- nobody else can --

It helps us both. I mean, we both get the same

MR. KOCHIS: We never have 320 people show up on

THE COURT: I think I see it, but I don't think I

MR. NEGUS: Okay. I'm -- I'm talking -- you have

30 people out there. We draw. One of them gets the No. 5,

distribute it. We know which -- we know which order they're

going to be coming into the box, which helps us, I think,

one of them gets No. 73, one of them gets No. 82. We

So you'll -- you'll get a random drawing as to whether

group, or whatever. You follow me?

MR. NEGUS: Okay.

MR. KOCHIS: No. I'm lost.

they're in the first 60 group to be called, the second 60

MR. NEGUS: Well, right. But -- okay. That's right.

nobody else can affect the result of that. Does that solve

your problem?

MR. KOCHIS: Yeah. The only problem I have with that statistically is I'm not sure we're going to lose people representatively, due to time and publicity, the same percentage.

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For example, we could give random numbers, and what we find out is all the people who have random numbers from 150 to 250 we lose due to <u>Witherspoon</u> or time.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. But, then, we -- it's still -then the -- then the selection process is still random.

I mean, it's -- even if it turns out to be you go in order,
once you lose No. 1, then you skip to No. 2. So if you
lose 1 through 150, then you still -- then you just still
go in the order of 151 through 320.

MR. KOCHIS: That I understand. But one of the things we were concerned about in Gray was telling the jurors, "Okay, you're going to be here for half a day to get a date. And then within the next three weeks, you're only going to come back once. It's either in the morning or the afternoon, and it will be for a date certain."

And then when they did come back, if they qualified, we told them, "You're free until 9:30 a.m. at this particular time."

And the clerks didn't have to scramble around and call people and move them up. And that's one of the things I'm concerned about.

I'm not, as I think about it, I may not be opposed to Mr. Negus' original suggestion. But we're going to be imposing on San Diego enough. And I'd like a system where the jurors come in, they get a date certain for <u>Witherspoon</u>, and, when they leave, they know exactly the day and the time that they're to come back for general voir dire, and that

no one has to do anything in the interim to them, don't have to --

MR. NEGUS: We can stack the general -- I mean, okay. I think that the way I suggested will essentially accomplish that, because you're going to get a random distribution of the numbers from --

THE COURT: Go through it again briefly.

MR. NEGUS: First, we have -- if we're --

THE COURT: 60 people come in first. What do we

do?

MR. NEGUS: We have 320 numbers in a hopper.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NEGUS: The clerk sits in and assigns the person a particular number from 1 to 320. If the number is from 1 to 127 or whatever it turns out to be, then they're on the first day of general voir dire, and we can schedule their appointment for -- for <u>Witherspoon</u> whenever it is convenient for them. If they're from 108 to 2 -- 216, they're on the second day of general voir dire, and they can schedule their appointment whenever is convenient for them. If they're from a number from, whatever it is, to 320, then they're on the third day of general voir dire, and they can schedule an appointment whenever is convenient for them. And that way --

THE COURT: Counsel, why are you doing this?

MR. NEGUS: Because --

THE COURT: What is wrong with the way that we're doing it? We're drawing them -- they're drawn by random.

We have initially 60 people coming in at random. We're scheduling them -- you're going to exercise your for cause and your peremptories in the usual manner. We're going to put from 40 people or 30 out. We're going to draw 12 people into the box by random.

MR. NEGUS: Because -- because -- because which

person comes, the important thing is that -- is that randomness

of the day in which -- the order in which they go into the

box is selected. You are taking the -- you're making it

non-random as to who's in the first group to have 40 -- to

have their names drawn from the hat to be -- to be

put in the jury, giving the clerk -- clerk the discretion

to do that. I don't -- I think that's --

(No omissions.)

MR, KOCHIS: But my argument is, one, we're not doing that,

MR. NEGUS: Yes, you are.

THE COURT: I won't give the clerk any discretion at all. We'll set down the rules. I'll give the clerk absolutely a directive to where they'll have no discretion.

MR. NEGUS: Then you can't change the order of the appointment.

THE COURT: All right. We won't change the order of the appointments unless she comes back to us and says that they have that marriage coming up or they're going to be sick that day or something.

MR. NEGUS: That's unworkable.

MR. KOCHIS: I have two thoughts. It's not exactly the day they call as to whether we — the day they come in under our system. It's what order they happen to fall in on the day they show up. For example, the way we did it in Gray, if you showed up on the last day we Witherspooned, but you happened to be in the group one slot, you came back with the first group. What we could do, if Mr. Negus is concerned about the randomness, is every morning and every afternoon when the eight people show up, put eight numbers in, hand them out, and, then, based on the number they get determines whether we see them first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and then that would be random, and that's the selection, the order, that's going to

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 determine whether they're group one, group two or group three.

THE COURT: I'd rather do something like that.

When they leave -- to refine that idea a little bit, we've got eight people come in. When that first one gets ready to leave, the clerk can then -- has all eight numbers, say, in the wheel. They'll --

MR. KOCHIS: No, It would have to happen before that. The first person we see, if they Witherspoon qualify, they'll be in group number one, come back for general voir dire the first day, and we'll definitely see that juror one way or the other. If the first three people all Witherspoon qualify, the third person we Witherspoon on day one, we may never get to again.

MR. NEGUS: Okay, but that's not random, because the clerk has set the order in which the people are coming in to see us. The clerk has determined who's number one.

MR, KOCHIS: Well, but it's --

THE COURT: It's from random selection from the audience, randomly selected 60 people to show up. That's random to begin with,

MR. NEGUS: It's not random when they form a line and the clerk writes down one through eight in the morning, one through eight in the afternoon. That's not random, and it's possible to have manipulation, and I'm opposed to it.

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and we're going to do it the way we did it before. I find no infirmity there, and we've got to do something in a reasonably logical manner. I'm not going to appear a complete bumpkin to the people in San Diego.

MR. NEGUS; I am willing to work out any of a number of ways, as long as it's random. Your way allows the clerk to determine the order in which people are assigned.

THE COURT: No. We predetermine -

MR. NEGUS: How do you do that?

THE COURT: We predetermine that the jury commissioner draws in 60 people, hopefully at random, and then their names are -- I don't know if they're arranged alphabetically

MR. KOCHIS: Those people are going to be seen the first week.

THE COURT: -- or what, and then we will go for cause.

MR. NEGUS: Okay.

THE COURT: And then when we excuse those people and we're down to the net the first day, after about 45 minutes to an hour, we're down to net, then we leave the room, and the clerk then, by whatever method we want, she can put in all remaining 30 people, if you want, and draw them out one at a time as far as what dates for their appointments.

MR. NEGUS; That was the original suggestion that

I had. Mr. Kochis objected to that because it didn't allow

any flexibility.

THE CLERK; Your Honor, what they had before was the appointment dates were already set up, January 21, January 22, January 23. Then the people -- half the people came to the bailiff's desk and half of them came to mine, and we scheduled them first come on the first appointment date. We had to fill up all the appointment dates.

THE COURT: You had the little slips for appointment filled out?

THE CLERK; No. This was a list. The little slips for appointment was after <u>Witherspoon</u>, groups one, two and three, but the other ones we had to fill out -- we couldn't -we couldn't -- like if there was January 21, 22 and 23 and then maybe there was March 1st, 2nd and 3rd, we didn't let them come back in March.

THE COURT: I hate to be wasting the record on something like this. Let's see if you can agree to this. What's wrong with this method? If that's agreeable with you, Mr. Negus, we're down to the net, 30 to 40, hopefully, we leave, those 30 to 40 names are put in the wheel, and she draws them out one at a time and she sets them up in whatever manner we tell her to set up, she draws a juror number 15, you get the first appointment, and you're there at 9:30 in the morning on such and such a day.

MR. NEGUS: That's what I suggested, I thought, to begin with, and Mr. Kochis objected.

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THE COURT: What's wrong with that?

MR. KOCHIS: Okay. Let me just understand this. The date that the people get the first day they're here, that's the day they'll come back for general voir dire; is that correct, not for the --

THE COURT: No. That's going to be for sequestered voir dire.

MR, KOCHIS: Okay, and then the -- then the only --I think this is what Mr. Negus is concerned about, and if he's not, then the slip they get will determine only -there's only going to be a limited number of slips. There's only going to be 16, whether they come back -- well, because we didn't --

THE COURT: They're going to all get a slip to come back at 20-minute intervals or whatever we decide upon at that point,

MR. NEGUS: If the order of the 20-minute intervals is determined on the first day by a random drawing and then the order in which they come back in the three groups is determined by the sequence in which they go through, then --

MR. KOCHIS: So they get a number one through sixteen, The first day they'd be numbers one through sixteen.

THE COURT: I don't understand that. Where do you get 16?

> MR, KOCHIS: Eight a session, sixteen a day; right? MR. NEGUS: If -- what you're saying -- if what

you're saying is that the clerk is drawing the order in which they appear, that is, August 1st from 9;00 o'clock, 9;20, 9:40, 10:00 o'clock, 10:20, 10:40, and then we're going to — when they go through, we go one — when we go through the <u>Witherspoon</u>, they're put into group A, B or C for the general in terms of first one at A, next one to B and C, then back to A, that's random. I have no problem with that,

THE COURT: Let's do it that way.

MR. KOCHIS: Done.

MR. NEGUS: That doesn't allow you to switch appointments, though.

THE COURT: We've got to have some flexibility.

We're not machines here, People have --

MR, NEGUS: As soon as you get flexibility, you have people manipulating,

MR. KOCHIS: But, Your Honor, here's a problem that would come up, and I'm sure Mr. Negus has had this experience. You have four people in the morning. Your clerk would come in and would say, Your Honor, juror number one, Mr. Jones, has car trouble, he's going to be 20 minutes late, do you want to wait or do you want to go to juror number two? You'd go, well, bring in juror number two.

Under Mr. Negus' proposal, we can't do it that way.

THE COURT; Wrong, I would simply overrule any
stupid objection he may make like that.

MR, KOCHIS: Also, if a juror calls in and says
I can't be here this morning, my son's sick, can I show
up at 1;30, that throws his thing in the whack also. We
have people who stay in the restroom longer --

MR. NEGUS: Yes, sir, because those kind of things came up in my last trial. I think I saw the possibility of manipulation. That's my personal paranoid opinion.

I feel that I got harmed by it, and it's -- it's -- I didn't -- until I saw it happen, I wouldn't have thought of making an argument. I think that what you're doing is, therefore, not random. That is, it's allowing people to control it, and that's illegal, If -- any way that you want to do it that we can make sure that the order of which people get in the box is random, I'm easy. I've tried five,

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Negus, there's going to be some deviations from random drawing, as you define the phrase. The whole thing is random to begin with. I think anything we do after that is superfluous. I'll do it to this extent. There will be no deviation from it done by the clerk. Any deviation would be done by the judge after the clerk can bring us a message that the juror can't come that time, but can come at another time, they've got to take their child to a doctor a certain day. And at that time it can be put on the record in chambers, or wherever we are, and I will make a ruling after hearing from counsel,

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but there's got to be some room. We're not machines.

Okay? So I will simply overrule your objection in that regard.

We are going to bring in 60 per day -- per session, like 60 at 9:30 and 60 at 1:30, Of that first 60 we will excuse for cause, we will wind up, hopefully, with 30 to 40 people. We will put their names in a wheel. They will be drawn by random and scheduled with no flexibility from the clerk eight in the morning, eight in the afternoon, at least initially, to see how we go. We can add or detract if we can't make it or we go faster.

MR, KOCHIS: Your Honor, not to get bogged down in the mechanics, but then they would get a number from one to whatever, and they would be called as if they were standing in line to buy ice cream, and number one would get the first slot, number two --

THE COURT: I don't have any trouble with deviating from that. If one of them's in the bathroom, we'll take that one and go back to the first one when he comes out of the bathroom.

MR. KOCHIS: I'm talking about the first day when we've got the 30 people left after the general.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KOCHIS: What numbers are you going to have some poor clerk in San Diego who doesn't know we're coming yet put in there, times or numbers, or what are we going to do?

MR, KOCHIS; Fine. Now I understand that. The names are going into the wheel.

THE COURT: Any final words?

MR. NEGUS: Not that I haven't already said,

(No omissions,)

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THE COURT: All right. I appreciate that we don't have a date yet to commence and move to San Diego. You are going to make -- have you made up your mind about motions and --

MR. NEGUS: I'm going to challenge the jury because I don't think there's a single jury panel in California that has enough Black people on it, certainly not the percentage of the -- of the population. And I'm going to make a motion for a change of venue.

THE COURT: Well, what -- that's -- that's two things you're doing.

MR. NEGUS: Yes.

THE COURT: Challenging the jury?

MR. NEGUS: I suppose that the most logical thing to do would be change venue first, because then that's -if it were granted, then the jury challenge would be moot. But, yes, those two things.

THE COURT: Challenge the jury for inadequate representation of Blacks?

MR. NEGUS:

THE COURT: You expect to be prepared on those? You have already done much preparation as to change of venue, and you probably will have some additional materials.

MR. NEGUS: Well, the answer to that question depends upon two things: when we -- when we go down there and how much time I have between, whenever we finish up here and when

we go down there.

THE COURT: I was going to give you a couple days off.

MR. NEGUS: I -- as I said, I think I need at least three weeks between the time we finish here and the time we start there. And I don't think I can be prepared otherwise. If I get that adequate time -- I can't be --

THE COURT: We know what -- pretty much what we're going to be doing next week. We went through that. How much time are we going to have after that?

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, when we stop Monday, what direction does the Court want us moving in on Monday?

I can have --

THE COURT: Well, we're going to have Gregonis here, as I understand it, and he said he had another ten minutes or something like that on matters that he didn't conclude. In any event, I don't mind another ten minutes or twenty, whatever, something brief, between the two of you. But then we're going to have some questions, and I would suggest -- I don't care which one of you takes the witness to try and answer the concerns that I have. I could do it, or either one of you. I don't care.

MR. KOCHIS: I plan to ask Mr. Gregonis in that area, and he may not be the only witness in that area on the issue of photography.

THE COURT: Well, all right. Whatever. We're going

to spend that day, such as it is, on those issues, limited re-examination by Mr. Negus, and for you, and then the question of the <u>Hitch</u> issue.

MR. NEGUS: The Hitch issue?

THE COURT: We're still on Hitch.

MR. NEGUS: Can we get the evidence in before we argue it?

MR. KOCHIS: I think the Court's talking about argue about the A-41 photograph Hitch issue, are you not?

MR. NEGUS: Well, I would -- that's --

THE COURT: That's what I'm talking about.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I'm not -- I want to have Dr. Blake testify on that before we decide anything on A-41. I -- I -- not -- I -- I want --

THE COURT: I don't think I would decide --

MR. NEGUS: Dr. Blake's coming down Thursday, and that's the -- that's the --

THE COURT: I don't think I indicated that I was going to make a decision on that. It's going to be hopefully by the end of next week I will make a decision on Hitch. Thornton's, well --

MR. NEGUS: John's going to be on Tuesday, Blake's going to be on Thursday, Wraxall apparently is out of town all next week. If we get his report, I may be able to -- if Counsel will stipulate, may be able to have Dr. Blake interpret that report for us so we don't have to wait for

Mr. Wraxall to get back. Otherwise --

THE COURT: That's the end of it on Thursday, then?

I didn't intend to make a decision after Gregonis.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. Assuming that -- that we know the results of UU, because that's the most important, and we can stipulate that the results of the other stuff would be -- would have been the same --

THE COURT: All right. So that takes care of next week. And then, following that --

MR. KOCHIS: Well, Your Honor, I don't think it does.

THE COURT: It doesn't?

MR. KOCHIS: Let's assume, for example, Monday Mr. Negus and I, in our very organized fashion, handle Mr. Gregonis by eleven or noon. Which area are we going to move onto at 1:30?

MR. NEGUS: I will have more stuff, I hope, to give you on the jury stuff. We -- what I have, my --

THE COURT: You're going to have to synthesize it for me. You're just inundating me on that material. I -- I -- I am simply not going to -- you know, this -- this may be unworkable, Mr. Kottmeier, as -- as you can see. I don't mind having it here, and I don't mind taking a look at it. But there's simply no way that I can assimilate each and every word of that.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I --

THE COURT: Unless you're able to annotate it for

 me or argue from it logically in some manner.

MR. NEGUS: I'm prepared -- I would like that to be a record as to what the witnesses would say if they -- if they came. I am perfectly -- I think I'll be able to pick out what I considered to be the high points of it and -- but I -- I --

THE COURT: Well, I'll have information from what you say, not -- not everything that's in those records.

MR. NEGUS: And I'll have to read the reports, I suppose, because I -- that's what the -- or, you know, I'll just ask that I -- I mean, I can ask for a continuance in order to try to get everybody down here, because, you know --

THE COURT: Counsel, if you have a motion under

Penal Code 995, for instance, there's only portions of that

transcript that are crucial to you. Hopefully you don't have

to call each and every thing as cited in those reports.

MR. NEGUS: Well, the -- let's -- let's take it one by one.

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, could we have a five minute recess.

THE COURT: Certainly.

MR. KOCHIS: Appears we're not going to be done any time shortly.

(Recess.)

MR. NEGUS: As far as the offers of proof, perhaps we could not argue about that now and wait and see, on when

we actually get down to it, how it works out. I don't think we're getting -- I don't think I was being very articulate about the issue, and, when I get ready, I'll probably be more articulate.

THE COURT: I don't have your tentative list with me again, Mr. -- yes, I do.

MR. NEGUS: Anyway, once I get all the stuff gathered, I can be -- we are not finished with any of the nine except one, I think. And as far as B4, B5, B6, as soon as I get all the stuff together, then I'll have all the stuff together and I can at least articulate and argue what I'm asking for.

THE COURT: What did you do with reference to 4, turn over to the Defense for testing serological evidence?

MR. KOCHIS: That -- when I talk to Mr. Gregonis on Sunday, I'm going to pin him down as to an estimate as to when he's going to be done, and then we're going to go from there. That was my understanding.

MR. NEGUS: And his -- if his estimate is soon enough, that might make me happy.

THE COURT: What's the 1385 Motion regarding special circumstances?

MR. NEGUS: 1385 is the motion to dismiss. That requires we get into the end of the <u>Hitch</u> motion. And --

MR. KOCHIS: It's the section of the Penal Code that gives the trial Judge general discretion to dismiss an action with cause in the interest of justice, or words to

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MR. NEGUS: And -- and -- and --

MR. KOCHIS: It's not even limited to murder cases or special circumstance cases.

MR. NEGUS: There was a case which I don't have a copy of yet which came out of Orange County.

THE COURT: Why would you think I'd want to dismiss?

MR. NEGUS: I'm not sure that you would, but I want

to make the motion on the grounds that you -- that the

death penalty, which is what the special had to do with,

requires a certain amount of certainty that, based upon

the handling of the scene in this case, we can't have. I

don't suspect that to be a long one.

THE COURT: Well, prepare for the next session some time on Monday to get to that.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I need to have -- I -- I'd like to have the <u>Hitch</u> thing decided beforehand. But it depends upon the outcome of the <u>Hitch</u>. I can do another short 1385 one, which does -- which has the racial characteristics -- racial thing before, which is based upon the same studies as the other stuff.

THE COURT: Let's go to your survey, 5a, survey of racial composition in San Diego jurors. You wish to be heard on that?

MR. NEGUS: Not yet. I need to get ready on that.

I'm still not -- I'll be able to articulate based upon the

materials that I have given you why that's necessary. But I haven't finished that yet.

THE COURT: If we do that for 320 people drawn at random, you think that's an adequate foundation?

MR. NEGUS: 320 people, if they all answer it, will give you a confidence level of about 5 percent, which is barely enough to get under <u>Buford</u>. If you do it for 500 people, you have a much better -- your -- your confidence level goes up quite a bit.

So what I was going to request was 500. First 500 in the door, whenever he starts at a given time.

MR. KOCHIS: Some of the problems that I have with that is that it seems to be the least random method of doing a survey. And that I don't know if the people -- I don't know who's going to be responsible for handing it out. Are they going to be a Defense investigator who's going to pick and choose and make sure he only hands them to the Caucasian people and not to minority members?

THE COURT: Oh, wait a minute. This is for -- this is something you want to do in the jury assembly room, right?

MR. NEGUS: Yes, same as last time.

THE COURT: We can take the 320 that we have, if we did anything at all, and supplement that with 180, selecting at random out of the jury assembly room, you know. We'll take everything on Monday, and they normally have, say, X a day, and everything on Tuesday, and have them for -- fill

it out, if you did it at all.

MR. NEGUS: The problem -- that's -- that's okay. What that requires is that we have a couple of days in that we have to do, then, do the jury challenge after we get our 320 people, because we don't know what the -- we don't have the figures until such time as we do it, so that that's okay with me, but that requires doing our excuses, say, one week and then taking two or three days off to do the -- to do the motion and analyze the data before we start the Witherspoon. Follow me?

(No omissions.)

THE COURT: I follow you.

MR. NEGUS: Because I can't make the motion before
I get the data.

THE COURT: I'll hear you about the motion for the survey tomorrow -- whenever you're ready, then.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. I mean I have no problem with that, I mean I don't see any -- there's no -- I don't see any problem about just scheduling Witherspoon after a two or three -- and then have the testimony. That's a more economical way of doing it.

THE COURT: Well, as long as you're not prepared to do it fully now, let's pass it.

MR. NEGUS: Okay.

THE COURT: Discovery of jury selection procedures, that's something you want me to request from them?

MR. NEGUS: Yes.

THE COURT: I don't know -- well, I guess it would be idle speculation to make any -- try and pin it down now, but I'm just -- to tell you what I was thinking about, I don't know if they have a 20-mile rule or anything like that.

MR. NEGUS: I know. That's what I'd like to find out, plus which list they use, what they do as far as what they do, if anything, about getting -- about the "no responses" to their summonses.

Let me just find my notebook on that.

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In our county, we have a little -- they print up a thing that gives -- it's called --

THE COURT; What would you prefer as far as the source of your jurors, in case they have any options? Would you prefer them mostly from the downtown area?

MR. NEGUS: Geographically?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. NEGUS: Yes.

THE COURT: So if they do have a procedure for drawing jurors from the more metropolitan, as opposed to the more far out --

MR. NEGUS: I would prefer downtown.

MR. KOCHIS: Well, Your Honor, I think what he's entitled to is a representative -- if he's entitled to anything after his change of venue motion -- and I'm not sure what he's entitled to after he gets a change of venue motion, based on the cases we cited last time -- he's entitled to a representative cross section of that community, not a block, not a street, but the community, the community of San Diego, and I think what Mr. Negus initially was wondering is do they go to voter registration lists, do they go to the Department of Motor Vehicles, do they go the police department and pull criminal records? And he might have some legitimate inquiry as to what type of sources they draw from generally, but in terms of city blocks, hotels, two-mile downtown area --

MR. NEGUS: What I meant by that was whatever they standardly use for their downtown courthouse, I mean, I assume that that's not going to -- I'm not talking about within three blocks of the U.S. Grand, but I'm not -- I would -- you've already indicated that North County would be included. I don't remember exactly whether --

THE COURT: Well, I don't know, myself. I told you I wouldn't transfer the case to Vista, you know.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I assume that they have -- I know that people in North County do not normally get taken to downtown San Diego on the juries.

THE COURT: Where does North County begin? I don't know.

MR. NEGUS: North County is essentially -- you take a line from I think probably Carlsbad and draw it across, and so like --

THE COURT: Well, that would include all of Rancho
Bernardo, Fairbanks Ranch?

MR. NEGUS: Escondido, all that stuff, Fallbrook, Carlsbad, Oceanside.

MR. KOCHIS; La Costa.

MR. NEGUS: I'm not sure about Leucadia and Encinitis, but all of the North County.

THE COURT: I would hope we wouldn't have people from that far a distance drive to town.

MR. NEGUS: They don't normally. All I could say is

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I know that people in North County don't have to go down to San Diego to be on the jury, because that's where my parents live, and they don't.

THE COURT: What else can we do? I'm running out of gas, and I've got work to do for tomorrow.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. We're easy.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. KOCHIS: Not at this time.

THE COURT: You're going to be ready to go on Monday morning at 9:30?

MR. KOCHIS: Assuming Mr. Gregonis returns to this county. I'll be ready on something. I hope to have him here at 9:30 to start examining him.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m. an adjournment
was taken in this matter, until Monday,
July 30, 1984.)

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