SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

CR 72787

KEVIN COOPER,

Supreme Court No.

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY

HONORABLE DAVID C. MERRIAM, JUDGE PRESIDING

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1983

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Respondent:

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IN PROPRIA PERSONA

COPY

DEBRA GODINEZ, C.S.R. Official Reporter, C-4491

1	IN THE SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY JUDICIAL COURT DISTRICT				
2	WEST VALLEY DIVISION, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO				
3	STATE OF CALIFORNIA				
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5	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE)			
6	OF CALIFORNIA,)			
7	Plaintiff,)			
8	vs.) NO. FWV-13949 and FWV-13950			
9	KEVIN COOPER,)			
10	Defendant.	}			
11	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL PROCEEDINGS				
12	BEFORE HONORABLE DAVID C. MERRIAM, JUDGE				
13	DEPARTMENT A - ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA				
14	Friday, October 7, 1933				
15	APPEARANCES:				
16	For the People:	DENNIS E. KOTTMEIER District Attorney			
17 18		and JOHN P. KOCHIS Deputy District Attorney			
19	For the Defendant:	CHARLES E. WAPD Public Defender			
20		BY: DAVID WILLIAM NEGUS Deputy Public Defender			
21	Also Present:	ROBERT G. MENDEZ Attorney at Law			
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24		ROBERT J. BIERSCHBACH Attorney at Law			
25		599 Arrowhead Avenue San Bernardino, CA. 92412			
26	Reported by:	DEBRA A. GODINEZ Official Reporter C.S.R. No. 4491			

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ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA; FRIDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1983; 8:30 A.M.

(The following proceedings were held in chambers:)

THE COURT: The record should reflect that we're in chambers at the request of defense attorney. Present are counsel for both sides and Er. Cooper.

MR. NEGUS: Two things: First of all, I'd like to again object to the extensive or extended television coverage. You now have the documents from my motion to close the preliminary hearing. The publicity has been extensive. Hopefully, some day it will die down, but I don't think it will ever die down if we keep having the cameras in here, so I would object.

THE COURT: Okay. The objection will be overruled.

MR. NEGUS: The second thing is with respect to the motion to close the preliminary hearing. I would be requesting to be able to indicate a few things which I think that the evidence will show at the preliminary hearing back here in chambers so that they don't -- I don't have to articulate them in open court.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm inclined to allow you to do that. So when you make your request, I'll rule on it out there.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. Well, I just wanted to do it now if you wanted --

THE COURT: Okay. How long do you expect it to be?

MR. NEGUS: Five minutes.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court will allow you to do that now.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. Basically, the basic prosecution evidence which I think will be introduced at the preliminary hearing is primarily physical evidence which will be used by the prosecution to try and put Mr. Cooper at two places. The first place that they will try and place him at is the place called the Lease residence, which is approximately a hundred and fifty yards away from the Ryen residence.

THE COURT: How is that spelled?

MR. NEGUS: L-e-a-s-e.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. NEGUS: And Ryen is R-y-e-n.

The evidence that will -- there will also be some evidence that they will try and introduce from my understanding which will try and place Mr. Cooper inside the Ryen residence, and basically that's -- the nature of the evidence that I would expect having read the prosecution's witness list -- the particular evidence which will be used to place Mr. Cooper inside of the Lease residence is a semen stain on a blanket, which has an enzyme in it which is only found in Black people, and apparently only in approximately ten percent of Black people and which

Mr. Cooper has. The -- there's also a footprint of a bare foot on a shower entrance, which I believe that Mrs. Punter of the Crime Lab will indicate is in her opinion Mr. Cooper's footprint. There will be tobacco found in the place which I would expect somebody is going to claim is of the kind of tobacco which is issued to inmates at the California Institution for Men. There -- that same type of tobacco is also found, I would expect -- I don't know for sure, but this is what I expect -- it would be -- there would be testimony that that would be found inside the -- an automobile that was taken from the Ryen residence some time in the same period of time as the -- as the -- as the killings. They will try and show that an ax from the Lease residence was one of the murder weapons, and that that ax was found at a distance of a quarter of a mile or so away from the Ryen residence.

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There will also be evidence of shoe prints, and there will be some evidence about a shoe -- a Pro-Ked shoe which left a print both in the Lease house and there's also a partial print in blood on a sheet inside the Ryen house. I would expect testimony that that particular type of shoe is issued to inmates at the California Institution for Men, and a -- testimony of one James Taylor, that he gave that particular type of shoe to Mr. Cooper when Mr. Cooper was at the California Institution for Men.

There will also be evidence inside the Ryen house

that in a hallway leading to the master bedroom where the bodies of the five victims were discovered is one drop of blood. That drop of blood has been analyzed partially and has in the course of the analysis been exhausted. there are in the drop of blood two rare enzymes which are found only in Black people. These are genetic markers that of the type that are found in blood. According to the analysis of Mr. Gregonis of the Crime Lab, I would expect him to say that that drop of blood and Mr. Cooper have those two rare enzymes, and I don't know what their calculation of the odds are of the percentage of the Black population which would have all the different characteristics shared by Mr. Cooper in that blood, but it's something in the order -- I would guess it's certainly over one in a hundred. That was the last I heard, and I don't know what it is at the present time, but it's a very small percentage of the Black population would be the only person to be possible to be a donor of that particular blood.

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I would expect also that with respect to that testimony there will be a motion with respect to suppressing it for failure to preserve — to take the proper steps to preserve that particular sample and also samples that one could reasonably expect to find in the carpet around that particular drop of blood. And I would expect those motions to be made both in the preliminary hearing and then if

Mr. Cooper is held to answer, again in the Superior Court.

Finally, there will be testimony by the prosecution of -- autopsy testimony which will be -- involve at least a hundred and forty separate wounds, and I would expect to take extensive testimony with the photographs of those wounds and other things that I would expect the prosecution to use in their presentation which would be of a rather inflammatory nature.

Finally, it may be necessary for the defense to call Joshua Ryen, one of the victims in the case. I am endeavoring to set up an interview eventually through his grandmother's attorney with him so that won't become necessary, but if that's not -- if that doesn't work out, he may also be called. I would expect his testimony to be rather spectacular if it was placed in the press.

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

Okay, Counsel, what I would expect we'll be doing this morning is I will go out into the court. I'm going to hear Mr. Mendez for NBC first on his motion to permit cross-examination, and that should be brief, and I'll rule on that. Mr. Megus, then you'll be given the opportunity to present any additional evidence you wish to on your 868 motion which we'll be proceeding on.

MR. NEGUS: Let me just ask you what is the status of the -- have we -- our stipulation -- as I understand it, the stipulation is that the exhibits that I have -- the Court

has looked at are now part -- are now introduced into evidence?

THE COURT: No, they're not. We have A through J and -- plus N. The remaining ones, which go through double R have been submitted but not received, and so you can make your motion then presumably.

MR. KOCHIS: I have no objection.

THE COURT: Okay. We'll do that out in open court.

MR. HEGUS: Okay.

THE COURT: Then once all the evidence is in, I'll permit argument on the 868 motion, likely take a very brief recess, rule on the 868, and then go back into court and -- or after the ruling on the 868, I'll allow you an opportunity to be heard on the request for a change of location. It's only a request. It's obviously not a change of venue.

Can you think of anything else that we're going to be covering this morning?

MR. KOTTMEIER: We have the matter of the requested contact of the FBI, the Border Patrol.

THE COURT: That's right. That order -- we'll address that order after the ruling on the 868. That ruling was up to the time of this hearing and so I'll hear counsel on whether that should terminate, and that may well depend in part on the 868 ruling.

Okay. Let's go out and do it.

(The following proceedings were held in open court:)

THE COUPT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, Counsel. This is the time and place set for the continued hearing in the case of the People of the State of California versus Kevin Cooper. The record may reflect that Mr. Cooper is present with counsel. The District Attorney's Office is represented.

At our last hearing we were hearing evidence and some argument on the defense motion to close the preliminary hearing to the public under Penal Code Section 868. We've had two interveners allowed to be — to participate in that matter and I've received points and authorities from both of them, and I appreciate that. What I would intend to do at this time is to allow Mr. Mendez to be heard on his motion for the Court to reconsider its previous ruling on the denial of the right of both Mr. Bierschbach and Mr. Mendez to cross-examine any witnesses that the defense expects to call.

Perhaps before we do that, do you expect to call additional witnesses, Mr. Negus?

MR. NEGUS: No, I do not.

THE COURT: Well, I guess it's moot at this time then, so we don't need to do that. Okay. Let's proceed right further on to the evidence part of the 868 motion.

Mr. Hegus, we have had marked Exhibits A through

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double R. Of those, A through J and N have been received
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   in evidence. Do you have a motion regarding the balance
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   of those exhibits?
           MR. NEGUS: Yes. At this time I would move that
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the remaining exhibits be introduced into evidence.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. KOCHIS: We have no objection.

THE COURT: Okay. They may be received.

Mr. Negus, do you have any additional evidence you wish to present?

MR. MEGUS: No.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Mendez, I don't think you're prepared -- or intended to offer any evidence, did you? Just argument.

MR. MENDEZ: No.

THE COURT: Mr. Bierschbach, likewise?

MR. BIERSCHBACH: No, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. We're then at the point where we'll allow the proponent of the motion to present his argument.

Mr. Negus?

MR. MEGUS: Basically we're here today, Your Honor, because the news industry has objected to having a closed preliminary hearing. My understanding is that the prosecution has not made any objection to this particular procedure being followed. We've already -- I've already

spent approximately two weeks of my time, plus I know the Court has spent additional -- a great deal of time in going over the exhibits. My investigator has spent a lot of time trying to gather them. My secretarial staff has spent a considerable amount of time preparing the exhibits, and based upon what we have accumulated, both counsel for the news industry appear to concede that there is a -- at least a reasonable likelihood that based upon the nature of the publicity that we have had heretofore, that an open preliminary -- an open preliminary hearing may very well prevent a fair trial of this particular case. And certainly it would prevent a fair trial in this particular judicial district, the West Valley Superior Court District, and -within a period of time which we could foresee would be the normal statutory time to bring the case to trial. would also submit that by any other standard of proof that's capable of actually being -- being proved, that the documentary evidence which we have submitted to you and which you've considered is such that the preliminary hearing should be closed.

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The argument essentially that the news industry is presenting through their attorneys is based upon -- first of all, it's based upon a dissenting opinion in a United States Supreme Court case. It was not the standard that they want to -- that they want to impose as far as what burden I have at this particular hearing. It's based upon

Justice Blackmun's concurring and dissenting opinion in Gannett. And then it was -- that -- that particular opinion was taken up by the -- I believe it was the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, a Federal Court, in the case of U.S. v. Criden, and the courts in Criden indicated that they weren't sure whether or not what they were doing was compelled by the First Amendment or not, but just to be careful and as part of their supervisorial powers over their particular circuit, they were adopting that particular test. The news industry presented that test -- or lobbied for that particular test in the Legislature of the State of California, and there was in fact a bill which I have presented in the points and authorities which set out that the test that they're requiring, the Legislature rejected that particular piece of legislation and did not require a showing such as the news industry requests.

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I would submit that given the analysis of an 868 motion made in the case of San Jose Mercury-News versus Municipal Court, that a mere showing that there's been high publicity should be enough. That is, one should not have to do what I did in this particular case and spend two weeks accumulating massive amounts of evidence to show the nature and inflammatory content of that particular publicity. But as no Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court hasn't yet ruled on what exact standard is required, in an excess of caution I felt compelled knowing that the news

industry was going to -- was going to intervene to make that particular -- to make that particular showing. I would submit that at a maximum, the kind of showing that one could be expected to make for a motion to close the preliminary hearing should be no greater than is required to obtain a change of venue. And in this particular situation I would submit that certainly based upon the analysis I set forth in the original points and authorities, that burden has been met. There has been a lot of publicity about other crimes than the one Mr. Cooper's on trial for that he's alleged to have committed, and basically those crimes are crimes that he has not been tried for. If you believe the statements of the prosecutors which are quoted in the press, Mr. Colville of Alleghany County and Mr. Sneddon of Santa Barbara County, those are crimes which at least in their anticipation, their hopes, they'll never have to try Mr. Cooper for, so we'll never know whether or not there's proof sufficient to sustain those in a court of law.

There has been publicity that he is supposedly a former mental patient. There has been publicity that associates Mr. Cooper with other crimes. There is -- every time some sort of crime comes up that involves an inmate of a custodial institution, Mr. Cooper's name is associated with that crime in the press. There was a Cuban escapee that was involved in a shoot-out in Los Angeles with banner

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headlines which connect -- and stories which connect Mr. Cooper into that. There was an escapee out in Lake Hughes from some probation facility out there that -- those stories connect Mr. Cooper. Obviously, Mr. Cooper had nothing to do with those particular crimes, but the nature of the publicity is to associate Mr. Cooper with any sort of dangerous or violent behavior and -- in a situation when in fact Mr. Cooper has never been convicted of a crime of violence.

The case also is involved in local politics, and we've had testimony that Mr. Cooper has become somewhat of a symbol of local opposition to further expansion of prison facilities in this particular area. There are innumerable articles which I've provided the Court which whenever they mention the legislative battles about prisons in this particular area tie those battles into -- into Mr. -- into Mr. Cooper's case so that various political figures have attributed the defeat of the Governor's plan to expand prisons in this particular area at Y.T.S. to the impact that this particular case has had in Sacramento.

There is various different kinds of publicity which indicates that various authorities have a belief and are expressing a belief in Mr. Cooper's guilt that they shared on television, Channel 4 as well as others, when Mr. Cooper was arrested which indicated that he thought he had a strong case. There are lawsuits which are being filed

against the California Institution for Men on the theory that they're responsible by -- for the Ryen killings. The only logical link in that particular -- in those particular lawsuits is the implicit assumption that Mr. Cooper must be guilty. The Grand Jury of this County is apparently investigating -- at least according to the newspaper articles in the Sun and some of the other newspapers -- apparently are investigating the same sort of thing.

There is in various publicity that has come out a certain -- a considerable amount of inflammatory language about the case. I would have liked to have quoted from NBC because their counsel is here, but they didn't provide us with any scripts of their particular broadcasts in response to a subpoena, so it's somewhat difficult to try and do that, but just as an example of the type of thing that we're dealing with, Channel 7 had an ad in the T.V. Guide which is reproduced in Exhibit QQ, I believe, and that was purported to be -- the program apparently never aired, but it was advertised as a program with an interview with an Owen and Angelica Handy, who are the people that according to the reports we've received so far Er. Cooper was staying with from early June until his -- until the time of his arrest. And quite unlike Mr. Mendez's assertion that the press doesn't take any position with respect to Hr. Cooper's guilt or innocence, the advertisements for that were entitled "Profile of a Murderer," indicating

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The alternatives to closing the preliminary hearing that the news industry has presented are (1) Mr. Mendez indicated that we should have the preliminary hearing open because quote rather than rely on secondary sources for this information, NBC submits that for the protection of Cooper's fair trial rights, it is best to permit MBC to attend the preliminary hearing so that it may accurately recount the events which transpire. That's on pages 12 and 13. And they have submitted a declaration by their news director that they're going to send people out here and report stuff even if they don't have any information coming out on which to base that. And I would submit that that particular kind of threat should not be a reason for buckling under to them and leaving the preliminary hearing open so that they can profit by the exposure on the evening news. In fact, I would be very surprised if this preliminary hearing lasts three weeks or however long it will last, that we will be shown every night on the evening news shots of a closed door in a courtroom. Maybe they'll do that once or twice, but I would expect that most news directors would get sort of bored with that after a while and find it not newsworthy. So I expect that probably if there is a closed preliminary hearing, the amount of publicity coming

clearly that KABC saw it in their commercial interest to

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Mr. Cooper.

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out of this particular court will be substantially -- will be substantially reduced.

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They indicate that -- the attorney for the Sun, Mr. Bierschbach, indicates that voir dire, I believe, should be a satisfactory remedy; that is, that somehow when we get to trial in this particular case, whatever damage the news media has done to Mr. Cooper's chance to get a fair trial can be cured at that particular time by asking jurors questions. Something of the futility of that I think as I mentioned in my responsive points and authorities is that in a case -- a capital case which is being tried right now, almost half the people mentioned Mr. Cooper spontaneously when they were asked questions about -- on the voir dire. Those are people who are actually going to be jurors, and it's very, very difficult, of course, to go out and subpoena in a hundred thousand people that would be part of the jury pool in this particular county and ask them questions -- you know, "How are you affected right now?" But we'd have some rather dramatic evidence, I would suspect, that there has been a substantial effect on the jury pool by the publicity that we've had heretofore so that -- I would submit that the kind of voir dire that counsel suggests is at least in this other case producing -- not producing the kind of results that would help Mr. Cooper.

They also suggest that a change of venue might be the kind of thing which could protect Mr. Cooper's rights

as an alternative to closing the preliminary hearing. Of course, in our state they cannot -- we cannot be compelled at this point in time to elect to change venue, and, of course, this Court even has no jurisdiction to grant such a request. So in making a determination about the closed preliminary hearing, this Court cannot sort of guess what a Superior Court will do if a change of venue motion is made. And we can't -- you can't even anticipate what a Superior Court will do if a motion for a continuance is made. So in ruling upon this particular motion, we have to assume that the case will be tried in the West Valley Superior Court within 60 days of the time the Information is filed.

Even if a change of venue were granted in this particular case, given the nature of the publicity, the extensive publicity that NBC has requested be allowed about the preliminary hearing, one wonders where the change of venue would be to. One of the problems in using the federal cases relied upon by counsel on a state context is that in the Federal Courts, you can change venue from, for example, Texas to Florida, which was recently done; that is, you're not stuck with trying to find some court in the state of California that -- in which Mr. Cooper can get a fair trial. And if there is a change of venue granted, one would hope that it would be to some area which doesn't cost the County of San Bernardino great amounts of

money to transport Mr. Kottmeier, Mr. Kochis, myself, and all the witnesses up to some remote corner of Northern California where perhaps the publicity isn't so strong. So what their -- what their proposed alternative is -- the change of venue is, I would submit a very, very potentially (a) very, very costly to this particular county; (b) not likely to preserve Mr. Cooper's fair trial rights if we have to try the case somewhere in the state of California, which we do under state law; finally, there's in the outline that I made of -- my outline of what I thought was shown in the documents that I've submitted, I mentioned that opening the preliminary hearing would, I believe, lead to witness fabrication, and counsel has disputed that. The there's one exhibit that I submitted and that is one out of many actually just as an example, but that is the reports of a person by the name of Alfred Hill. Mr. Hill is a peace officer. He's a correctional officer at the California Institution for Men, and he was interviewed by the police on -- I believe it was June 11 some time in the early -some time approximately a week after the crime. He presented to those people a complete fabrication about Mr. Cooper. The only thing that gave that fabrication any plausibility whatsoever was that he included in it certain materials that he'd heard in the news. We have received by way of discovery hundreds of reports of things that people have heard on the news which they have -- then

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led them to imagine -- fabricate some information with respect to this case, which they then telephoned into the Sheriff's Department. Thus far based upon the rather limited information which has been available, the fabricators with a couple of exceptions haven't been very persuasive. If the detailed facts that the prosecution intends to show at the trial were known to various potential witnesses, that would immensely aid in their fabrication of information about Mr. Cooper.

There's already been a strong showing there's a propensity for that to happen. San Jose Mercury-News recognized that particular problem and indicated that one of the -- one of the factors that could be used in closing a preliminary hearing was that there was no alternatives at a preliminary hearing such as would be available at trial which would be excluding and sequestering witnesses. So in order -- just on that ground, I think in order to preserve Mr. Cooper's fair trial rights and in order to make sure that we don't have witnesses drawing upon the testimony of one another, then I think that the preliminary hearing in this particular case should be closed.

The news media wants to establish a standard which is essentially impossible to prove. They want -- they want to have prior to a preliminary hearing being closed -- and most preliminary hearings in fact are not delayed as long as this one and probably most judges would not be too

happy with the proposition that one has to spend two weeks gathering evidence in most cases to try and justify a closure, so I doubt seriously whether the Legislature ever intended to impose upon counsel the burden that the news industry is suggesting. There are cases that don't even involve this kind of situation. The cases they involve involve pretrial suppression hearings. Those are hearings that take place just prior to trial at a situation in which all the parties are prepared, in which situations if there is going to be change of venue motions, the material can be gathered. The -- this particular situation is much more akin to a situation where you have a Grand Jury investigation; that is, we're still in the investigatory stage, and to require that -- before a preliminary hearing is closed that one go out and do jury surveys of the -- spend \$20,000 which I believe is the figure that was quoted to me -- to survey the people that have been exposed to the publicity so far in order to try and make the kind of showing that they would -- that they would require me to make, I think is just an absurdity and a waste of resources, and the showing that we've made -- the massive volume of publicity, the inflammatory nature of some of that publicity, the likelihood that that publicity will never die down as long as we continue to be exposed on the evening news at regular intervals, I think justifies closing this preliminary hearing so that some day, some time Mr. Cooper can receive

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THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

Mr. Mendez?

MR. MENDEZ: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

Before I respond to counsel's claims, I'd like to make a few points of my own. I think our position is well set forth in our points and authorities, but I would like to emphasize a few things.

It's clear that in this case before the preliminary hearing can be closed, this Court must make a finding that it's necessary in order to protect the defendant's fair trial rights. No California decision to date has established a standard that the Court should use in making that finding. The only cases to date that have treated that issue are the Federal Court cases. Those cases are based on a Supreme Court decision, and we have two Minth Circuit decisions, Brooklier and Associated Press. In each of those cases, they have held that a preliminary hearing cannot be closed unless the defendant proves to a substantial probability three tests: First of all, that if the hearing it's substantially probable that if the hearing is not closed, he will suffer irreparable harm. Secondly, that there are no alternatives to closure, and thirdly, that closing the hearing will protect against the perceived harms.

In this particular case the defendant has made three

claims in support of his position that he will be irreparably harmed in this case. First of all, he has said that if the press is permitted to be at this hearing, it will result in an increase of fabrication or perjury. Two, he has suggested that the public may learn of evidence that can be suppressed at trial. And finally, he has also said that if the press is permitted to be at this hearing, it will result in inflammatory publicity about this case. Now, we have taken the position that every claim that he has made is not supported in fact. The Supreme Court has held and the Federal Courts have held that having an open hearing protects against perjury because witnesses are then subject to the scrutiny of the public and it is less likely that perjury will occur when a hearing is open to the public. Secondly, with respect to his claim that the public will learn about evidence that may be suppressed at trial, he ignores first of all the fact that this case has received a great deal of publicity already, and it's quite unlikely that anything that will be revealed at the preliminary hearing will be new to the public, will be something they haven't heard already. In addition to which, he also ignores the procedural safeguards of voir dire and instructions from the Court. Finally, just to summarize our position, I think it's unreasonable for counsel to suggest that the press will take a position with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. NBC has not done that, and we will not do

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that. Our role is not to inflame, and we aren't here to try and pass judgment on the defendant. Our role is to simply make sure that the public is kept informed about an issue that is of primary importance to them.

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Now I'd like to respond specifically to some of the claims that defendant has made. First of all, he makes the claim that the press supported its substantial probability test before the California Legislature two years ago and that the Legislature rejected that test. think that's an unfair statement. As I understand it, the bill that was brought before the Legislature was brought very late in the legislative year and the bill never reached the floor of the Assembly or the Senate, so I think it's unfair to say in this case that the Legislature rejected that standard. I think it's more accurate to say that the Legislature never acted on it. The bill simply died in committee. As evidence of that, you would note that in Penal Code Section 868, no standard is articulated. I would suggest to the Court that if the Legislature intended to reject the substantial probability standard, the Court would have -- the Legislature would have articulated another standard in 868. There is no standard articulated in 868, and I think it's unfair --

THE COURT: There is one word, Counsel.

MR. MENDEZ: "Necessary." That's the only word that the Legislature gives us.

THE COURT: Isn't that the standard?

MR. MENDEZ: Well, how do we define "necessary,"
Your Honor?

THE COURT: Well, that's our problem, isn't it?
Didn't they intend that to be the standard?

MR. MENDEZ: Yes, it is. Well, I would point out to the Court that in <u>Brooklier</u> and <u>Associated Press</u>, that the language mirrors the language of 868. In <u>Brooklier</u> and <u>Associated Press</u>, the finding was that a court shall close a preliminary hearing when it is strictly and absolutely necessary to protect the defendant's fair trial rights. And then the courts went on to say that in making that finding, the defendant must meet a three-part test, the test that I've asserted to you before.

Now, again defendant's -- the defendant's reliance on the San Jose Mercury case is inapplicable here. Penal Code Section 868 was amended to provide for public hearings because of the holding of the California Supreme Court in San Jose Mercury. Again, the defendant makes -- bases a great part of his arguments on the fact that this case has generated a great deal of publicity. I won't dispute that. That's true. But the Supreme Court and the Federal Courts have also made it very clear that publicity alone is not enough to close a hearing. If that were true, a defendant could close any preliminary hearing at which the press showed up. By definition, any time we show up to a hearing, it's going to generate publicity. And if the only fact that

the defendant must prove is that the case has generated some publicity, we would be precluded from attending every preliminary hearing or every criminal proceeding for that matter.

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Counsel has suggested that the Court should use the same standard that is used in change of venue cases; that is, the reasonable likelihood standard. Change of venue cases are quite distinct from cases such as this where there is an attempt to keep the public out of the hearing. In a change of venue circumstance, the public's First Amendment right to be at the pretrial hearing won't be affected. The only thing that happens in that circumstance is that the proceeding is moved to another area, and that won't affect the public's right to attend that hearing. And I would suggest to the Court that the reasonable likelihood standard should not be used in this circumstance because the First Amendment considerations are more substantial. If this hearing is closed, the public's First Amendment right to be at this hearing will be infringed, and --

THE COURT: On what do you base any First Amendment right to be at a pretrial hearing? On what do you base it?

MR. MENDEZ: Well, in both Associated Press and Brooklier, citing Justice Blackmun's concurring and dissenting opinion in Gannett, the Court found that there was a First Amendment -- a right based on the First Amendment

to attend pretrial hearings.

THE COURT: Okay. If counsel is right in saying that the California Courts are not bound by the lower Federal Courts and if you're only tie to a Supreme Court -- the United States Supreme Court case is a dissent, where do you finally tie your Federal Constitutional right -- First Amendment right into a California Court?

MR. MENDEZ: Exactly. I understand the position.

First of all, although Justice Blackmun's opinion in

Gannett was a concurring and dissenting opinion, he wrote
for four justices. He wrote for not the majority, but it
was the only opinion in that court which represented the
oginions of four justices. I believe there were three other
oginions filed in that case. One was a dissent. And then
there of course was the opinion itself. And the Court was
divided as amongst itself in the three decisions, but
Justice Blackmun's decision represented four justices. And
the Federal Courts have stated that based upon that, that
it's fair to say that a majority of the current Supreme
Court would find a First Amendment right for the public to
attend pretrial hearings.

Again, I would point out to the Court that there is no California decision that has treated this issue. The Federal Courts have looked at this issue. They have specifically addressed this particular point, and they have used language that mirrors the California statute. The

Federal Courts state that there must be a finding that closure is necessary -- that closure is necessary to protect the defendant's fair trial rights. And in making that finding, they've established a test that this Court, we submit, ought to adopt.

THE COURT: Okay. So what you're asking is based on the statute, not necessarily on a United States Supreme Court dictate.

MR. MENDEZ: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MENDEZ: Again, counsel also emphasized the point that if this hearing were closed — if closed, it would somehow reduce the publicity that this case is going to generate, and I would submit to you that that's not very likely. This case has already generated a lot of publicity, and whether or not the press is permitted to be at this hearing, it is going to continue to generate a lot of publicity and I don't think that that argument is very compelling in this case. I don't think that the Court — that counsel's arguments to the Court establish that if we're not at this hearing, there won't be any publicity about this case. I submit to you that there will be continued publicity about this case, and I also submit to you that I would characterize that publicity as being fair and unbiased and as neutral as possible.

Counsel also made the point that the declaration of

Pete Noyes, our executive producer, was intended as a threat to the Court. That certainly is not the case. By making the point that we intend to cover this case whether or not we're permitted to be at the hearing, we aren't suggesting that we would not comply with the Court order should the Court order this hearing closed not to be in the courtroom. We won't do that. But we do have an obligation to our viewing public to report whatever it is we can, and from our vantage point outside the courtroom, we will attempt to meet that obligation. And again it's not meant as a threat to the Court. It's simply meant to state what is a fact, that we have an obligation to inform our viewers and we'll do it the best way we can.

With respect to reasonable alternatives, the Jury Commissioner for San Bernardino County estimates that there are approximately 300,000 jurors called to serve in San Bernardino County. As amongst that vast multitude of individuals, I find it unreasonable to suggest that this Court would not be able to find a group of jurors who could be unbiased and neutral and fair in this case. We have available to us the protections of voir dire. You can get the people here. You can ask them "Do you know --" "Have you received any publicity about this case?" "What was that publicity?" "Has that publicity affected your ability to be impartial in this case?" "Can you be impartial in this case?" We have those protections, and they are substantial

protections. In addition to which the Court can issue instructions to the jury, reminding them what their responsibilities as jurors are. I'm not sure where counsel gleaned this, but at least in my points and authorities, NEC never suggested that change of venue was an alternative in this case. We would simply rely again on voir dire and jury instructions, but we never suggested the change of venue as an alternative.

Finally, counsel has indicated that the standard that we have submitted that -- of proving necessity to a substantial probability is a very strict standard. Well, it's meant to be that way, Your Honor, because what it affects is the right -- the First Amendment right of the public to be at this hearing. That is a very substantial right.

moment. Where are you finding that First Amendment right if you — if it's not founded in a Supreme Court of the United States basis, the statute really places the determining question on this Court; that is, is the closure of the preliminary hearing necessary to ensure the defendant a fair trial. It doesn't say anything about weighing First Amendment rights. It simply says that I'm to make an attempted factual determination as to what effect the opening or the closure of the preliminary hearing will have on the defendant's opportunity for a fair trial.

MR. MENDE2: That's true, Your Honor. I can't dispute that. And again I can only tell you that the two Ninth Circuit decisions which have found that there was a First Amendment right for the public to attend these hearings is based upon Justice Blackmun's decision and Gannett.

THE COURT: We understand the circular approach then.

MR. MENDEZ: And I would -- that's basically our argument, Your Honor, that that is where we make that conclusion.

THE COURT: Fine. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Mendez.

Mr. Bierschbach?

MR. BIERSCHBACH: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, in this particular matter there has been no suggestion by Mr. Megus that the evidence at the preliminary hearing is going to be particularly inflammatory. Now, obviously every preliminary hearing is directed toward showing that a crime has been committed and that there's a reasonable probability to believe that the defendant committed the crime, and there has been no suggestion in this particular case that there will be confessions offered for the admission which may be disputed by the defense. Those are the kind of matters that are most dangerous and obviously if such a matter does come up, the Court could hold an in-camera hearing and decide whether or not it

would be admissible. But as far as I know, there has been no suggestion that anything like that exists or will be offered.

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Mr. Negus suggests that we have conceded that he has met a standard of a reasonable likelihood that prejudice will result if the preliminary hearing is allowed to remain open. We do not concede that at all. The evidence that he has submitted shows that there has been a lot of publicity indicating that a crime has occurred -- four people were murdered -- and that a person, Mr. Cooper, has been arrested for that crime. But there has been no showing of anything else. He attempted to show by Mr. Walker and by Mrs. Katz that the public opinion is to the effect that Mr. Cooper committed the crime. I believe he did not succeed in eliciting that evidence from either of those witnesses. Mr. Walker said he simply didn't know what public opinion was, and Mrs. Katz made the same response. So as far as the Court is concerned, there is no showing as to what public opinion may or may not be, and the fact that additional publicity may result certainly is not going to indicate that prospective jurors are going to have an opinion as to whether Mr. Cooper is guilty or not guilty of the crime that he is charged with.

Mr. Negus suggested that we were saying that an alternative is a change of venue. In my points and authorities I did cite the case of Metraska Press, a

United States Supreme Court case, which said that one of the alternatives was change of venue. But in the next paragraph I pointed out that the most satisfactory alternative is a very searching and thorough voir dire examination of prospective jurors at the time of trial, and I submit to the Court that that is the way that the matter should be handled. For the Court at this time to say that the defendant cannot get a fair trial unless the preliminary hearing is closed is speculation. The Court cannot determine or have any idea as to when this case will be tried. Mr. Negus says it will be tried in 60 days -or it could be tried in 60 days. Yes, it could be, I suppose, but I would suggest that the Court knows and everyone else knows that in capital cases such as this, it would be more likely to be six months to a year before this case is ever tried, and I would like to remind the Court of the case of People versus Odle, a Supreme Court case in 1982, in which the Supreme Court says, "Time dims all memory, and its passage serves to attenuate the likelihood that early extensive publicity will have any significant impact at the time of trial." That's 32 Cal.3d 932. that particular case, Your Honor, the Supreme Court denied a writ of mandate for a change of venue after the Superior Court had denied the motion, and made the point that if at the time of the selection of the jury the evidence indicates that the jurors are -- they cannot get a fair jury in that

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particular venue, then they will change it. That particular case was in a county which is smaller than San Bernardino County by a considerable number, and I submit that that case is an indication of what the Court should do, and that is, wait until the time for the selection of the jury. And then if it appears that a fair panel cannot be impaneled, then have a change of venue.

THE COURT: Counsel, on the issue of speculation, I admonish jurors not to speculate. I admonish witnesses that they can't answer questions that call for speculation. But doesn't the Legislature put that burden on me, to speculate as to what's going to happen down the line? I mean, how else do I approach this issue of deciding whether or not the opening or the closing of the preliminary hearing will affect a fair trial down the line unless I'm involved in some degree of speculation?

MR. BIERSCHBACH: I think that the Legislature intended and I think the Minth Circuit cases certainly have clearly stated that there has to be some evidence to base this on, and I submit that the mere gathering of reams of newspaper stories and stacks of television tapes is not the kind of evidence that will show that later jurors will be prejudiced against the defendant. It would negate the statute if every time there was any story, the Court had to say, well, you know, this is going to prejudice the jurors at a later date and therefore I'll have to close all

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the hearings from here on out. I don't think the Legislature intended that.

THE COURT: I suppose it's a distinction between speculation and a reasonable conclusion that can be drawn.

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MR. BIERSCHBACH: That's correct, yes. And I think that while the Court has pointed out that the standard that it is expected to meet is whether it's necessary or not, I think there's also a finer distinction and that is, what is the standard the Court must use to decide whether it's necessary or not? And Mr. Negus would say that if you can decide that there's a reasonable likelihood -- just a likelihood -- then that's all that's required. On the other hand, we're saying that you have to -- that you should have to find that there is a substantial probability. I think that it's very important to distinguish between the change of venue cases which counsel has cited and which are mostly Supreme Court cases -- they're California Supreme Court cases -- and the situation that we're faced with here and the change of venue cases. You are not weighing competing rights. And maybe the Court feels because the United States Supreme Court has not clearly enunciated the constitutional right to attend a hearing,. I think it certainly is of some weight and should be given weight by the Court that the Ninth Circuit Court and several other circuit courts have said that as far as we can read the United States Supreme Court mind based on what they have

said in the past, we believe that they will enunciate that there is such a constitutional right. And if you are then going to weigh constitutional rights, I think that there has to be a higher standard in the question of whether to close a hearing as opposed to the standard where only the question is shall we change the venue and still allow the People to attend the hearing. I think that that's a distinction that must be made.

We submit, Your Honor, that the evidence which has been offered here does not meet a standard which should be met, and that it is insufficient. Mr. Negus has attempted to say that there are political overtones in this case. I say that that's rubbish. He even tries to say that Mr. Nottmeier and the Sheriff are exploiting it because in — some time in the future, some four years from now or six years from now, they have to run for reelection. I think that's preposterous to make such a statement.

With respect to the bringing in of the prison dispute, I would submit to the Court that that dispute was very, very prominent long before Mr. Cooper came on the scene and that his presence did not alter the decision one way or the other. There was strong resistance to the additional prisons in San Bernardino County long before he ever was known.

We'd submit to the Court that the motion should be denied.

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

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Mr. Kottmeier, do you wish to be heard?

MR. KOTTMEIER: Only in regard to some of the assertions that Mr. Negus has made within his points and authorities and within his argument and the idea that he expresses that these assertions should be given the weight of evidence. As an illustration, the statement that he has had personal experience in voir diring a jury and that this voir dire process has come up with Kevin Cooper's identity, I haven't seen anywhere in the items of evidence placed before the Court that particular foundation being laid for the statement that was made. And secondly, I would request that the Court not be led into a trap or at least distinguish the difference between the ruling as far as the openness of this particular preliminary hearing as distinguished from the issue of a change of venue. I notice that Mr. Negus kind of slid that one in there to the Court, suggesting that the burden was exactly the same for a change of venue, and I just wanted to make sure that the ruling is clearly solely based upon the issue that's before the Court and not going to be used as a later opinion of this Court relative to change of venue.

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

Mr. Kochis, do you wish to be heard?

MR. KOCHIS: No.

THE COURT: Mr. Negus, do you wish to be heard on

any final comments?

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MR. NEGUS: San Jose Mercury-News makes the point that one of the difficulties you have with an open preliminary hearing is that people are liable to confuse it with the trial. I think that the arguments of counsel here have exemplified that particular problem in that the cases that they cite all have to do with pretrial motions made in the trial court. We're just dealing with the preliminary hearing here, and this is not the court that's going to be making a decision on the change of venue, as Mr. Kottmeier knows, and it's not the court that's going to be trying the case, and so that particular confusion the People can't make up -- they can't make a distinction between pretrial motions in a trial court and a preliminary hearing I think is exemplified by the arguments of counsel here. None of the cases they cite involve a preliminary hearing. The only case that has decided whether or not there's a right of access to preliminary hearings that has been cited by anybody in this particular case is San Jose Mercury-News, and that says that there isn't --

THE COURT: Counsel, let me direct some questions to your inquiries regarding the <u>San Jose Mercury-News</u> case because, of course, that was prior to the amendment of the statute which changed it.

MR. NEGUS: Right.

THE COURT: And if I read all the way to the end of

San Jose Mercury-News, the last full paragraph after they've gone through all of the arguments justifying the Legislature allowing the preliminary hearing be closed solely on the request of the defendant, they proceed to declare and remind us of Justice Holmes's remark that "The legislatures are the ultimate guardians of the liberties of the people employed in quite as great a degree as the courts."

Now, if they meant that and then if the Legislature perhaps they read that as well. They entered into this balancing act between First Amendment and fair trial rights. They came up with the conclusion as the guardians of liberty that it's to be open unless a certain condition exists, and that condition is changed from; in other words, once they re-balanced it, they came to a different balance and they said that the hearing is to be open unless it's necessary for the defendant to have the protection of a fair and impartial trial. Now, hasn't that changed quite a bit from what San Jose Mercury-News is saying?

MR. NEGUS: It doesn't change the basic analysis of <u>San Jose Mercury-News</u>. What it changes is whether or not the defense can just come in and assert that it — I want it closed, or whether we have to make some sort of showing. And clearly what they were trying to do was to not allow preliminary hearings to be closed in just routine cases for no reason. There was at the time that that statute was — was being propounded originally, the then

reporter for the Daily Report, Mrs. Altman, was always coming around and asking me, "Why are you closing this particular preliminary hearing? There is no publicity."

And I take it that what she was trying to do was -- there was to -- establishing there was some sort of arbitrary or capricious reason why I would use that particular statute at that particular time, and that particular argument that defense counsel shouldn't just be allowed to do it whenever they want to was I think what the Legislature was attempting to change. And so they're saying that you've got to show there's some reason to do it.

The state of the law in California at the time that that particular statute was passed was that you could issue an order to a witness, a prosecutor, a defense lawyer, anybody involved in a case, and tell them that they can't reveal anything about the case on a mere showing that there was a reasonable likelihood that their talking to the press would deprive a defendant of a fair trial. That's the only standard that existed in California law at the time that the Legislature passed this particular statute. It's still the only standard that exists in California law. That's still the standard for what's called a gag order. I would submit that as they did not pass the statute requested by the news industry, that is, the statute which would make it very, very difficult, not impossible however, to make the kind of showing which would be necessary to close a preliminary

hearing; that what they intended was that all we would be required to do is to show that based upon the kind of publicity that you have in a particular case, that if that publicity is sufficient, for example, that would require a change of venue, then it's necessary to close the preliminary hearing in order to try and prevent that from happening. I know that our county does not like change of venues. It costs us a lot of money. And I know that the judges in Superior Court aren't particularly fond of long continuances because that delays their clearing their calendars. What the press is -- what the press is suggesting is that somehow the Legislature ignored the large body of law -- the only body of law -- the only standard that existed at the time the statute was passed and somehow grafted on this higher statute and that higher standard, and that standard was one that they in fact did not elect to pass. So I would submit that basically they did not intend to set for us a standard which is almost impossible to prove at a preliminary hearing. If they had wanted to just say preliminary hearings shall be open, they could have. And the fact that they didn't and that they passed that statute with an understanding that most preliminary hearings are heard within ten days of the time that the person first comes to court, I would submit that is evidence that they didn't intend to make us go out and do jury surveys, which is the only way that I could

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envision handling counsel's problem about speculation.
But they intended the Court to engage in the same kind of analysis of publicity that courts engage in in determining change of venue motions.

If you look at the five factors which are -- which are involved which have to do with the nature and gravity of the crime, which have to do with the nature and extent of the publicity, which have to do with the size of the particular area, which have to do with the relative statuses of the victim and the defendant, and which have to do with whether or not there are political overtones to the case, you engage that type of analysis. That's the only kind of analysis which a court could reasonably expect to be doing at the preliminary hearing, and so I submit that's what the Legislature had in mind for this particular Court to do. And I submit also that on the basis of the information that I've provided to you, that that standard has been met.

Counsel for the different industries, the newspapers and the television, essentially I think argued contradictory things, which is nice to have two lawyers to be able to do. Basically Mr. Mendez says, well, the publicity about this case is always going to be so great that closing the preliminary hearing won't -- will never do you any good and so why do it? And Mr. Bierschbach argues, well, it will die down eventually. Well, I hope it will die down eventually and I think that in that particular sense

Mr. Bierschbach is more accurate, that I think that's -if in fact the preliminary hearing is closed, then it will
die down eventually and hopefully he can get a fair trial
somewhere. The example which is foremost in my mind at
the moment because it was just argued in the Court of Appeals
yesterday -- Wednesday is the <u>Diaz</u> case in Riverside County,
and in that particular case the preliminary hearing was
closed despite the fact that there was massive pretrial -there was massive publicity when the charges were
originally filed. The preliminary hearing was closed.
The transcript has remained sealed, and it's now believed
by Mr. Diaz's lawyers that he can get a fair trial in
Riverside County, and they did a survey to show that.

THE COURT: But they've apparently waived jury.

MR. NEGUS: They have waived jury, but they have also indicated that -- that's a different decision.

THE COURT: I know. But, you see, it puts this Court in an extraordinary position of having to wonder what's going to happen down the line. I mean, if I were able to divine that in six months if Mr. Cooper were held to answer and were to waive his right to a jury trial, I might come to one conclusion. I mean, that's --

MR. NEGUS: That's true, but I think what you have to do again according to the cases and the standards is that in making this determination, you have to assume that it's going to be in this judicial district, which is a

hundred thousand jurors, not three hundred thousand, and that's not a hundred thousand jurors called, by the way. That's a hundred thousand jurors that they have on their computer list.

THE COURT: I'll assume, Mr. Negus, that it will proceed to a jury trial in this county.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. And in order to do that, I think that we have to try and reduce the volume of the publicity about the case, not have all the -- not have all the facts that the prosecution is going to be bringing out brought before the jury and not have the very substantial problem which we've had innumerable times in this particular case.

Mr. Kottmeier, I believe, several weeks ago lectured the Court and myself on confusing preliminary hearings and trials. I would submit if we have this thing televised, that lots of people will be confusing the two and that's going to make it very, very difficult for Mr. Cooper to get a fair trial.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Counsel.

MR. EIERSCHEACH: Just one thing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Just very briefly, Mr. Bierschbach.

MR. BIERSCHBACH: I don't like to make statements that aren't substantiated by some sort of evidence; although, Mr. Negus doesn't have any hesitation about that. And I would only say that where he says that the average

preliminary hearing is held within ten days of the day you appear in court, I believe that in murder cases it's closer to two months, and I think the Court probably has sufficient knowledge of its own to know that that's probably true.

THE COURT: Okay. I've received all the evidence on it and I've received the argument. We're going to take a brief recess at this time, maybe until about five minutes till 10:00, at which time I'll come back and issue a ruling on the defense motion.

Court will be in recess until five minutes till 10:00.

(Recess.)

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THE COURT: Before I do rule on the matter, I would like to compliment and thank counsel for all parties and all interests involved for the excellence of their argument and their points and authorities, particularly defense counsel for his diligence in the presentation of evidence on the matter. It was all commendable.

This is a new statute. It has not been interpreted yet by any Court of Appeal. There has been no judicial definition given to the word "necessary." It would be this Court's intention to give the word "necessary" its common and ordinary meaning; that is, that it's a condition that is essential or indispensable. Given that meaning, the Court would, I believe, have to be convinced that if the preliminary hearing is not closed, that the defendant will

be denied the right to a fair and impartial trial, and the Court at this time is not so convinced. Therefore, the defendant's motion under Penal Code Section 868 to close the preliminary hearing is denied. I would indicate to counsel that the Court will reserve a right to any — entertain any later motions as to any particular portion of the preliminary hearing in this regard as well.

Counsel, on my agenda it appears we have perhaps two remaining matters to conclude this morning. One, I was going to give counsel an opportunity to address the Court on the question of the location of the preliminary hearing and also I think Mr. Kottmeier wished to address the Court on an existing order dated 9-14-83 relative to certain items which have been subpoensed on a subpoens duces tecum.

MR. BIERSCHBACH: Your Honor, thank you for your patience in our hearing.

THE COURT: Yes. Thank you, Counsel.

MR. MENDEZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Counsel, do you wish to be heard on the location issue?

MR. NEGUS: It would be much more convenient for Mr. Cooper in terms of the transportation and the time that he has to spend going from the point of the preliminary hearing to have it in San Bernardino.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Kottmeier, do you wish to be heard?

MR. KOTTMEIER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court doesn't find any compelling reason to change the location of the preliminary hearing. I think it's been our experience in these prepreliminary hearings that this is an adequate courtroom and the security for all parties involved is able to be maintained, so it will be the Court's intention to hold the preliminary hearing in this courtroom on the date set, which is November the 9th, commencing at 8:30 in the morning.

Okay. Mr. Kottmeier, you wished to be heard regarding the previous court order.

MR. KOTTMETER: Your Honor, the Court had ordered the District Attorney's Office to contact the Department of Justice, the Immigration people -- Department of Justice was the FBI -- Immigration, Border Patrol, as well as the Attorney General, and I have copies of the letters that were sent by my office pursuant to that order, which I'd like to have marked. I think they can be marked as a group.

THE COURT: That would be fine.

MR. KOTTMEIER: And also I have a response dated October 3rd from the Immigration and Naturalization Service with regard to one of the letters. Easically the response to the Border Fatrol request -- or Immigration authorities was that they had no information and no reports.

We have also been in contact with the Attorney

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General's Office, and representing the Attorney General's Office this morning is Attorney Peter Quon, and Harley Mayfield indicated to me that there were certain miscellaneous papers that the Department of Justice had as a result of the investigation into the procedures that led to the misclassification of Mr. Cooper, and that the defense would be allowed to view those items on receipt of a subpoena duces tecum. And I received from Mr. Negus this morning the subpoena duces tecum and have given it to Mr. Quon, so Mr. Quon, I think, is prepared to respond to the Court on that issue.

As I may have said already, the FBI has not acknowledged one way or the other by phone or letter the receipt of the request that we have sent to them via the mails.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. QUON: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Quon.

MR. QUON: If I may correct Mr. Kottmeier on one matter -- rather than our acceding to the subpoena duces tecum which I received this morning, what we -- I believe what Mr. Mayfield of our office informed Mr. Kottmeier is that we would waive the receipt of the subpoena d.t., reserving our rights under Evidence Code Section 1040, also Code of Civil Procedure 2016 for the governmental privilege and also attorney work product privilege with

regard to those items -- some of the items which we have in our possession. I did bring with me today all the materials that I am aware of -- that our department is aware of of our activity in this matter. I have gone through the box previous to this hearing. I have secluded -- separated out those materials which we perceived no privilege to exist and have also identified those items which we believe either the attorney work privilege or the governmental privilege under 1040 to apply.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Megus, do you wish to be heard on that? You don't know what has been offered or not offered, I take it, at this time.

MR. MEGUS: That's true. I haven't seen it.

THE COURT: Okay. I was slightly under the impression, Mr. Kottmeier, you were going to address a different issue. You are addressing the discovery order issue the Court made --

MR. KOTTMEIER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- earlier. Okay.

Well, what I'm inclined to do is -- I don't want to schedule another hearing between now and the preliminary hearing, so what I'm -- well, how long do you think -- maybe Mr. Negus and Mr. Quon, you could just confer very briefly right now in terms of time -- what length of time you think we're talking about in your reviewing what is offered and --

MR. NEGUS: I take it there's no problem with the stuff that he's not asserting the privilege on.

MR. QUON: That would be correct, Your Honor.

I'm prepared to give -- or at least show it to him at this point. I did not bring copies of any materials with me, so if Mr. Negus desired to have copies, he -- we would have to arrange a time between he and I where we could go to his office to xerox it.

THE COURT: The only question I raise is if the privilege is exercised and is contested, then the Court has to perform certain functions to rule on the privilege and then to have an in-camera hearing on matters if the privilege is -- or if the request for an in-camera hearing is requested. That's the proceeding that I'm concerned with.

MR. MEGUS: Well, I would suggest that perhaps we could do that now.

THE COURT: All right. Let's do it now then.

Mr. Quon, perhaps you could be seated at counsel table. They'll make room for you.

In this great volume I'm going to attempt to find our discovery orders.

Mr. Mcttmeier, perhaps you can address the Court as to what particular paragraph it is of the defense --

MR. MEGUS: It's number 9, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's number 9?

MR. KOTTMEIER: It's on page -- begins on page 5.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm with it now. And that is

"Any and all reports, documents, notes, tapes, photographs, or other writings concerning Kevin Cooper, Kevin Cooper's escape from CIM on June 2nd, 1983; the killing of the Ryen family and Christopher Hughes on June 4th or 5th of 1983;" that was the extent of the order.

MR. KOTTMETER: I think you may have left out the section -- the last line, "the arrest of Kevin Cooper on July 30th, 1983."

THE COURT: You're absolutely right, Counsel. I did leave that out.

Hr. Quon, you have with you certain documents that are in the possession of the F -- is it the FBI?

MR. QUON: No. Department of Justice, State of California.

THE COURT: The Department of Justice. And as to portions of those you're going to -- you wish to exercise the privilege under Evidence Code 1040 and also the work product privilege; is that right?

MR. QUON: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And you're requesting an incamera hearing?

MR. QUON: Yes, I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court will be in recess.

I'll proceed in chambers in-camera with Mr. Quon and with

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the court reporter and make an in-camera examination of
the documents, and will then issue a ruling back in court
shortly.
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Court will be in recess.

(The proceedings held in-camera are not transcribed herein by order of the Court.)

(The following proceedings were held in open court:)

THE COURT: Before I rule on Mr. Quon's motions,
I'd like to inquire of Mr. Negus as to whether or not you
have a multi-page report, maybe a quarter to a half-inch
thick of what's believed to be a report to Mr. Denton by
a Mr. James Brown --

MR. MEGUS: I do.

THE COURT: -- that's dated June 20, 1983.

MR. NEGUS: I do.

THE COURT: You do. Okay.

The Court has reviewed the documents presented to it by Mr. Ouon, and the Court orders that the following documents be made available to defense and the motions made under the 1040 privilege or work product privilege are denied with regard to these items, and that is: a folder entitled "San Bernardino Confidential Investigation #831V0011," the right-hand portion of that file, and also a file designated "Clips and Miscellaneous," all the items within

that file.

MR. QUON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Okay, Mr. Negus, do we have any other matters at this hearing --

MR. NEGUS: Yes.

THE COURT: -- to take up?

Your Honor, request that the preliminary hearing be delayed.

I would request a week's delay. The reason for that is

MR. MEGUS: I would at this point in time,

that in order -- I would like to have the opportunity to prepare a writ to a higher court on the Court's ruling this morning because I don't think that -- you know, if you're wrong, it's not going to do me much good to take it up on appeal, and it would take me approximately, I think, a week to do that. So if we could start on November 16th,

THE COURT: Well, this is the 7th today. You're talking about one, two, three --

that would give me an opportunity to do that.

MR. NEGUS: I'm talking about one week's delay of the prelim.

THE COURT: Well, we've got four and a half weeks until the prelim as it is now.

MR. NEGUS: That's true, but I have enough work preparing for the preliminary hearing to take up all of that time, and in trying -- I've already spent two weeks

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trying to get in all the junk together on this particular case which I couldn't do getting ready for the preliminary hearing, and I feel in order to -- in order to -- I can't -- I can't justify really to myself taking time away from the preparation of the preliminary hearing especially if it's going to be open -- which is going to require additional work on my part, I'm sure -- I can't justify taking that time away in order to -- in order to prepare the writ, but I think that the writ should be done, so I'm asking for an additional week.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Kottmeier and Mr. Kochis, do you wish to be heard on that motion?

MR. KOTTMEIER: We oppose the requested continuance, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. At this time the motion to continue the preliminary hearing will be denied.

Do we have any other matters, Mr. Negus? Mr. Kochis? Mr. Kottmeier?

MR. KOTTMEIER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NEGUS: We --

THE COURT: Yes?

MR. NEGUS: We have not yet received most of the documents requested in the discovery motions, especially from the Department of Corrections, and other things.

There may be also additional discovery matters that will

be -- we will have to litigate. I would assume that whenever the preliminary hearing starts, that we could do that in the course of the preliminary hearing. I am not asking any additional favor, but I want to let you know there will probably be additional discovery motions.

THE COURT: I would think so. I would think your indicated length of the preliminary hearing would give us a chance to resolve some issues in the first few days or so that would facilitate the preliminary hearing proceeding in a reasonably expeditious fashion.

Okay. The Court will be in recess until November the 9th at the hour of 8:30 for the preliminary hearing in this matter.

Thank you, Counsel.

(Proceedings concluded.)

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

SS.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

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I, DEBRA A. GODINEZ, Official Reporter of the above-entitled court, do hereby certify:

That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of California, duly licensed to practice; that I did report in stenotype the oral proceedings had upon hearing of the aforementioned cause at the time and place hereinbefore set forth; that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 53, inclusive, constitutes to the best of my knowledge and belief a full, true and correct transcription from my said stenotype notes so taken.

DATED this 24th day of July, 1985, at Ontario, California.

Official Reporter C.S.R. No. 4491