SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

CR 72787

Supreme Court
No. Crim 24552

KEVIN COOPER,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY

HONORABLE RICHARD C. GARNER, JUDGE PRESIDING

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Respondent:

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IN PROPRIA PERSONA

VOLUME volumes
Pages 85 to 175, incl.

JILL D. MC KIMMEY, C.S.R., C-2314 Official Reporter

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1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDING	
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4	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,	
5	Plaintiff,	Ś
6	₹8.) NO. OCR-9319
7	KEVIN COOPER,) }
8	Defendant.))
9) VOLUME 2
10	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL PROCEEDINGS	
11	BEFORE HONORABLE RICHARD C. GARNER, JUDGE	
12	DEPARTMENT 3 - ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA	
13	February 24, 1984	
14	APPEARANCES:	
15	For the People:	DEMNIS E. KOTTMEIER
16		District Attorney and
17		JOHN P. KOCHIS
		Deputy District Attorney
18	For the Defendant:	DAVID MCKENNA
19		Public Defender By: DAVID NEGUS
20		Deputy Public Defender
21	Also Present:	JOHN VAN DE KAMP
		Attorney General By: STEVEN V. ADLER
22		Deputy Attorney General
23		(Representing California
24		Department of Corrections)
- 1		(Appearances continued on
25		the following page.)
26	Reported by:	JILL D. McKIMMEY
		Official Reporter
1		C.S.R. No. 2314

APPEARANCES: (Continued) SILVER & KREISLER Also Present: By: WILLIAM J. HADDEN Attorney at Law (Representing San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department) IRA KURGAN Attorney at Law (Representing CBS) DONALD ZACHARY Attorney at Law (Representing NBC)

ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA; PRIDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1984; 10:08 A.M. --000--

THE COURT: Good morning. In the matter of People versus Kevin Cooper, I see Mr. Cooper here.

Counsel, would you state your respective names and your clients, please.

MR. KOCHIS: John Kochis. I represent the People of the State of California.

HR. ADLER: Steven Adler, Deputy Attorney General, for California Department of Corrections.

MM. KOTTMEIER: Dennis Kottmeier, District Attorney of San Hernardino County.

MR. NEGUS: David L. McKenna by David Negus representing Mr. McKenna -- Mr. Cooper.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. HADDEN: And William J. Hadden representing the officers of the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hadden.

Now, there, I understand, are other attorneys here, depending upon the areas of interest that we may get into this morning, and that if we do get into such matters, I think I will certainly give you an opportunity to be heard.

MR. MEGUS: Your Honor, before we begin, I hear the click of cameras, and I notice the man seems to be focusing his television camera. My understanding was that

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there would be no extended coverage today until all opportunity -- all sides had an opportunity to be heard. I am told by the people from CBS that they didn't even file their thing on time, their request, and so I wondered why we are being televised right now.

THE COURT: First, I don't know of any such understanding that there would not be extended coverage. Secondly, I received or was informed that we had a request for extended coverage and pooling agreements yesterday, which I consider sufficient time, at least in the informal manner that they have been received in the past.

MR. NEGUS: Well, they have been received formally in the past, and I believe the Court stated — we don't have a transcript yet, but I believe the Court stated on the record last time that before any extended coverage took place at this hearing, that I will be given an opportunity to object as the Rules of Court provide, and I haven't.

THE COURT: Mr. Negus, I simply don't recall saying that. That was not my intent at any time. You informed me that you have previously objected in the lower court, and in my court previously in chambers arguing against extended coverage, and that you intended to continue that practice, and I think I indicated to you -- it's according to my recollection,

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in any event, that we -- if you wish to make that in this court, that we would do it, and we can do it first, if you wish, but it would be in open court so that other interested people could be heard on the subject.

MR. NEGUS: Right. I understand that, but my understanding was that — it appears that the issue's already been decided. They're sitting here taking pictures.

I suppose, and if you wish to take that up at this time then, we will hear from you and we will hear from the prosecution and we will hear from the media people. I've got no ironclad method of procedure this morning.

Otherwise, I thought that we would take up perhaps the easier motions first: The motion to include in the preliminary hearing record certain matters, number one; the motion for daily transcripts; and then the motion to set time for filing of evidence in aggravation; then the motion to compel disclosure of prior acts; perhaps the motion to take judicial notice: and finally perhaps the motion, extensive motion to be heard today, is the motion for discovery.

Now, we can put number one before all of that, the motion to avoid extended coverage, if you wish to do so.

MR. NEGUS: I do wish to again have the record

reflect that I do object to extended coverage today.

Today's proceedings are purely legal proceedings, and I can't imagine anything of extended interest to the press that would require cameras in the courtroom in covering it. If the Court -- I made note in the past that in the 868 motion that I requested the Court to consider as part of the 995, I documented that whenever we had a legal proceeding like this where essentially nothing happened, prejudicial material tended to be published, and that material had nothing to do with the court proceeding.

I also have noticed the Court that on the 5th of March I am going to be making a motion for change of venue; and by allowing continued extended coverage of this particular case, what we do is we run the risk that we will never be able to get a fair trial anywhere in the state of California.

that the Southern California area is saturated with media coverage, and points and authorities to that effect will be filed with the Court today, but by allowing the cameras in the courtroom, one encourages coverage beyond that in other parts of the state — other parts of the state of California where we, hopefully, would be seeking a change of venue to. The general tenor of the pictorial coverage tends to be of more emotional nature than informative. At the preliminary hearing when extended coverage was

allowed, the types of stuff that were -- were broadcast did not involve the ratner technical and dry scientific evidence which was the crux of the case, but oft times involved matters which were not even evidence. The biggest play in the preliminary hearing was given to a Diane Williams, Mr. Cooper's former -- former girlfriend who expressed emotional -- strong emotions that she hated Mr. Cooper. They liked that. That was -- that was broadcast. More informative stuff on the same date was not.

By allowing extended coverage, I think that you are -- that you are encouraging an emotional type of coverage of this particular -- of this particular case, and I am not criticizing the television folks for -- for doing that. I mean, that's -- they put on the television that which they think is -- is best, but I think it's indisputable that that is the kind of thing that they think is best, and that is just the kind of -- that's the kind of coverage, that's the kind of thing that makes it harder and harder for Mr. -- for Mr. Cooper to get a fair trial.

I get -- we get mail in our office. I even had a call from one of our local assembly persons or his field representative worrying about Mr. Cooper's suit; and whenever people see pictures of Mr. Cooper in a suit, that seems to excite great prejudices. We get phone calls

and objections that Mr. Cooper is allowed to wear his own suit, and I think that that's the kind of coverage that we are getting, and if you -- if you look at the rules, the extended coverage is discretionary.

We have also had several instances where there's been pictures published in the local newspaper of Mr. Cooper looking at some notebook or Mr. Cooper writing letters and, in essence, invading the inner bar. We can't even put our papers out on counsel table without somebody taking a picture of what we are looking at and what we are doing, and I think that makes it very difficult to —

THE COURT: Counsel, I am informed that they cannot pick up the printed word nor read what's on your — the counsel table at this time. I specifically checked that out.

MR. NEGUS: There was in the Progress Bulletin — and the exact citation to date and time is in the change of venue motion which I'll file — there is pictures of Mr. Cooper sitting at counsel table, and indicates that Mr. Cooper, according to them, is reading — is looking at a scrapbook of photographs concerned with this particular case. That is, they may not be able to pick it up with their pictures, but they can with their captions, and there is other things Mr. — they had a story about Mr. Cooper was sitting with a stub of a pencil writing letters during the course of the proceedings. That is,

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they may -- the actual resolution of their cameras may not be sufficient to take a photograph of the -- of the -- of the item, but they may take pictures of Mr. Cooper looking at things on the counsel table, and I guess the reporters' eyes are sharper than their cameras, and they put it in the captions.

THE COURT: All right. I will come back to you.

Mr. Kottmeier, Mr. Kochis?

MR. KOTTMEIER: Your Honor, as far as extended media coverage, this is an issue that we have left with the discretion of the Court and have not taken a position whether the proceedings should be open or closed.

THE COURT: Mr. Adler, anything on that issue?

MR. ADLER: No, Your Honor. We have nothing to add.

THE COURT: Mr. Kurgan, Iran Kurgan from CBS, do you wish to be heard on this?

MR. KURGAH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mr. Zachary from CBS.

MR. ZACHARY: Good morning, Your Honor. Thank you very much. I am Donald Zachary. I am with NBC in Burbank, and while we did not request extended coverage of this particular hearing, I would, with the Court's permission, respond to some of Mr. Negus' comments since we have covered this proceeding in the past and will no doubt do so in the future.

THE COURT: All right. You may.

MR. ZACHARY: Your Honor, the policy embodied in California Rule of Court 930.2 is for open proceedings. Because we represent through NBC all of our viewing audience in their desire to be — to have access to this proceeding, the points that Mr. Negus makes are based on — on his — his well-meaning attempt to defend his client, but without any basis in fact or reality. For example, he — he has — he makes a — his major point seems to be, as I understand it, that by allowing extended media coverage here in this courtroom to the stations in Southern California, that is soing to prevent him from getting a fair trial anywhere in the state.

Your Honor, we -- we doubt that the extended coverage would prevent a fair trial in Southern California, because of the large number of potential jurors in the Southern California area. I don't think it's possible because of our coverage to -- to inhibit the right of Mr. Cooper to get a fair trial; and through the techniques that are available to the Court, particularly through extensive voir dire, I think that this Court can eliminate any problem of prejudicial publicity.

Furthermore, if, as Mr. Negus contends, the Southern California area has been saturated, that does not in any way imply that the rest of the state has been prejudiced by that coverage. KNBC's coverage area extends

not further north than Santa Barbara, so that the whole northern part of the state is open and is not affected in any way by our coverage, and there's simply no facts to demonstrate that because KNEC covers a story which is important to it and its viewers, that someone in the northern part of the state would thereby be encouraged to do so or in fact has done so.

The fact is, Your Honor, that -- that Mr. Negus has brought forward no facts which would indicate prejudice to his client, and on that basis we respectfully submit that extended media coverage should continue to be allowed.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Anybody else?

Do you wish to respond?

MR. NEGUS: Just briefly. There's nothing in Rule 980.2 that I can find which establishes a preference for either having it or not having it. It merely -- it merely establishes a procedure whereby the various television stations or other stations can ask for it and the Court can rule on it. It doesn't give you any -- any guidelines that I can see in there as to -- as to how you are supposed to -- how you are supposed to make the -- how you are supposed to make the decision; so I think that basically it's a matter of discretion.

Secondly, I have had personal experience that the various television stations' footage here doesn't limit itself just to their own particular viewing audience.

What ABC and NBC publish — or put on the television here is made available to other NBC or ABC affiliates throughout the state, and I think we have to recognize that in this day and age, the impact of television is probably considerably stronger on potential jurors than — than other forms of — than other forms of coverage.

I'm aware -- maybe counsel can inform me otherwise of no other case which has had the degree of television
coverage that this -- this one has. Even the most
celebrated cases in Los Angeles haven't had -- haven't
had the -- haven't had the cameras in the courtroom for
every little thing that they -- that they -- that they do,
and I also beg to differ with Mr. Zachary in that -- that
somehow voir dire is going to be a cure for Mr. -- for
Mr. Cooper. There have been change of venue granted in
counties of comparable size to San Bernardino with
considerably less publicity than we've had in -- in this
particular case.

Just tabulating in preparing for the change of venue, we've had more television stories on two channels, which I happen to have available to me, on this particular case than they had newspaper articles in a case that was — where a change of venue was granted in Morthern California;

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so I don't think that -- that we can sort of plausibly say that, oh, it's not going -- it's not going to make any difference. The newspapers and the press themselves treat this case as a -- as unprecedented, at least for this particular county, in its publicity, and there have been stories to that effect.

THE COURT: All right. Rule 980.2 of our Rules of Court perhaps doesn't establish guidelines to require me in any way to open it up to extended coverage, but I think it's undeniable that the mere fact that we have 980.2, which is of recent origin, indicates the trend evident in the past few years towards openness in judicial proceedings. It used to be a violation of judicial ethics if I even permitted a camera to be in the courtroom, but we've gone on an experimental basis that's been extended, and I think that precedent has indicated that as far as the participants in the judicial proceedings are concerned, cameras get largely ignored, and it doesn't bother us here. It's true that it can bother your client or perhaps the prosecution in certain/ circumstances, but I do not subscribe to what seems to be a premise that mere publicity is bad publicity in all cases.

These are purely legal proceedings. I find nothing prejudicial about these proceedings. This is a non-evidentiary matter, at least today. We are going

to take it one day at a time, so to speak. Any order for extended coverage will be subject to revocation.

Mr. Negus, I wouldn't expect us to have to do it every single day, but if something unusual comes up that may well be prejudicial, I'll hear you again, but here we are considering your client's right to a fair trial and balancing it against what is clearly a legitimate public interest in the proceedings, and the fact that somebody sees him bringing — taking notes at a table or looking at exhibits, something like that is perfectly to be expected of somebody on trial or facing criminal proceedings. That doesn't necessarily mean that it's bad or prejudicial to him. I do not find prejudice sufficient to outweigh the public interest. At least at this time we are going to continue with permissible extended coverage.

MR. NEGUS: My -- I'm not -- from the Court, I'm not sure whether the Court was ruling that unless I object again there, you're going to continue to allow it or we're going to have these hearings each -- each time.

THE COURT: No. I do not wish to duplicate this every single time.

MR. NEGUS: Well, then I wish to make clear that I am objecting to it from now and forevermore.

THE COURT: All right. I will consider it a continuing objection.

Now, as far as procedure to the meat of our issues

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today, would you like to take up --

MR. ZACHARY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. Perhaps I simply arbitrarily looked at some of them, and I find no difficulty with some of your motions, Fr. Negus, and perhaps the prosecution doesn't, either.

Let's go first to your motion to include in the preliminary hearing record certain matters to be considered with your 995 motion which has not yet been filed, but you've indicated that you would do so.

MR. NEGUS: And also with the change of venue motion.

THE COURT: All right, and I haven't -- I'm not looking at your pleadings at the moment, but you wanted the transcripts of the complete proceedings, I believe, before the Municipal Court. You wanted the Defendant's exhibits which were offered to the court below with reference to your request to close the preliminary hearing to extended coverage. You wanted oral testimony from the transcripts, particularly at the time of the motion of a Larry Walker, Philip Schuyler, Naida Katz, and Bill Arthur.

MR. NEGUS: Right. Basically, that's the evidence that was submitted to the Court in support of the 863 motion.

THE COURT: And then I guess all exhibits; is that

correct?

MR. NEGUS: Right.

THE COURT: Any objection to any of those?

MR. KOCHIS: No, Your Honor, not from the People.

THE COURT: All right. I don't, either, so that will be granted in its entirety.

Secondly, I have a motion for daily transcripts, and I may -- we do not have it today, and we discussed this kind of informally and fairly briefly before, but you indicated what I felt were compelling reasons to grant that to you on your venue motion and on evidentiary motions and for trial and for even jury voir dire. The only reservation that I have about it was with reference to non-evidentiary legal motions.

Mr. Negus, is there some compelling reason why you should have a daily on that, for instance, a 995?

MR. NEGUS: The only reason I requested the daily was two -- there's practical reasons and --

THE COURT: Just on that now. I understand some of the practical problems.

MR. NEGUS: Just thinking now, taking the 995 as an example, well, I am aware, from having gone through this before, that there is — there are economic problems which are put on court reporters by — by the burdens that this kind of case puts on them, and I had a situation in another case where I felt that the economic pressures put

on the court reporters were such that they couldn't do an adequate job. I'm concerned that how do you -- how do you schedule people coming in and out?

THE COURT: I am aware of some of that. Why don't I go ahead and make the ruling at this time that -- I have even reservations. I'm trying to cut down and economize, but I -- I think basically your request is well taken, so unless -- unless there's some opposition to this -- I can't conceive of you doing so, because it would benefit perhaps the prosecution as well -- I will make a standing order then, and unless I tell the court reporter differently, commencing on the 5th of March, if that's going to be our next hearing date, we will have a daily transcript.

MR. NEGUS: Thank you.

THE COURT: There are good and valid reasons and burdens on the reporters to where even if I don't order it, they would only be able to work part-time perhaps.

It's a small amount that I'd be able to exclude even if I didn't grant it.

Number three, I had a motion to set time for the district attorney to file notice of evidence that he would introduce in aggravation pursuant to Penal Code Section 1903. Gentlemen, at the time that motion was filed by the defense, he was talking about the first trial date previously set of March 19, and thus requested the district attorney to file by March 1st. I have no

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idea whether or not the case will go to trial at that time. MR. NEGUS: I have no idea, either, but I still think that's a reasonable date, Your Honor. They have -basically, they have known about the motion for several

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, I am approximately 70 percent done with the response to that request. I intend to have it filed if not on the 1st of March, the very next day, on the 2nd. I don't see that as being a problem.

MR. HEGUS: The 2nd's fine.

MR. KOCHIS: Likewise, with Hr. Negus' request --THE COURT: I'll even establish, say, the 6th of March. That should be plenty of time. All right, to be filed by March 6. Okay?

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, likewise, with his request for the 1101 noticed motion, I intend likewise to file my response to that, hopefully, by either March the 1st or March the 2nd.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NEGUS: The 6th is fine for that.

THE COURT: In an abundance of caution, that's with reference to similars or prior acts, and we'll set that likewise on or before 5:00 p.m. on March 6. That takes care of two more of the preliminary motions.

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, before we leave that, the method I prefer to follow in that is to serve

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Mr. Negus by those dates, and then he and I can determine if we want to actually file the documents with the Court because, as I understand it, things that are filed with the Court may become matters of public record, and I think those are types of documents that we might not want to be made public.

THE COURT: Good idea. Satisfactory?

MR. NEGUS: Fine.

THE COURT: I am certainly not indicating that you must file everything that you give to Mr. Negus with the Court.

Then one that's perhaps not listed is you made a formal but general motion for the Court to take judicial notice, and you furnished me with some nine volumes. I read three-fourths of one of them without mention of the Cooper case, but you are going to have to get much more specific before I will take judicial notice. That's in the Frey case.

MR. NEGUS: Right, Your Honor. What -- first of all, the records --

THE COURT: I would prefer, Counsel, for you rather than just to tell me orally, that you file written documents citing page and line within those documents in some way.

MR. NEGUS: Can I just point out to the Court that I asked that that motion was actually -- that I request

that you do that on March the 5th, and I am filing with my declaration in support of a change of venue references to the parts of that that I — that I wish the Court to take notice of. The only reason I did that was so that the prosecution would have notice that I want that record to be — to be part of the Court. I am not expecting you to read it all: just give them notice that matters in that will be requested to take judicial notice. That's what the Evidence Code requires me to do, just give them notice.

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, along that line -THE COURT: That may be. Are you asking me to do
something?

MR. NEGUS: No, I'm not. I'm just giving them notice that I am going to ask that you take judicial notice of certain parts of that record. I will tell you what parts specifically I want -- I am not even going to ask you to read anything I already haven't tabulated.

THE COURT: On March 5 then?

MR. NEGUS: Right.

MR. KOCHIS: And by that time, if I have an appropriate objection to the Court taking judicial notice of it, I will inform the Court of that and Mr. Negus in writing.

MR. NEGUS: Pine. I think -- I was just following a procedure in the Evidence Code that says I have to give

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him a piece of paper.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to be attending a study institute in San Diego and will be back here a week from today, and if you have something else in mind, I thought you might ruin my time in San Diego.

MR. NEGUS: You'll have approximately 60 or 70 pages to read, Your Honor, while you're in San Diego I'll get to you this afternoon.

THE COURT: All right. You are going to tell me that at some point. And with that, I am down to your motion for discovery.

MR. NEGUS: Okay.

THE COURT: Before we get to that, perhaps, I could hear in chambers, I believe, counsel discussing what was going to occur on March 4. Could you fill me in briefly before we get into your discovery motion? March 5, excuse me.

MR. NEGUS: What I have -- I am prepared to give ten days notice of a change of venue motion. Today is ten days before March 5, and my typist is mightily doing the last ten or fifteen pages.

THE COURT: They have oral notice of that all this time. They'd perhaps waive any slight defect.

MR. NEGUS: They may want to read it. I don't know. Maybe they don't, but, anyway, I am going to file that with the Court and get a copy to counsel.

THE COURT: Today?

MR. NEGUS: Today, so that is the one motion that I have had time to formally notice for March the 5th.

I believe that once you get that motion, once we introduce the exhibits, I am going to be calling a few witnesses, not very many, but a few witnesses on the 5th with respect to that motion. Once you get all that material, it's going to probably take you close to a week to go through it. You've got probably 20 hours, I would guess, of television to watch. There's many, many, many newspaper clippings. I have attempted to pick out some of the ones that I think are more important so mayoe you didn't have to read all the newspaper articles.

THE COURT: You understand that we've got a two-stage proceeding?

MR. NEGUS: Right. We're just talking about -THE COURT: Possibly we won't get to the second,
so don't give me information on the second that might be
irrelevant to the first.

MR. NEGUS: I'm just talking about the information on the first, Your Honor. I mean, we have -- I believe there was ten -- there was ten hour-long videotapes of visual coverage up to the 868 motion. I think it took me eight hours to watch them, and I would guess we'll probably have a similar amount that I haven't yet received -- I haven't yet viewed on -- since then, so that's -- you know,

that's several hours of that. There's just lots and lots -lots and lots of documentation just on -- just on newspaper
articles that had circulation within this county; and
pursuant to our informal -- our informal discussion before,
I have limited myself to -- in the preparation of exhibits
just to stuff that has to do with San Bernardino County,
but that's immense.

THE COURT: All right. The first stage would be whether or not the trial should be moved from this county.

MR. NEGUS: Right.

THE COURT: And if the Court decides that there's a reasonable likelihood that he cannot get a fair trial in this county, then when we get over that hurdle we go to stage two at some point, and we may well not get into stage two then until further down the motions.

MR. NEGUS: I would assume we would not. The Rules of Court provide that you -- if you make that -- make that finding, that you notify the Judicial Council, and that they -- it's going to take -- it looks like it takes at least a month or so for that process --

THE COURT: On, I wouldn't think so. I think it's almost telephonic.

MR. NEGUS: Well, whatever, but we have to set up --MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, I am standing because as
I've discussed with Mr. Negus ---

THE COURT: You want equal dignity, Mr. Kochis,

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because he's standing.

MR. KOCHIS: More or less.

I have an objection that I'd like to place on the record to us handling the change of venue motion first. I think it's practically inappropriate. I think Mr. Negus would agree he intends to bring a 995 and a 1538.5 motion during the course of these proceedings at some point. I would imagine those motions are going to take some time to litigate. Even the 995 is going to involve the Court reading portions of a rather voluminous preliminary hearing transcript. The 1538.5 hearing is going to be a de novo hearing. It's going to require the taking of testimony, likewise is going to take some time. If either party receives a ruling they are not satisfied with on either one of those hearings, I'm sure the prosecution or the defense may be taking a writ and requesting for a stay. That could affect the posture of this case in terms of when we would get to trial. What I am saying is it seems to be more practical because one of the factors the Court has to consider in a change of venue motion is how much time has passed between the crime and the trial, and these other motions and writs that may be taken would seriously affect the time frames, and it could cause us to move the trial date backward quite some time.

THE COURT: I'm in sympathy with that position, Mr. Negus, but let me go ahead and let you finish.

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MR. KOCHIS: And my preference would be I have no objection to starting motions on the 5th of March, whether that be a 1538 or a 995, hearing those matters first, getting the Court's ruling, seeing how much time it takes us to resolve those, and then hearing the change of venue motion.

THE COURT: We touched on this briefly before. You indicated some reason, but I -- it didn't persuade me too much as to why we should get into that first.

MR. NEGUS: First of all, the practical problems. I have noticed the change of venue motion, and I will have noticed it, and that's the one I am prepared to go on. I -- it is of considerable --

THE COURT: Suppose hypothetically -- let me interrupt, please. Suppose hypothetically I deny your motion for change of venue and say that he can get a fair trial in this county, and then we go all the way through these proceedings and you could quite legitimately renew your motion and say, but look at all this publicity that's occurred before, and this is duplication of efforts and two bites of the apple, perhaps.

MR. HEGUS: No. I don't think so, because basically my understanding is I can -- I can take -- I can make it twice. I can make it at the time of -- before trial, and I can renew it after voir dire. That's the only two times that I can -- that I believe that I am

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allowed to do it. If I wish to make it now --

THE COURT: Renew it after voir dire?

MR. NEGUS: Yes. That's clear in the cases that you can make the change of venue motion twice. You can make it before trial. If it's denied, you can renew it again after voir dire, because voir dire may very well reveal -- I mean if --

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.

MR. NEGUS: So basically --

THE COURT: "Before trial" covers a large area.

MR. MEGUS: Right, and what I -- so it's basically, you know, you're quite right that given your ruling on the extended coverage, that we'll probably get lots more publicity during the -- during the hearings on the motions; nonetheless, for what I consider to be legitimate reasons, I am convinced that the amount of publicity we've had till now is enough to get a change of venue motion, and so I'm not seeking to get that additional part of -- part of the record, so what I'm -- what I will be doing is this is the -- this is the only pre-voir dire change of venue motion that I intend to bring. If you deny it, I want time to take a writ. Unlike Mr. Kochis, I don't intend to take a writ as to 995 motions, 1538.5 motions, and all that kind of stuff, so this is the only thing that I think is -- is something which needs to be done before trial and without which Mr. Cooper can't get a fair trial.

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We can litigate --

THE COURT: How long do you expect that first stage to last?

MR. NEGUS: Well, as I say, I think it's going to take you probably a week, maybe -- Mr. Kochis said a week. My original estimate was two or three days, two or three days to get -- to get through all the material. It's just lots and lots and lots of material, and I think that counsel probably would agree.

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, you are going to need five working days to review the material.

MR. YEGUS: Anyway, so the upshot is that the —
that at the request of the District Attorneys' Association,
the legislature changed the statute, and they set up
exactly the procedure that I'm following. It's the D.A.'s
that did this. They said that you make your change of
venue motion. Then they specifically said that any motions
that are pretrial motions, like a 995 and a 1538.5, are
made in the county in which a change of venue is granted.
At the end of that, if the publicity has died down, then
the D.A. can come in and ask for a reconsideration, but
my best guess is that the publicity is not going to die
down. It hasn't yet. Pr. Kottmeier's been predicting
it's going to die down for months, and he's been wrong
for months, so I just don't think that — that it's likely
to die down, and I doubt if they are going to be able to

make that showing, but that's the procedure that the District Attorneys' Association pushed through the legislature, and it is their procedure, and I think that that's what I'm trying to follow.

THE COURT: Submit it, Mr. Kochis?

MR. KOCHIS: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Negus?

MR. NECUS: Yes.

THE COURT: Counsel, I think that these proceedings -- at least I hope that they are going to become so dry, technical, long and perhaps duplicative of what occurred at the Municipal Court that the media is not going to be interested in covering these proceedings after a while.

Secondly, with reference to the time and my duplication of services, if I have to consider it again to consider new publicity, would you stipulate at this time, Mr. Negus, that I could -- wouldn't have to go through all this again, and all we'd do is present evidence on the new matters that come up between now and -- come up between the time of my ruling and the end of the motions stage?

MR. HEGUS: The way it works is if you -- if you deny the change of venue motion now, then we've got a record. I take a writ. If you grant it, then it's granted. Then the D.A. can come back and show -- what he

has to come back and try and show is that there hasn't been any publicity in the interim, okay, and so you don't have to -- you don't have to reconsider what you've already done.

THE COURT: Yes. That's my understanding, so I don't really see any loss of time, and I would just take a look at the new matter, so I will deny your motion to not get into the change of venue first. If that's what he's prepared on, we will go on that.

Anything further before we get into discovery?

MR. KOCHIS: Not at this time.

MR. NEGUS: My -- just to give both Court and counsel some insight into what my plans with respect to the motions are is I would then -- I would be planning to be able to notice the motion to suppress evidence for March the 12th, and given Mr. Kochis' estimates of how long it's going to take to get the change of venue, we may or may not be ready exactly on the 12th, but whenever we get done with the change of venue, to go into that.

I would then hope to be able to have my points and authorities on the 995 completed prior to the completion of the motion to suppress. I would imagine the motion to suppress, judging on the basis of the preliminary hearing, and given the fact I think both sides are probably producing additional evidence at this time, might last a little over a week, so we would then

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be ready to go ahead with the 995 as soon as we finished the motion to suppress. That would then end the pretrial motions.

obviously, that's going to depend upon whether a change of venue has been granted, where we -- where we go from there, and we can take that up at that time, but that's my intended course.

THE COURT: Let me - let me mention one other thing at this time, and then there's one hearing that we should have sometime today in chambers away from the media, and that would be where all of this is going to take place, and I will give you a clue. If we are talking about extended court time as we are, at least pretrial on this matter, that deprives the West End Superior Court of a significant part of its judicial manpower. We have no more courts here with which to put another judge. We can perhaps get another judge assigned from San Bernardino or by the Judicial Council to help us with our workload. This is something, the administration of the courts in that area, that we all here are concerned with, but I can't do it if I am occupying one of the courts here, so I am considering another place to hold these pretrial motions, San Bernardino or Chino, and we have courts in both of them, and perhaps you'd rather speak on this privately, and perhaps you might get Sergeant Reynosa as

well, because they have an interest in the matter, in on that conversation.

MR. NEGUS: I'll just tell you I would object strongly to Chino, and I have no objection to San Bernardino.

THE COURT: Let the record reflect, but let's take that up at some point today when we can get all the interested parties involved in that.

All right. I believe in the next area you have all the counsel at the table here, including Mr. Adler and Mr. Hadden as well. Has --

MR. NEGUS: Your Honor, I received some points and authorities from Mr. Hadden approximately two minutes before the Court came out. I haven't had a chance to read them.

THE COURT: It's not much different from that that Mr. Kochis had filed.

MR. NEGUS: I still -- if we could do the other parts of the -- of the -- of the motion other than the Pitchess materials and then give me a chance to -- to look at that before I -- before we argue the Pitchess materials, let's take a break or go out to lunch.

THE COURT: Why don't we take a brief recess at this time, and that will give you a chance to look it over as well. All right. So we will be in morning recess.

(Recess.)

THE COURT: I have read the motion for discovery filed January 31, 1984, the incorporated pages of the transcripts mentioned in it, the order proposed, the district attorney's response thereto, and that from the Sheriff's Department, and the Sheriff's Department, Mr. Negus, you received that only this morning, as did I, but going along with that, I suppose, there's a declaration previously filed back on February 17 of Lieutenant Nunn, N-u-n-n --

MR. NEGUS: I received that.

THE COURT: -- which I have likewise read and considered.

Do you wish to be heard, Counsel?

MR. NEGUS: Let me just — I don't know which order you wish to do it. I've had talks with Mr. Adler from the Attorney General's Office, and we can go through and specify with respect to Section A those items which there are no objections to and those which there are.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NEGUS: And we can divide them up perhaps that way.

THE COURT: Let me go back to your motion for a minute here.

MR. NEGUS: Secause some -- there's various ones.

THE COURT: Did you file anything, Mr. Adler?

MR. ADLER: No, sir, I did not. If the Court — the Court will note that in the district attorney's response, there is a section of argument directed to a portion of — of the discovery motion that was directed towards California — to the Department of Corrections because —

THE COURT: All right. Let's take it up -- when we get to the part you are concerned with, then we will hear from you orally.

MR. ADLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Going to your motion for discovery, Mr. Negus, I've gone through and I've mentioned the ones that there are objections to, so let's just go through them one at a time, and we're going to quickly handle the uncontested ones.

Number one, there's no objection, and I will just initial where it says "ordered." That's correctional officers! names on May 3.

Have you gone through the district attorney's Response, Mr. Adler?

MR. ADLER: Yes, Your Honor, I have.

THE COURT: So do you have a different position than him on any of the others that he has not argued against?

MR. ADLER: Which -- which portion of the discovery motion are we talking about?

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THE COURT: I'm just going to start at number one on page two, and that's just the officers on duty on May 3.

MR. NEGUS: I can tell you which ones he objects

THE COURT: I can tell you that too.

MR. NEGUS: -- that are not in the -- there -I believe there's some in Mr. --

THE COURT: Counsel, let's be logical and just take them one at a time, and we are going to get to them, and we will take them up then.

Two, photographs of persons identified in the first question.

No objection?

So ordered.

MR. ADLER: Excuse me, Your Honor. There's one qualification on that. The Department is a little nervous about supplying these photographs in an openended way, and I discussed this with Mr. Negus. Mr. Negus, as I recall, has no objection to representing to the Court that he will show them to his client only and give them back invediately when he's done with them. The concern is that peace officers' photographs linked with their names and then just kicking around any old place --

THE COURT: I don't think I'd do that, but what you would do then, Mr. Negus, is perhaps turn them over

to Mr. Kottmeier or Mr. Kochis so that they'd be available for your further use later on during the trial, if needed; is that right?

MR. NEGUS: Basically, yes. I will be given them, take them out to the jail, talk to Kevin about them, bring them back, give them back.

MR. ADLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. As qualified orally.

Number three, basically about inmates.

No objection? So ordered.

Four --

MR. ADLER: Again, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Really?

MR. ADLER: -- there's no legal objection. There's a mechanical problem. The institution people tell me they this is difficult for them to do. I'm not sure difficult or impossible in representing it to the Court, because when an inmate roes to a particular part of the institution, that inmate's presence is officially noted by a three-by-five card which is in a little file in that particular physical sub-facility, if you will. When the inmate moves someplace else, the card's just torn up. There's no computer list or any other kind of a master list where the Department can reconstruct which inmates have been where, and that's the problem, so it's a physical problem.

THE COURT: I am distressed somewhat because I asked you before if you took a significant different position than the district attorney, and apparently you do. He has no objection to that one, but you do then. Are you telling me that that information cannot be supplied?

MR. ADLER: Well, the Department told me that given the way this works, it is difficult for them to do that, or impossible. Mr. Negus told me in our telephone conversation that in his experience, they have been able to do this before. I am sort of at a loss. I am telling the Court what my client told me, and also representing to the Court what Mr. Negus told me. I can't go much further than that.

THE COURT: He wants inmates in a certain hall between certain dates, in fact, three halls at a certain time. What do you suggest, sir?

MR. NEGUS: They can do it. That's why I think in my declaration I noted certain pages in the transcript. CIM always says they can't.

THE COURT: I will order it, and then if they can't, why, we will have, in effect, an order to show cause why not.

MR. NEGUS: Fine.

THE COURT: All right. I have initialed number three as being ordered.

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Number four, photographs. Have you got some kind of agreement to have those likewise returned?

MR. ADLER: These are of inmates, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ADLER: No.

THE COURT: No problem?

MR. ADLER: I don't believe there's a problem

there.

THE COURT: So ordered.

Number five, information with reference to a particular inmate.

No indicated objection so far.

Mr. Adler?

MR. ADLER: Your Honor, the only objection that we feel compelled to make is an objection based upon the right of privacy of Mr. Taylor. It seems to us if we don't make an objection and have the Court engage in the balancing and weighing process, Mr. Taylor might then seek redress against the Department.

THE COURT: What's on here? You've got psychological test results.

MR. NEGUS: Those are not privileged, Your Honor. They circulate freely amongst the institutions. Any staff member in the institution has access to them with a "need to know" basis. They are not restricted. They are not covered by any patient-psychotherapist privilege.

THE COURT: That's the only thing. Well, that would appear to be the most sensitive matter there. You have disciplinary matters which are likewise sensitive.

FR. ADLER: Your Honor, if it's the Court's sense that Mr. Taylor's right to privacy in -- in his file is outweighed by the need of Mr. Cooper to prepare adequately to defend himself against capital charges, you know, we will certainly comply with the Court's order, but for the record, we do feel compelled to make the right of privacy objection.

THE COURT: Normally you don't have to tell me twice, Rr. Adler.

MR. ADLER: Excuse me.

THE COURT: Mr. Negus, you are not going to divulge this information outside of the usual purposes of trial, I take it.

MR. NEGUS: No.

THE COURT: All right. I will -- I will order that with that understanding, because in trial in the way you might use it here, the Court maintains control over that in the usual manner.

Let's skip number six and go to number seven. MR. NEGUS: I can indicate there's no objection

to seven through fifteen.

MR. ADLER: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So ordered each and every

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He suggested a particular time that you would furnish this material somewhere. Did that appear all right to you, gentlemen? It's back at the end, I believe.

MR. NEGUS: I left that to the Court to decide, because we weren't sure when we were going to hear this motion. I would request two weeks from now.

MR. ADLER: May I have just a moment, Your Honor?
Your Honor, I am informed that with the exception
of the items three and four, which I am told will take
almost a month, there's no problem with the balance of
the request.

THE COURT: I am not approving that time limit suggestion of a month. I don't see why anything should take that long. I can't conceive of me trying to put anybody in jail, however, if you don't get it in a couple of weeks, so do your best to furnish it within that period of time, and then we will hear from you if there's a problem. All right?

MR. ADLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I trust that the institution is going to do their best to comply.

Surely, you have no objection to number sixteen and seventeen and eighteen, do you?

MR. HEGUS: Sixteen is the only other one that they have an objection to, Your Honor, and they don't like

me taking pictures of fences.

THE COURT: Excuse me. Which one? They don't want you what?

MR. NEGUS: They don't like me taking pictures of their fences; however, the fences I'm asking to take pictures of, you can see by standing on Edison Avenue, as I have; however, when I was out there trying to take pictures of them, the guards didn't like me taking pictures of them, so I said I'd get a court order.

THE COURT: There may be some real valid security reasons for that. I don't know. I could also see valid reasons for defense desiring that under the escape charge.

Do you wish to be heard, Mr. Adler?

MR. ADLER: Your Honor has touched on the basis for our objection. It is not just a fence, either. There are also -- there are also -- there's a route within the institution that counsel would like to photograph that. We have no objection to photographs of all of the other areas, but my client feels that the areas contained in this particular requests are security areas, and we would ask the Court deny number sixteen. In the alternative, if the Court is inclined to grant it, we would ask that the same representations that have been made about other photographs which might be sensitive be applied to this item.

MR. NEGUS: I won't use them for any other purpose

other than this case.

THE COURT: Is there any area that he requests pictures or inspection of that is not seen routinely by inmates?

MR. ADLER: Routinely by inmates?

MR. NEGUS: No.

MR. ADLER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Then what they can see with their minds, he should be able to see with his camera, but as far as qualifying your --

MR. NEGUS: I have no objection to -- I will not use those photographs for any purpose other than this case.

THE COURT: I trust he will do that, and with that qualification, I will order number sixteen, seventeen, eighteen.

Nineteen, any objection?

MR. NEGUS: No.

MR. ADLER: No opposition to any other items seventeen through twenty-one, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let's move on to Section B. There's a lot of those. Let's get all of those that there is no objection on in case we have to modify any of them.

Number one, two -- one through four, any objection to any of those?

MR. KOCHIS: No. Your Honor.

THE COURT: So ordered.

I'm on page 9 now.

MR. NEGUS: With respect to five, Your Honor, we can agree, I believe, on a modification.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. NEGUS: I am basically only interested in witnesses' tapes. I am also interested in the dispatch tapes, but I am only requesting that the prosecution continue to preserve those tapes as they have in the past, and sometime before we actually start presenting testimony, I will have narrowed down exactly which portions of those tapes I need to copy. I think it's probably like a day's worth, and we can work it out from that point in time. The prosecution doesn't agree that I can do that, but we could litigate that, if it's a problem.

> THE COURT: You will continue to preserve those? MR. KOCHIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then we will exclude dispatch tapes at this time from the copy order, and then there is going to -- on line 26 change "or" to "of".

MR. NEGUS: That sounds good.

THE COURT: All right. So ordered as modified.

MR. NEGUS: I think that's probably a typo.

THE COURT: Yes.

Number six, any objection?

MR. KOCHIS: No, Your Honor.

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25 26 THE COURT: So ordered.

Number one of Section C, district attorney says that they've got all of that, and that it's already in the reports; dig it out yourself. Mr. Negus.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I understand that, Your Honor, but let me just -- the problem with that is -- is that I believe there are probably, oh, at least a thousand, maybe two thousand people, just guessing, based upon the limited index that I've already done, mentioned in those police reports. Mr. Kottmeier has made statements in the past that the vast majority of those reports have little or no validity as far as the presentation of a preliminary hearing, that is to say they didn't really have to do with guilt or innocence, and a lot of the reports have to do with them searching for Mr. Cooper in places where Mr. Cooper never was. I think that if we are going to have a -- that that kind of request is routinely granted in civil cases, and in a situation where we have vast amounts of materials that have been supplied to me, if I were to go around investigating the credibility of everybody mentioned in those reports, it could take years. I'd like to be able to focus my investigative energies and the taxpayers' money on those people whom we can reasonably expect to be called.

THE COURT: Mr. Negus, I suspect that you're just about as skilled as they are to look through those reports,

and you will be able to predict which ones will be called. MR. HEGUS: Judge, I don't want Mr. Cooper's life hanging on whether I predict right or not. I mean, they are just as -- they know approximately who they're going to call as witnesses at the trial. They are going to have to subpoena them all. I am not saying that this list stands in stone that they will present to me and that if they find additional witnesses or going through the trial, they decide that there's some people on the list that they -- that they want to add, that they can't be allowed to do that, but I believe that it's not an unreasonable -- it's not an unreasonable request. It's a -- the discovery procedures are -- for criminal cases are judicially created. They have tended to go along the analogy of civil cases. In civil cases this kind of request is routinely granted because it's the only way that you can -- you can prepare a piece of complex litigation. Your average burglary you don't have any problem, but in this particular case it's more akin to a complex civil case. We have to have some way of narrowing in on who they are going to -- who they are going to call as witnesses, so that we can investigate them. They have statutes that they get continuances if I bring in witnesses that they haven't heard of. There's no such statute for defense lawyers, and I doubt seriously if the Court's going to be wanting to consider

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during the course of trial a request for two days of continuance every time they bring in a witness that I hadn't thought of, and I think that by -- by -- there's no real -- there's no real burden on them for doing this, because they have to prepare the subpoenas anyway, and so all you're saying is -- is should they have a right to try and surprise me at trial with somebody I hadn't thought of, I don't think that's any way to run a lawsuit, and it seems to me it creates immense practical problems in a piece of complex litigation like this.

THE COURT: Perhaps as we get closer to trial, there's room for some accommodation. At this time I suspect that you are -- you have no way of knowing, yourself --

MR. KOCHIS: Well, Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- but later on, you will.

MR. KOCHIS: We have spent two months in preliminary hearing together. Mr. Negus knows the names, the identities, the addresses, the testimony under oath of a large number of people he knows we are going to call at the trial. There's not a potential witness available, that we are aware of, that we have not had interviewed, had their name placed on a piece of paper with their address and had that given to Mr. Negus. He's also aware, with his many years of trial expertise, which reports reflect information of witnesses who have no

relevance whatsoever to the trial.

The court reporters at the preliminary hearing were kind enough to provide a typewritten chronological list of every witness who was called at the preliminary hearing. Each one of those witnesses is a potential witness, and most probably will be called at the trial. That's a list of 50 or 60 people for Mr. Negus to start to work on.

THE COURT: Mr. Kochis, I don't recall you ever trying a case before me but what you didn't furnish a witness list to the Court on perhaps the first day of court. Would you expect to do so in this case?

MR. KOCHIS: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Would that be at the commencement of voir dire?

MR. KOCHIS: Yes, it would.

THE COURT: That's sufficient, Mr. Negus.

MR. WEGUS: That's fine. I mean I'm not asking

for any more.

THE COURT: All right. I will not order number one.

MR. KOCHIS: Your Honor, the only qualification
I would have is the Court is familiar when I prepare a
witness list, I don't go through and put everyone's
name -- I mean telephone number and address and tip code.

THE COURT: No, but that's in the report, and

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he could go back and refer to the report; not ordered, number one.

Any objection to two, three -- two all the way through ten? I didn't note any from your documents filed.

MR. KOCHIS: No. Your Honor, there is none.

THE COURT: So ordered.

Skipping number eleven and twelve and the rest of them, let's go back then perhaps to the ones we had skipped before.

MR. NEGUS: Perhaps number eleven would be the easiest one. I think that can be done fairly quickly.

THE COURT: All right. The identities and present whereabouts of all Santa Barbara sheriffs and U.S. Coast Guard personnel at Santa Cruz Island on the 30th of July.

MR. NEGUS: That information, contrary to

Mr. Kochis' representations, is not available to me.

Had it been in the reports, I wouldn't have asked for

it. There was reference during the course of the

preliminary hearing to various unnamed Coast Guard and

Sheriff's Office personnel doing various acts. I have

no way, unless I have a list to work from, of attempting

to locate these people.

THE COURT: How big is Santa Cruz Island? How many people are we talking about?

MR. NEGUS: We are talking about -- what you're talking about is, I think, a couple of boatloads of people, that they should have a list of -- of -- of the people that they sent out there. There's no officers on the island. They're in the bay.

I would suggest to you at this time you write a letter to the Sheriff of that county asking him for this information. If he denies you or ignores you, in that letter you tell him that you are going to be moving on or — on a certain date to have the Court order that information. I want to give them an opportunity to be heard. I don't know what objection, if any, they may have to this. Try and get it yourself first. I reserve jurisdiction over it, but before I would rule upon that, I want at least an informal but written notice to the Sheriff of that county.

MR. NEGUS: And the Coast Guard, whoever they are, as well?

THE COURT: Yes, to those various people, so I will simply reserve jurisdiction on that one. They may -- it may be so few, they may have no objection. I don't think it makes much difference which -- whether we take number twelve there or number six. Let's go back to page 3, any complaints of the CDC to any law enforcement agency about fabricating, falsifying or failing to preserve

evidence, or dishonesty of some 44 apparently -- no.

This is just a very few people here. These are

Investigator Ezekiel Hernandez -- and I assume these

are all California Department of Corrections personnel;

is that correct?

MR. NEGUS: Yes.

MR. ADLER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Negus, do you wish to amplify on the documents filed?

MR. NEGUS: Well, there's -- taking I guess all the points and authorities filed against the similar request from the Sheriff's Department are deemed to have been applied against this one, so maybe if I just argued the whole thing all at once.

THE COURT: Yes. I think that they are very closely aligned.

MR. MEGUS: They were meant to be identical.

First off, the -- Mr. Hadden didn't have the benefit of the preliminary hearing transcript, and if that's important to him, I don't have my copy with me. I don't think counsel does, anyway, but I incorporated by reference in my declaration essentially my summation to Judge Merriam --

THE COURT: I read that.

MR. NEGUS: -- at the preliminary hearing that I am presenting as an offer of proof, which I think is one

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 of the two things that I'm required to do in asking for Pitchess type materials. That is, taking the situation which we're all familiar with under a Pitchess situation where the claim is excessive force, I have to claim that — I have to tell you that that's going to be my defense, I'm going to use excessive force as a defense, and I have to specify with particularity the kinds of materials that I want.

Well, I'm telling you in my declaration that my defense is going to include, both at the motion stage and at the jury trial stage, a claim that the San Bernardino Sheriff's Office --

THE COURT: Counsel, I really think you have stated all this.

MR. NEGUS: But I --

THE COURT: I know. I see no need, however, to -to make statements that may to some extent prove
inflammatory. Even though the proceedings are open, I
see no reason that you should bait them in any way.

MR. NEGUS: Well, can we have the people closed so that I can make my record? I don't want to be put in the position that we have to --

THE COURT: Your documents are filed. I merely suggest that to you. I know perfectly well what you are going to say. I don't see the need for you going into it, but if you insist on it, go ahead.

MR. NEGUS: I am perfectly willing to do it outside the presence of all these people.

THE COURT: Proceed.

MR. NEGUS: I mean, I think it is important in explaining why I think the stuff -- that I should get it. To state more succinctly, that my offer of proof is that the Sheriff's Department botched the investigation of the Ryen crisis, and after doing that, they decided to -as soon as they found that Mr. Cooper had been in the area, they made him a scapegoat. That's what I will be attempting to prove, or one of the things I will be attempting to prove at trial and during the motions. Specifically, I think that the motion -- the evidence at the preliminary hearing, which I referred to, showed that this is not just something that -- that I've --. that I've made up, that that's what -- that's basically what the evidence shows. The prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing admitted that they failed to preserve evidence. Mr. Gregonis testified that he wanted to have more time to gather evidence, wasn't given it. They admitted that they failed to preserve the carpet in the bedroom so that additional typing of -serological typing could be done on it. They admitted that they failed to preserve the furniture so that serological typing could be done on it. They admitted that there was various samples of blood which some officers

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thought were important, which supposedly through inadvertence weren't collected; so there was ample admissions at the preliminary hearing on the failure to preserve issue.

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There was also evidence at the preliminary hearing that there were statements made by Joshua Ryen which the officers failed to preserve. Mr. O'Campo testified under oath that on June 6, 1983, he did not discuss with Joshua Ryen anything that had happened at the time of the crime. Prosecution has now interviewed and has provided a report of a nurse at Loma Linda Hospital who overheard Mr. O'Campo discussing various suspects with Joshua on June the 5th, a direct contradiction to his testimony. Mr. O'Campo indicated that on June 14 when he talked to Joshua, at no time did Joshua ever say anything to the effect that "they," meaning more than one person, chased him around the house. The prosecution has now provided me with discovery of the notes of Dr. Jerry Hoyle who was also present during that interview which showed several -- I think three times in the course of that note, he writes down that Joshua said "tney" were doing something to him. Mr. O'Campo said he destroyed his notes.

with respect to the search warrant, we had a search warrant for blood from Mr. Cooper. That search warrant was divided at the preliminary hearing into two

parts, one that had to do with whether a crime was committed, in which there weren't any misstatements, and another one which had to do with a reason for believing that Mr. Cooper was responsible for the crime. That section had 12 paragraphs. Each one of those 12 paragraphs had matters in it which the evidence at the preliminary hearing showed was factually not true. The witnesses from CIM, evidence was introduced at the preliminary hearing that with respect to a certain transaction that occurred on June the 7th, they had nigh onto identical descriptions of that transaction, several sentences, I think a couple paragraphs of stuff almost word for word the same. That in itself may not be significant, but they both stated under oath that in no way did they consult with the other in drafting those two paragraphs. That is, they just somehow independently. came to exact same wording in their statements.

I would suggest that that is itself circumstantial evidence that at least those two people are lying; so in addition to just an assertion by my part -- and I haven't gone through all of it, just enough to -- I think just enough to highlight that it's not something that is -- it's not what they call, in every response to request for discovery that I have ever seen, a "fishing expedition". It's something which goes to the heart of the defense case.

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The second — the second criteria, in addition to an offer of proof, is that the items that are being requested are identified with specificity, and in this particular case, I have not asked for the complete personnel files or something like that which doesn't specify, but have given a specific statement as to what I want.

The six names from CIM are the six people that in my offer of proof I suggested that there was -- that, in the statement I made to Judge Merriam, suggested were involved in the process of fabrication. The names of deputy sheriffs which are included in the request from -for officers from the San Bernardino Sheriff's Office are names of the people that, according to a list drafted by Gary Woods of the Homicide and supplemented by testimony of people at the preliminary hearing who said that they were in the Ryen house, were there during the critical time when evidence was being -- was being -- was being seized. I have since talked to one of them, the first one, Roger McCoy, and he tells me that he was included on Mr. Woods' list by error. For that reason, I'd be willing to scratch Mr. McCoy from the list because I believe him. I don't think he was in there, but with respect to all the other people, they are either admittedly, or by reference to other people, people that were in the house, so it's just not -- it's not just an

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arbitrarily designated list.

As I take the basis of Mr. Kochis' objection, it's that the stuff that I'm asking for is not admissible in court, therefore, I shouldn't get it, and maybe I misunderstood him, but that's at least the way I read his objection. First of all, umpty-ump cases say that admissibility is not a prerequisite to discoverability, but, secondly, and more important, that the two cases that Mr. Kochis relied on were both decided before Proposition 8, Article 1, Section 28(d) was added to the California Constitution. That section was added at the request of the prosecutors because they felt frustrated that certain evidentiary rules were not allowing them to get in evidence those -- the legislature excepted certain sections of the Evidence Code from the list, from -- from -- from Article 1, Section 28. The sections that Mr. Kochis relies on aren't among them.

It seems that if the prosecution is going to have the benefit that all relevant evidence should be admissible, that the defense likewise should have that benefit.

If the officers named have lied, fabricated evidence, failed to preserve evidence or destroyed evidence willfully in the past, that seems to be certainly relevant to the defense that we are putting on

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at trial, and I don't see anything in Mr. -- in Mr. Nunn's declaration which says otherwise. Basically, he says that they have -- have an interest somehow in getting candid reports from -- from people; therefore, they shouldn't have to -- they shouldn't have to give it up. Well, if they get candid reports that officers are lying or destroying evidence or fabricating evidence, that doesn't seem the sort of thing -- what's the point of getting candid reports if you're not going to do anything about it? I specifically did not ask for the one thing which I think that might require confidentiality in order to get a candid opinion, and that is the conclusions of the Sheriff's people about the truth of those charges, and that is the thing that I could see they might have an interest in having the guy give a candid opinion whether he thinks they are true or not, and I haven't asked for that.

with respect to the -- I take it the second stare of defense, that is, if you -- if you don't buy their first line of defense that I shouldn't be entitled to know whether these officers have been dishonest in the past, that you only give the names of the people who have made complaints and not give the reports, I would submit that that procedure is deficient for two reasons: Pirst off, it just wastes time. I mean, it makes us go out and talk to everybody who's ever given a

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complaint, without being able to evaluate, you know, what they -- what they -- what they charge. In -- in allocating our investigative time, if it looks on the face of it to me like the complaint's not justified, then I won't waste investigative time in going out and contacting the people involved.

Secondly, I have found that from practice, that just getting the names of the complainants doesn't — doesn't necessarily furnish all the — the information which is necessary.

In a case which we had recently, the case of People versus Ruben Munoz, you ordered essentially this -in this particular form that I have requested here -- in fact, the language I think is identical. I think I xeroxed it. And in that particular case, as just an example, there were six reports and two names of complaining witnesses. The most important witnesses that we discovered, on interviewing those people, were the people that didn't file complaints. That is the -the situation is where it was in the officer's files things of investigations, but in which nobody actually came down to the police station and filed -- and filed a complaint: so having to -- having to rely upon somebody to file a complaint, you have to get somebody who's -who thinks it's worthwhile to go down to a -- a police station and complain, and that he -- especially at CIM,

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but also the Sheriff's Department -- leaves out an awful lot of -- awful lot of materials.

In summary, I have given you a reason why I want it. It's not just something I made up. It was something that there was a lot of evidence presented at the preliminary hearing about, an offer of proof made at the preliminary hearing about it, continued to present evidence on that throughout the course of these proceedings. I have told you with specificity what I want, and I think that's all I am required to do.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, would you care to digest all of that with your lunch and return at 1:30?

MR. KOCHIS: That's fine.

THE COURT: I think we're going to go rather far into the lunch period otherwise. Let's resume at 1:30 this afternoon, please.

(Whereupon, the noon recess was taken.)

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ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA; FRIDAY, PEBRUARY 24, 1984; 1:37 P.M.

THE COURT: All right. Who would like to be heard?

MR. KOCHIS: I believe I would start off, Your honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Kochis.

MR. KOCHIS: Frior to lunch, Mr. Negus made reference in his oral statements to the Court of evidence that was allegedly introduced at the preliminary hearing, and in support of his discovery notion in his affidavit, he has specifically referred the Court to a particular volume and pages within that volume. The Court has read that volume and those pages and, of course, the Court is aware that what Mr. Negus has referred the Court to was neither testimony nor evidence. It was simply Mr. Hegus' interpretation at the end of the preliminary hearing of what he felt the facts and the evidence was, and the Court's aware that ho's attempting to bootstrap himself, in that today he's making these same proundless, warrantless accusations against the law enforcement officers involved in this case that he made at the preliminary hearing.

The Court is also aware that Mr. Negus used those accusations in support of his motion to suppress pursuant to Hitch to dismiss and to suppress pursuant to 1535.5.

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and the Court is aware, because we're here in Superior Court, that Judge Merriam, who heard all the evidence and all the testimony, found that Mr. Megua' accusations were groundless, and that he denied each and every motion Mr. Hegus made based on the same ground he suggests today, and he held Mr. Cooper to answer.

It is our position, Your Honor, that the cases we have cited, Tyler, Royes, Hinojosa, are right on point. They provide that the defense is not entitled to intrude into the confidential files of law enforcement officers with these types of accusations.

Mr. Negus would lead the Court to believe that the status of the law has changed since Proposition 8; however, I am going to quote from the California Constitution Article 1, Section 28 Subsection D wherein it states: "Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege." And the matters we are dealing with here in court today are privileged evidentiary matters as defined by Evidence Code Sections 1040 through 1045.

The Minojous case makes it abundantly clear that the limitations provided through the Pitchess rationals hold that intrusion into law enforcement officers' files is limited to the arresting officer where there's a showing of good cause and officers that were involved in the fracas.

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In this particular case, you have Mr. Negus requesting to intrude into the confidential personnel files of people like Captain Myers, Lieutenant bradford, Assistant Sheriff Pollett, Deputy Chief Majors, Captain Schuyler and the Sheriff himself, Mr. Midwell. All of those individuals were individuals who not only did not arrest the defendant, they interviewed no witnesses, they collected and gathered no evidence, and there's no aubstantiation in Mr. Negus' affidavit in affidavit form without referring in boiler plate back to some argument he made at the preliminary hearing to specify which officers were involved in the collection of which particular evidence or the interview of which particular witnesses and how he has a good faith belief that there is any evidence in any personnel files of fabrication that would affect his demonstration of their credibility to the jury during the trial.

It is our position that if the Court follows the rules set forth in Reyes, in Tyler, it will deny Mr. Megus' request for the intrusion into the personnel files of the officers he's requesting.

I would submit it.

THE COURT: Ckay. Mr. Adler.

MR. ADLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Department of Corrections would join in the observations of counsel, of the prosecutor. We would additionally point out to the

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Court that the showing made by defendant in his affidavit is deficient. It doesn't even come up to that required by Pitchess. What does defendant say? Defendant says he will try to prove — his words — that the Department of Corrections officers were lying. Your Honor, this is no different than the vast majority of cases that I am sure this Court has seen, in which in every case the defense tries to prove exactly that. This — there is little more actual factual basis or showing in this case than in the run-of-the-mill case where the arresting officers credibility is attacked which justifies this unprecedented intrusion into these officers' both statutorily and constitutionally protected files.

We would submit that the analysis of the prosecutor is proper; that notwithstanding Proposition 8, the 1040 through 1045 privileges remain in full vitality; and, furthermore, even if they don't, the overwhelming interests of these officers in maintaining the privacy of their personnel file, when compared to the entirely speculative interest of defendant in intruding into those private matters, clearly should result in the Court's denial of this motion.

Unless the Court has questions, we'd be prepared to submit the matter as well.

THE COURT: Sir, are you Mr. Hadden?

MR. HADDEN: Thank you, Your Honor. If I may only

 add a few things, I concur with the remarks made by the Attorney General and — the Attorney General's Office and the prosecutor. As regards the affidavit, as Mr. Kochis noted, the affidavit is defective. It's not stated under oath as to the items noted in the transcript.

As regards the Sheriff's officers, there is no specific allegation in the affidavit, other than the reference to the transcript, that our officers fabricated, falsified, et cetera. In addition, I understand from Mr. Nunn that his department was not even served with the transcript as part of the papers he received. My clients have not received copies of the transcript, and I would allege that the affidavit is therefore defective and that the defendant has not complied with the provisions of 1043 et seq.

In addition, there is absolutely no showing from anything coming from the defendant that the personnel files of all 44 officers need be discovered. Counsel's argument related to a paltry few. It had absolutely no relevance to the great majority of officers listed there, and I would allege that his request is nothing more than a fishing expedition that has been specifically disallowed in the Tyler case.

Finally, his request for the names, addresses, phone numbers, statements and discipline -- investigative statements and discipline of the officers, he has no right,

according to the cases that have — the <u>Kelvin L.</u> case and the <u>Carruthers</u> case cited in our brief. He has no right to material other than the names and addresses and phone numbers. The statements of witnesses and other information is specifically precluded from the defendant until such time as he has made a showing that such material is otherwise unavailable to him, and on that, we would submit it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

Back to you, Mr. Negus.

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MR. NEGUS: Mr. Kochis' argument about privilege confounds two issues. There is a relevancy issue or a materiality issue that is involved. Tyler, Reyes said that certain materials were not material because Evidence Code Sections 1101, 787 made them inadmissible. Prop 8 did change 1101 and 787. It did away with them. What it didn't do away with was the privilege involved that the Court, before giving me those records, has to review the file in camera to make sure that we're not dealing with a fishing expedition, that they don't just give me the whole file, they only give me those parts of the file which are material; so it is true that the privilege didn't change, but the materiality changed. That's why Reves and Tyler are no longer good law. They didn't go to the -- to the issues of procedure, which I will concede that 1040 through 1045 is still in effect. You

distimestill have to have an in-camera hearing, look at the officers' files before they are released to me, but the scope of evidence that I can introduce at trial has changed. I am now allowed to introduce prior acts of officers lying if it's relevant to try and prove that they're lying now. That is the thing that has changed by Proposition 8; therefore, it becomes relevant to find out whother they have lied in the past.

THE COURT: Suppose, hypothetically, that by this material, you find out that Officer Z three years ago was less than truthful in a particular incident. It may well be subject of debate or of conflicting evidence if we had to prove that at this hearing, but how is that relevant to prove that they lied on this particular occasion?

MR. NEGUS: That is to show -- because -- it's -the proposition that one lied once, one will lie again has
always been recognized as being relevant. The framers
of the Evidence Code -- and Jefferson explains this in his -in his discussion of that -- found that they -- they
created a policy against allowing it, but the District
Attorneys' Association in their wisdom elected to go to
the voters and overrule the drafters of the Evidence Code.

What I'm saying is, you know, I may not have voted for their attempt to overrule the Evidence Code, but once they've done it, both sides get the benefit of

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THE COURT: Okay.

I knew it was in the files, I wouldn't have to ask for it, if I knew there was specific things. All I have to say is with specificity what I want you to look for; that is, you have to, unfortunately, do the work, but that's what the -- that's what the privilege says. You've got to look - I've got to tell you with enough specificity, so that it isn't a fishing expedition, what to give me if it's in there. I think I did that. Any complaints about dishonesty, falsification, fabrication and failing to preserve evidence: that's pretty specific. It doesn't do -- it doesn't deal with, you know, officers that get caught making phone calls to their girlfriends on company time or officers that beat people up or any of the 10,000 other things that might be in semebody's file. It is specific, and I don't have to prove that -- I don't have to put the preliminary hearing on all over again at this notion in order to get discovery. That's why I tried to avoid spending -- just resubmitting my offer of proof, bringing it all out again. I incorporated it by

reference into my declaration that the reason that it's

not evidence is because that is what I am attempting to

MR. MEGUS: Hinojosa and the cases collected

therein state that I don't have to know that there's

stuff in the files in order to get it. Obviously, if

show. Counsel is, I think, not quite correct that the Judge found that it was groundless. He found that certain of the propositions didn't justify a motion to dismiss. He may also have found that there was -- that the District Attorney mercly met their burden that there was a suspicion, but we're dealing in a trial before a jury with proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and there may be a reasonable possibility that the officers lied without and Mr. Cooper would still have to be held to answer. so I think it's not -- Judge Merriam's ruling is not res judicata. I'm not to be prevented from introducing the evidence and drawing the same inferences at trial merely because there was a suscicion enough to justify holding Mr. Cooper to answer, if in fact that was justified. What I have to show is why I want it, and I think my declaration states that that is soing to be part of my defense. You can't -- like in a battery on a peace officer case, which was what we're used to, you can't get a Pitchess motion if your defense is going to be the defendant didn't do it, he was comeplace else. You have to tell -- but all you have to do in order to get a Pitchesa motion granted is to say, yes, Judge, I'm not lying to you. My defense is going to be excessive force. It doesn't matter whether there's evidence in support of that or not, and the Judge isn't required to rule on that evidence.

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I declared under penalty of perjury that that's the evidence I am going to be putting on. I am going to be doing -- and I -- I mean, the Court was reluctant for me to go through it again in open court, but I wanted to state on the record that when they claim that there's no basis for what I am asking, I am specifically going to prove that. That's -- I am going to be presenting evidence to that at the Slitch motions and in front of the jury. That's going to be part of my defense, and so this is not something that is -- that is irrelevant to what we are going to be doing. It is relevant. I have given you enough specificity as to what I want. The law has changed to allow it in under Prop 3, and the last point that was alluded to, the case of Kelvin L. and Carruthers, do not stand for the proposition that all you get is the names of people. They say unless you make a showing, then that's all you get at first. I am arguing to you that it is a complete waste of taxpayers' time and money to do it in a two-stage process, to have Mr. Porbush go out and talk to all these people, do the screening that way -- and who knows how many people we're going to be dealing with -- and then come back. Let us do the screening by looking at the reports first. It's a lot more expeditious. It's going to save a lot of investigative time. It's just going to be -- it's a more efficient way to do it, and there's usually information

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in the reports, and it's been my experience through umpty-ump Pitchess motions in the excessive force area, that there's always information in there that is not available just by the -- by the statement of names. I gave you the example before where we had twice as many witnesses from the reports as we got from the people who have the chatzpah to go down and file complaints.

Finally, as to the numbers of efficers, each of the four investigators and the two correctional officers that are named from CIM were involved in the issue of did a James Taylor give a certain pair of tennis shoes to Mr. Cooper in the prison. There were innumerable contradictory statements from all of those people at the preliminary hearing to amply justify the conclusion that they're being deceitful. That's why those six people are relevant.

The 4% people that -- if that's the number that are named in the -- in the motion are the 4% people who were involved in taking the evidence out of the Ryen house. I agree that 4% is a large number, but there shouldn't have been 4% people in the house, to begin with. When the sheriffs invited everybody in the whole department into the house to gather the evidence, they were the ones that created that particular problem. The reason that there's so many people being asked about it is that there was so many people in there. It's not correct that

Sheriff Tidwell, for example, had no connection with what's going on about the obtaining of evidence. Sheriff Tidwell was sitting there telling them do this, do that. There was testimony at the preliminary hearing. There was testimony at the preliminary hearing that the -- some people wanted to seize some other evidence. Others gave countermanding orders. There was conflicting testimony. It's going to be important at some point in time that these different people that gave conflicting testimony -we are going to have to try and weigh their credibility. That's why I need to have this particular information about those particular -- those particular people. I mean I didn't just pick out names at random. out people that were involved in the process which is critical to the prosecution's case and in the process which I think is critical to the defendant's case in trying to examine, so it's not just arbitrarily chosen. The reason there's so many is that they had so many people in there.

moment that you are being just arbitrary or that in your mind you don't have good cause for -- and good foundation for asking for this particular discovery, and you analogize at great length with the Pitchess type cases and the battery on a peace officer case which are very much distinguishable from this situation here, and you

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ask me to do something and to permit you to make discovery in an area that is unprecedented. You give me no authority other than analogizing to Proposition 8 in the truth-in-evidence provision in the Pitchess cases. It is distinguishable. While you give me no case or statutory authority for this kind of discovery, I do have the other, though prior Proposition S, cases that are specifically against it: the Tyler, the Reyes cases. Perhaps Proposition 3 has indeed overruled Evidence Code Section 737 and 1101. I'm not sure, but at least the basis for those code sections, which was one of relevancy, which caused them, I'm sure, to be enacted to begin with, is still a valid consideration for me. The truth-inevidence provisions of Proposition 3 specifically provided qualifications by (a) privilege that Mr. Kocnis mentioned and (b) Evidence Code Section 352; and your argument, though more extensive and based upon a considerable record, is little different than the usual type of case where we get a trial where we're trying police officers as opposed to the defendants.

I do not find good cause to grant this to you.

I do not find the plausible justification that the Tyler case speaks of. I do find that the considerations of Evidence Code Section 352, the time, the fact that this would be a complete Fandora's box, getting off onto considerable time and confusion of issues, weighed with

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the prejudice to the morale and efficient administration of the Sheriff's Office and CDC personnel, which I find to be significantly great, and weighed with the significant invasion of privacy of individual persons that you seek to get into the personnel files, are simply lacking. When I balance the probative value to the defendant and the public interest and the necessity for a fair trial, as you've put forth your argument against these considerations, and the constitutional right of privacy, I find your request is simply overbroad and lacking in weight. Counsel, I feel I must, and I do deny each of those particular discovery requests, the ones that we have not yet taken care of.

MR. HEGUS: A-6 and C-12, for the record.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. NEGUS: I believe it's λ -6 and C-12 for the numbers.

MR. KOCHIS: Those are the numbers.

THE COURT: I believe that's right.

MR. NEGUS: I bolieve we have covered all the discovery matters. I have a couple --

THE COURT: On another point, during the recess this morning after we broke, I spoke to the presiding judge. I simply am unable to tell you at this time as to whether or not it's going to be -- it may be a most question as to whether or not we can get another

judge here. We will work on that. I have no objection to moving the pretrial hearings to San Bernardino as opposed to the only other two places in the county, Chino or Barstow, I suppose. That would probably be the likely place to handle the pretrial motions, and I am willing to do it. In fact, I am urging it, but I think all of that is conditioned upon us getting another judge here, and if we do, we shall move to San Bernardino, unless somebody persuades me otherwise, for the pretrial matters. I have no department. I have no — they are working on it. We have started the ball rolling. I hope that they can, for the sake of the Court as well as pernaps for this case. I hope it works out. Anything else?

MR. NEGUS: Yes, a couple things. I have already subpoensed some stuff to come into this court at 9:39 on March the 5th. Is that -- unless we hear otherwise, is that --

THE COURT: We'll be back here on March 5, 9:30.

MR. NEGUS: That's what I'm asking.

THE COURT: Yes. That's right. I've got it set aside. I've notified Judge Ziebarth that we will -- at that point, unless I get another court elsewhere, I will be -- would expect to operate this particular department.

MR. KGCHIS: Your Honor, to inform the Court, what I believe Mr. Negus and I anticipate happening at

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that time is to give you the balance of the material on the change of venue motion, and then I imagine Mr. Negus and I would leave the courtroom and give the Court the time it needs to review the naterial in chambers, whether that be three to four days.

MR. NEGUS: I think I have an hour's worth of testimony I want to put on as well.

MR. MOCHIS: Then we'd take that and allow the Court to work on the material; so you need not tie up Judge Ziebarth's courtroom, what I'm saying, for Monday afternoon and the rest of the week.

THE COURT: You don't have it ready now?

SR. NEGUS: What?

THE COURT: These exhibits that you're going to give me.

MR. MEGUS: No. Some of them haven't been received. Some of them are still being organized. I have to file for you a change of venue motion, which should keep you busy a little bit.

THE COURT: All right. I'll work on that, but I'm used to working outside of court hours as well, so --

MR. MEGUS: I think it's just that there's -part of the record that I'm relying on these motions is the transcript of the preliminary hearing, part of -and just the volume of stuff.

THE COUPE: I know it.

MR. NEGUS: It may not take you all week, but it is going to keep you busy.

MR. KOCHIS: A practical problem, I'm not sure what facilities are available to the Court to view television coverage that is on cassette. Does the County provide the Court with a VCR to view the coverage?

THE COURT: I know nothing of such things. I don't think so. I've always had counsel supply us with that.

MR. MOCHIS: I turn to Mr. Negus for that.

NR. NEGUS: Judge Merriam had his own, so that's how we did that.

THE COURT: He does? I don't have one.

MR. NEGUS: Neither do I.

HR. HOCHIS: Because, otherwise, there will be a practical problem with you being able to review some of the factual materials.

THE COURT: I am not even skilled in operating one of them.

MR. MEGUS: It's pretty easy.

THE COURT: So we are going to have to check out all of that.

MR. NEGUS: Even I can do it.

THE COURT: I will be back I guess then on the 5th of March on this matter, and in the meantime, find one.

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FF. NEGUS: Can I -- I'll take it upon myself,
Your Honor, if I could -- I think it would be probably
cheaper, rather than me renting one and then getting
reimbursed for renting one, to see if we can get one
from the County, and I can make inquiries of Mrs. Shearer
or whoever's in charge.

THE COURT: Check with Jon Mikels, if there's one available, and I think that one is.

THE CLERK: Excuse me, Your Honor. There's a question as to the court reporter whether you want a daily for one hour on March 5, if that's all it's going to be.

THE COURT: Mr. Negus?

MR. NEGUS: Yes, I think we do, because it may be more than that.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NEGUS: There's no way that we can guarantee that we don't get long winded.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NEGUS: I would like to file with the Court, Your Honor, a subpoens that was issued to the Chino Champion along with two letters from Mr. McCombs, the editor of same -- or publisher of same. Excuse me.

THE COURT: I see Hr. McCombs here.

MR. NEGUS: And Mr. McCombs, apparently his position is that he doesn't have to provide the information

I requested, and if Mr. McCombs wishes to speak for himself, I have no objection to that.

THE COURT: Counsel, with reference, I believe, to the Honterey paper, at one time informally I suggested to you that I do not wish to fight with the media representatives unless it becomes absolutely necessary. By now, I would assume that those that are going to cooperate with you have cooperated with you. Those that are not, are not. You can — in an hour or two you can check this out. Your investigator can find it. There's no point in me fighting with Mr. McCombs.

MR. NEGUS: Judge Kayashima doesn't take the same view of my investigator that you do, and I think that it's something that -- I mean, I've leaned on all the other newspapers in the state, and all the other newspapers have complied. Some of them have just sent me copies of their newspapers, without giving me their files. I think that I am entitled to it, and I think that everybody, even local papers, should comply. I am filing it, and I would request that the Court -- I haven't received any materials from Mr. McCombs other than that, and I would request --

THE COURT: Counsel, he indicates in his letter that he offered you the facilities of the office and your investigator the opportunity to go through his paper, as I read this.

MR. NEGUS: My investigator that served the subpoena has no knowledge of the case, other than I handed him a subpoena to serve. He has no way of going through the newspapers.

THE COURT: It says -- I have myself gone to newspaper offices and gone through issue after issue. I know that that can be done. It says in the letter dated February 21 he was offered our file of newspapers maintained for public use in our front office so that he could determine what information he would need, but he declined to do so.

MR. NEGUS: Well, he offered that to Mr. Blanco who knows nothing about this case and had no knowledge.

THE COURT: Well, send a more qualified person there.

PR. NEGUS: Your Honor, I don't think I should have to do that. Every other newspaper in the state has honored the subpoena. It's a valid subpoena. The declaration in support of it is valid, and if Mr. McCombs just wants to send in the newspapers, every newspaper from June the 2nd to the present to comply, I think he should comply.

THE COURT: I know from past experience that

Mr. McCombs is very zealous of the rights of a free press

as he sees them. I see no need for a confrontation

between the Court and the press at this time. I will deny

your request for an enforcing order. You can -- you have facilities. It's available to you, Mr. Negus. Anything further? See you all on March 5.

MR. NEGUS: Can I -- just a second.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. NEGUS: Channel 4 and Channel 11 have not complied yet, either. Channel 4 tells me they are going to comply. I have not yet — I received the message from Channel 11. I have not yet received a response from them.

THE COURT: Mr. Negus, I am not bellying up or copping out. If it becomes absolutely necessary, then I will intervene, but right now you haven't shown me that it is necessary. I would like to see such a request supported by declaration in the usual manner.

MR. NEGUS: I have — the Court has the declaration for the subpoenss for Channel 4 and Channel 11 in the file. All I am asking is that at the present time that the Court note that you have not received the exhibits. I will represent that I have not received the exhibits. I expect that I will, but in case I should have to go after enforcement, I haven't got them yet.

Similarly, the Los Angeles Times has indicated that they will be late in complying. I expect them to comply, and the practical problem, Your Honor, on this

is that the newspapers are the only people that keep records of what they ran. I don't, and I cannot go throughout the state and get newspaper articles from every newspaper in the state, but that's relevant.

Mr. Kochis has requested it, that he'll want that --

THE COURT: Counsel, I just consider this kind of dialogue self-defeating at this time. You supply me with the necessary information, and we will take it from there. I do not wish to air this publicly at this time in a most general way when I'm not prepared for it. I don't know what all you're speaking of. It may be self-defeating, as I indicate.

I would urge Mr. McCombs, the Chine Champion, and any other redia people here to cooperate as much as they conscientiously can. This is a difficult case for all people concerned, including myself. I do not wish to divert my energies and intellect off on side issues to where I am concerned about constitutional principles of free press and fair trial. I want to maintain my tunnel vision to give you a proper trial in this case, without these other matters.

Now, I'm reserving the right to look into them at an appropriate time. This is not the appropriate time.

Do you have anything further, Hr. Negus? Support it, Counsel, by declarations.

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MR. NEOUS: It is supported by declarations. THE COURT: No, no, no, no. I do not know every-2 3 thing that they have said. I don't know --4 MR. NEGUS: It's all in the letters. THE COURT: I responded to this particular one. I have that foundation before me. I will expect to see further foundations with reference to any particular media or organization that's failed to comply. Okay. 8 9 Let's don't get sidetracked. MR. NEGUS: Well, could we go back in chambers 10 11 then? 12 THE COURT: If counsel wish. All right with you, Mr. Cooper? THE DEFENDANT: Sure. THE COURT: Sure. Okay. Thank you. (Whereupon, the following proceedings

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THE COURT: You've got a big voice. I'd prefer we keep the doors closed when we are going to get involved in these matters.

I don't know what you're going to be talking about. I thought you were holding a news conference out there earlier, but apparently you were not.

What can I do for you?

were had in chambers:)

MR. NEGUS: Judge --

THE COURT: By airing all this out in the public

that way, all we're doing is putting the newspapers on notice to get tough with us in some way.

MR. NEGUS: Well, that's exactly what I'm saying is that --

THE COURT: You're inviting it.

MR. MEGUS: You invited it, Judge, because, look, I just wanted to file my piece of paper and hold off compliance to do it. You put me in a spot. You jumped on me before I even had a chance to get the words out of my mouth and tell you what I wanted to do. I wasn't about to ask Mr. McCombs. I just wanted to file my papers and make my record that I hadn't got it, so if I wanted to do compliance in the future, I could. You put me in a box, and you keep putting me --

THE COURT: I think you could have expected that, because I told you that before, so you must have known what my indicated response was going to be.

MR. NEGUS: I didn't know anything. You didn't -well, if I had said that I want you to hold Mr. McCombs
in contempt, I can see your indicated response. You told
me before that you wanted me to hire investigators to go
out and do it. I don't have time to do that.

THE COURT: You only had -- at that time we had -you told me about Monterey only. I don't know how many
of them. I don't know the extent of the problem, and I
wasn't prepared to get into it and air it all outside now.

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You started talking about the Times and --

MR. NEGUS: All I wanted to do was to make a record, Judge, that today is the day that the subpoenas are answerable. Okay, and I wanted to make a record that it hadn't been complied with. That's all you wanted me to do. If you would have let me do it without jumping on me before where I had to respond to you, we wouldn't have had this problem, but you put me out there. All these other guys are sitting out there. They have all complied. They "Grinched" like hell. They have complied. Al McCombs sits out there, and you've made -- he alone is going to be the one that didn't comply. It's going to be ten times narder for them to get compliance from the other people, and it's going to be ten times harder for me, because you put me in that box. I've got to do certain things to make a record. If you want to have it out there --

THE COURT: No. We can do -- when you start talking about this sort of thing, let's take it up -- I kept asking you to give me declarations or something like that, or let's perhaps ask to come to chambers on this. Let's get away from the media on this sort of thing when we're fighting with the media.

MR. NEGUS: Judge, you give me --

THE COURT: You can make a record here as well as outside.

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MR. NEGUS: Okay, but we're -- last I heard, we were doing everything in open court. That's -- we can't have it both -- you can't put me in a box both ways, either.

THE COURT: If I put you in a box, I apologize for that, Mr. Negus, but I didn't intend that we should never ever be able to come to chambers. In fact, we specifically cleared the ground for that with your client last time. We can, of course, come to chambers, and I will be happy to do it, and when you get into some sensitive areas, in fact, I mentioned it this morning that we'd be able to come to chambers. Let's really do

I am serious about this, though. I am not backing off a bit from my indicated feeling. I do not want to fight with the media unless I absolutely can't avoid it.

MP. NEGUS: Well, then, Judge, I don't want to spend all my time fighting with them, either, so it's easier -- you know, there's only one of me, and I've got all this work to do, and I am not going to spend -- I am not going to go and draft an order to get an investigator specially to go down and clip coupons -- clip papers from Al McCombs because he's stubborn.

THE COURT: I think that you're making -MR. NEGUS: The thing is, it's who gets put in
the box, him or me, and you're putting me, and I don't
think that's right, because I've got a valid subpoena

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on it, and he thumbs his nose at the valid subpoena.

THE COURT: My goodness, you in open court as soon as he walked in placed that before me. It won't take an hour for your investigator that's knowledgeable to go down there, and he can recognize the name of Cooper. That's a very tiny, little paper. It's seven miles from here. Get that work done. It won't cost us ten dollars. I'll be dammed if I'm going to take up a fight with Allen McCombs and the Supreme Court.

MR. NEGUS: There's no constitutional issue.

The only issue is does the man have to give us copies of his paper or not. There's no constitutional issue of free press involved.

THE COURT: Yes, there is. Yes, there is.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I don't see it.

THE COURT: And he will find it, and, Counsel,

I've been here for eight eons. I know Mr. McCombs from
way, why back. I know his constitutional makeup. He
will find constitutional issues. The man is extremely
protective of his estate, as he sees it.

MR. NEGUS: Okay. Then you're putting me in a position where I've got to protect my record too. I've got to do -- I think in this particular case I have to do it correctly. I made a decision that the best way to do it, the only way that I can protect myself that I got everything that I wanted and then not have somebody come

back and say, well, Hegus missed it or something like that, is to do it by subpoena. I have to do it by subpoena.

THE COURT: Make your record, Hr. Negus. Go ahead, but when you get around to enforcing the subpoena, I am going to consider alternatives. You can make whatever record you wish.

MR. NEGUS: If Mr. McCombs had called me up and offered me alternatives other than me going down and buying the newspapers. He wants to sell me newspapers. That's what he does. Ask him. I told him -- I've told everybody if they just want to send me the newspapers, send me the newspapers. Then I have thom. He doesn't want to do that. He wants my investigator to sit in his office and clip his newspapers and buy them from him at 50 dents a copy. I don't think that's right, and, you know, I -- if it were just Al McCombs, that would be one thing, but I've leaned on 51 newspapers in the state of California. All other 51 have complied, and so I don't see why I should make an exception for him.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. HEGUS: But I just want to let you know that all I was trying to do this morning, when I did that, was just to make a record that he hadn't complied, and if you try to anticipate what I'm going to do before I do it, you know, you put me in a box, and I have to

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fight you back.

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THE COURT: Okay. I regret that, but be caroful the way you present things to me, perhaps, where that won't occur.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I try my best. That's why I didn't say anything nasty.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you all.

MR. KOTTMETER: Could we just indicate on the record the parties present, in case for some reason it becomes important later on; that is, who's here.

THE COUPT: Okay. Mr. Nottmeier and Mr. Mochis throughout. We haven't been off the record. We do not 7 intend to be off the record through the course of this trial.

THE CLERK: Your Monor, on March 5 what time do you want that?

THE COURT: 9:30 is what I said.

THE CLERK: Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't hear.

THE COURT: And after you file that document, would you give it back to me, and I could carry that with me when I leave today.

MR. KOTTMEIER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Enjoy your weekend. I'll see you ten days from now, roughly.

MR. MEGUS: If you need to see us on the 2nd, you may be busy, but if you do, we'll be available.

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THE COURT: I'll certainly be here, and I invite any two of you to come to me, as long as both sides are here, at any time, and I would urge you to, and we'll get on the record, but I would urge you to clue me in, give me notice. Like the 2nd I'll be back, and say, Judge, it might help you if you read this or that or you don't have to read this. I'd appreciate that kind of forewarning. Let me husband my energies as well.

MR. NEOUS: I'll tell you right now that as soon as I get the time over this weekend to draft them, you're going to have two other motions, or at least one other motion, available that goes with the change of venue motion, and that is a motion for a jury survey, and as I indicated before, I am going to make that contingent on what the prosecution's -- what the prosecution's claims are. I'd like to get the jury survey if there's any -- if there's any question as to the extent of the publicity in this county.

Now, I think I've heard from both Mr. Kochis and Mr. Mottmeier different theories as to why they are opposed to the change of venue, both of which concede the extent, so if they are scing to concede the extent, I am not going to put them in a box right now and say anything, if they are going to concede the extent of the publicity.

THE COURT: If they are going to do what?

MR. NEGUS: Concede the extent of the publicity. There's two theories I've heard from them. One is a sort of Manson case theory where publicity everywhere is so bad that you don't need a change of venue, so that concedes that the publicity has been extensive in this county.

The other one is that, okay, it's been extensive, but the nature is not prejudicial, so if they're going to make either of those two arguments ---

PR. KOCHIS: And others.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Bochis?

MR. KOCHIS: And others.

MF. NEGUS: But if they're not going to deny that there has been extensive, unprecedented, so that everybody's heard about it in this sounty, then we don't need it. If they are going to argue with me about the extent of it, then I am going to request it, and I will have points and authorities as to why I think I should get it.

MR. KOTTMEIER: Your Honor, in this area, it seems to mc, in my past experiences, that the request for a jury survey has been made not by the trial -- to the trial judge by the defense, but by the defense to the judge that is granting the motions for various extraordinary --

THE COURT: Judge Kayashima.

MR. NEGUE: I discussed this with Judge Kayashima off the record and on the record. I told him this was the procedure I was going to do, and he indicated that was okay with him. In fact, I think it may have been —

I'm not sure whose idea it was, but —

THE COURT: I'd invite you to go back to him.

MR. NEGUS: Well, I think it's better to do it

this way, and I think so today. I can't speak for him,

but I think it's better to do it this way, and I talked

about it.

THE COURT: I suppose -- I have no idea. I suppose when you submit your motion, that you'll estimate the cost and that sort of thing, which would certainly be a factor, and that's something normally the trial judge doesn't do in capital cases.

MR. NEGUS: But I'm not asking for it --

MR. KOCHIS: They're about \$25,000 each time.

MR. NEGUS: Yes.

THE COURT: (I'm kind of cheap.)

MR. NEGUS: I know, but, Judge, you may be cheap, but every time you deny -- if you deny it, that protects me. I think I've got a good enough record without it.

THE COURT: I'll keep an open mind.

MR. MEGUS: If you deny it, that protects me.

THE COURT: Sure.

On the record just a second before you leave, I

THE COURT: Because I would think that you need one day off to work.

MR. NEGUS: I agree. You're absolutely 100percent right.

THE COURT: As a matter of fact, when I mentioned to Judge Morris and Judge Ziebarta, I said I will protably be able to handle my other calendars on those days.

MR. MEGUS: Probably we can say the 5th and then on the 12th.

THE COURT: So don't plan on working Pridays on this case.

MR. HOCHIS: Your Honor, I'm not confident in this type of case you'll have Fridays free, either because I assume oftentimes we'll come to a portion in the case where we'll complete testimony on Thursday and we'll submit something lengthy for you to read in writing that will take you most of Priday to read, so I think you're going to be very busy.

THE COURT: Try and time toose things where I can do it over the weekend, and I'll come back to you on Monday. I'm happy to work Saturday and Sunday.

MR. NEGUS: I've been working seven days a week sixteen hours a day.

THE COURT: I'll bet you have.

MR. MEGUS: Since August, and I'll tell you that

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wanted -- I'm thinking I want to tell Judge Ziebarth 1 about his availability of his courtroom next week --- or 2 the week of the 5th. You would expect me only how long on that date? MR. NEGUS: I don't know. I mean, I think --THE COURT: Can I do it in Department 3 on the 5th?

MR. NEGUS: I'd really rather not, if we can

avoid it.

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THE COURT: He's working with a jury, most likely. It's kind of difficult for him to bounce back and forth with a jury.

MR. EOCHIS: Your Honor, I think comfortably we could estimate we should be done by noon if we start at 9:30.

MR. NEGUS: No, we can't. You know better than that.

MR. KOCHIS: Monday.

MR. NEGUS: Just Monday, and then whenever you want to start up again, probably Friday or the Monday after.

THE COURT: Now, on your motions, you asked me early on informally if we'd be a four-day or five-day department. I indicated four days. I -- it was my intent when I mentioned that that that would apply for motions as well as trial.

MR. NEGUS: Fine, four days.

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the transcript -- when you -- you're going to have to start -- I don't see any way that I can cut down of what you read in the transcript, and I think from my perspective of what I'm going to argue, you're probably going to have to read most of it.

THE COURT: I'll do it.

MR. NEGUS: We can skip out some of it.

THE COURT: I've always regretted never taking a speed-reading class.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, the matter was adjourned until March 2, 1954.)

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA) ss.
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO)

I, JILL D. McKIMMEY, do heraby certify:

That I am an official reporter of the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Bernardino;

That at the time and place herein stated I reported in stenotype the oral proceedings had with respect to the above-entitled cause and that the foregoing pages numbered 85 through 175, inclusive, constitute, to the best of my belief and ability a full, true and correct transcript of said proceedings as transcribed from my stenotype notes.

Dated this _____day of March, 1934, at Ontario, California.

Official Reporter C.S.R. No. 2314

.11

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